scholarly journals Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism

2016 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brie Gertler
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agency ◽  
Self Knowledge

scholarly journals Expressivism, self-knowledge, and rational agency

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Blackwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Present Tense

Abstract One family of thought about self-knowledge has argued that authoritative self-ascriptions express a form of higher-order knowledge whose special character is explained by the role that knowledge plays in rational agency. In contrast to this “regulative model”, according to Wittgenstein’s treatment of self-knowledge authoritative self-ascription of one’s present-tense mental states is explained by the fact that sincere self-ascriptions express the very states they self-ascribe. The Wittgensteinian account is epistemologically deflationary, and it makes no use of higher-order thought to account for the distinctive features of self-ascriptions. It is argued that the regulative model faces difficulties that both undermine it and reinforce the Wittgensteinian explanation. Making use of ideas from Donald Davidson and Richard Moran, an alternative first-order sketch of rational agency consistent with the expressivist view is offered.

scholarly journals Self-Knowledge, “Transparency,” and the Forms of Activity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agency ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
David Velleman ◽  
Alex Byrne

This paper begins by setting out in very general terms some considerations that would link self-knowledge to a certain form of agency, and then considers two recent studies (one by Nishi Shah and David Velleman, and another by Alex Byrne) which argue in their different ways that an account of self-knowledge which appeals to the “transparency” of belief must be divorced from any appeal to rational agency. The paper argues that in both cases the account that emerges from this divorce ends up with a kind of agency in the picture after all, only of the wrong kind. The paper aims to characterize the sense of “activity” or “agency” that is relevant to a central class of cases of self-knowledge, and distinguish this sense of activity from the sense of activity indicating a process of production, or acting upon oneself so as to produce a belief.

Rational Agency without Self-Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?

dialectica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Luke Roelofs
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agency ◽  
Self Knowledge

scholarly journals Realizing Who I Am

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Antoni Gomila
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agency ◽  
Transformative Power ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Asymmetry ◽  
Practical Dimension

In this paper, the old view of self-knowledge as a practical achievement is vindicated. Constitutivism, the view that connects self-knowledge to the rational agency, thus taking a step towards this practical dimension, is discussed first. But their assumption of an epistemic asymmetry that privileges self-knowledge is found mistaken. The practical dimension of self-knowledge, its potential transformative power, is accounted in terms of the interiorization of the concepts acquired in intersubjective interaction.

Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharina T. Kraus
Keyword(s):  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Self Formation

The impact of a sport-related context on the gender-related self knowledge

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maike Tietjens ◽  
Norbert Hagemann
Keyword(s):  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Impact

Evaluative Organization of Self-Knowledge and Tendency to Forgive

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Gaetan ◽  
Alicia Limke
Keyword(s):  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Evaluative Organization
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