scholarly journals Expressivism, self-knowledge, and rational agency

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Blackwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Present Tense

Abstract One family of thought about self-knowledge has argued that authoritative self-ascriptions express a form of higher-order knowledge whose special character is explained by the role that knowledge plays in rational agency. In contrast to this “regulative model”, according to Wittgenstein’s treatment of self-knowledge authoritative self-ascription of one’s present-tense mental states is explained by the fact that sincere self-ascriptions express the very states they self-ascribe. The Wittgensteinian account is epistemologically deflationary, and it makes no use of higher-order thought to account for the distinctive features of self-ascriptions. It is argued that the regulative model faces difficulties that both undermine it and reinforce the Wittgensteinian explanation. Making use of ideas from Donald Davidson and Richard Moran, an alternative first-order sketch of rational agency consistent with the expressivist view is offered.

scholarly journals Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1594) ◽  
pp. 1424-1438 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Striking Difference ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Considerable Benefit ◽  
And Function ◽  
Psychological Processing ◽  
In Virtue Of

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

scholarly journals The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Brown ◽  
Hakwan Lau ◽  
Joseph LeDoux
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
First Order ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
Episodic Memories ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models, such as first-order local recurrency theory. The criticism that HOT overintellectualizes conscious experience is inaccurate because in reality the theory assumes minimal cognitive functions for consciousness; in this sense it is an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views, and plausibly accounts for shortcomings of both. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can more readily account for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories, and make HOT potentially useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

Der Begriff der inneren Erfahrung bei Petrus Johannis Olivi

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 123-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rode
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Striking Resemblance ◽  
First Order ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Modern Self

The concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of (self)consciousness. Thus, in order to be said to be »known« or »certain« it is not necessary for each single act of intellect to be followed by a higher-order act; Olivi argues that in many cases a simple first-order cognitive act suffices.

scholarly journals Can Comparative Psychology Crack its Toughest Nut?

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-652
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Higher Order Thinking ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Step Method ◽  
Folk Physics ◽  
First Order ◽  
Experimental Approaches ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Current Paradigm

What is the likelihood that humans will ever determine if other animals engage in higher-order thinking? In examining what has happened in the twenty years since the publication of our book, Folk Physics for Apes, I conclude that comparative psychologists, the academic stalwarts charged with making progress on this front, are stuck in a series of intractable, and largely unacknowledged, conceptual problems. Because higher-order mental states depend on the existence of first-order, perceptually-based representations of objects and events, and because those first-order representations are necessary and sufficient to explain current experimental and observational results, the approaches deployed by comparative psychologists are doomed to failure. I examine this Asymmetric Dependency Problem in detail and show how the failure to confront its implications leads to viciously circular arguments that cannot be fixed within the current paradigm of research. Next, I offer a seven-step method for isolating the common structural flaw in any given experiment, and work through several examples. Finally, I examine the central claims that my colleagues and I made in Folk Physics through the lens of the Asymmetric Dependency Problem and current research trends. Although the optimism we expressed that experimental approaches could implicate the presence of higher-order thinking in animals requires considerable dampening, the challenges we isolated remain as vital today as they were twenty years ago.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Challenging the Multidimensional Conception of Perceived Person-Environment Fit

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Julian M. Etzel ◽  
Gabriel Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
University Students ◽  
Educational Outcomes ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Substantial Proportion ◽  
Unique Variance ◽  
First Order ◽  
Person Environment Fit ◽  
Order Factor

Abstract. In the current study, we examined the viability of a multidimensional conception of perceived person-environment (P-E) fit in higher education. We introduce an optimized 12-item measure that distinguishes between four content dimensions of perceived P-E fit: interest-contents (I-C) fit, needs-supplies (N-S) fit, demands-abilities (D-A) fit, and values-culture (V-C) fit. The central aim of our study was to examine whether the relationships between different P-E fit dimensions and educational outcomes can be accounted for by a higher-order factor that captures the shared features of the four fit dimensions. Relying on a large sample of university students in Germany, we found that students distinguish between the proposed fit dimensions. The respective first-order factors shared a substantial proportion of variance and conformed to a higher-order factor model. Using a newly developed factor extension procedure, we found that the relationships between the first-order factors and most outcomes were not fully accounted for by the higher-order factor. Rather, with the exception of V-C fit, all specific P-E fit factors that represent the first-order factors’ unique variance showed reliable and theoretically plausible relationships with different outcomes. These findings support the viability of a multidimensional conceptualization of P-E fit and the validity of our adapted instrument.

Computational Models for Multilayered Composite Shells with Application to Tires

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. M. Kulikov
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Geometrical Nonlinearity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Stress Strain ◽  
Strain Fields ◽  
First Order ◽  
Timoshenko Type ◽  
Joint Influence ◽  
Discrete Layer

Abstract This paper focuses on four tire computational models based on two-dimensional shear deformation theories, namely, the first-order Timoshenko-type theory, the higher-order Timoshenko-type theory, the first-order discrete-layer theory, and the higher-order discrete-layer theory. The joint influence of anisotropy, geometrical nonlinearity, and laminated material response on the tire stress-strain fields is examined. The comparative analysis of stresses and strains of the cord-rubber tire on the basis of these four shell computational models is given. Results show that neglecting the effect of anisotropy leads to an incorrect description of the stress-strain fields even in bias-ply tires.

Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Synoptic View

In a tradition inspired by the Delphic injunction to ‘know thyself’, ancient philosophical works contain a variety of treatments of self-knowledge—of knowing the content of certain kinds of one’s own thought, or knowing one’s own status as a knower or moral agent. This book draws together contributions from an international collection of scholars working in ancient philosophy, and explores self-knowledge in ancient thought in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus, noting continuities and discontinuities with its contemporary counterpart. The nature and structure of ancient self-knowledge is investigated in different thinkers—whether it is higher-order or a kind of self-presence, consists in a synoptic view or is diachronic, is arrived at directly via self-perception or some other kind of grasp, or mediated by dialogue or friendship with others. So too the book enquires into the relation of self-knowledge to virtue or tranquillity, either as a condition on attaining that state, or a result of the agent’s development, resulting from a process of effortful reflection.

Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Willingness To Use

This chapter considers various cases of irrationality (such as akrasia, weakness in executive commitments, doxastic incontinence, etc.), all of which involve a break between an agent’s considered judgment and her effective mental states. It is shown that parentheticalism can solve puzzles that these phenomena typically raise. The discussion leads into a deeper grasp of the rationale behind parenthetical and non-parenthetical uses of verbs like “believe” and “want”: They are associated with aspects of rational agency that normally coincide but can come apart. In the latter cases, our willingness to use verbs like “believe” and “want” is conflicted in a way that confirms parentheticalism. Finally, I suggest that parentheticalism can help us understand the role of the agent in rational agency and solve the Missing Agent Problem.

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