The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their being an independent point of view) that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain problems that the affective mode encounters in common social circumstances, allowing us to see how these modes might be distinct while the political nevertheless shapes the affective. I contrast this approach with that of some contemporary Kantian writers on affective phenomena (Sarah Buss on shame, and J. David Velleman on love) who, for reasons rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy, have modeled affective ways of relating to others on duty. I claim that Rousseau’s writing provides us with a way of capturing the correct insight of these accounts—that some of our emotional responses to others are ways of appreciating their personhood—while avoiding the characteristic implausibilities of their close association between the affective and the political.

Five Easy Arguments for Assisted Suicide and the Objections of Velleman and Gorsuch

This chapter presents five arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of, and even a duty to engage in, physician-assisted suicide both to end suffering and for other reasons in those who are and are not terminally ill. It considers objections to these sorts of arguments presented by David Velleman from a Kantian perspective and by Neil Gorsuch (now associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) who argues against intentionally causing death. The chapter considers how to identify intention, the significance of it for moral and legal permissibility, and the role of the Doctrine of Double Effect in arguments about assisted suicide. It also deals with the difference between assisted suicide for the good of some enabling versus causing harm to others.

Belief

Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and reject several important arguments David Velleman has proposed in defense of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter argues that the thesis is vulnerable to counterexamples, and the standard moves made in response to such counterexamples are unhelpful to the cognitivist. It then considers accounts that use a weaker thesis about the intention–belief connection, but even the best available cognitivist account along these lines has trouble showing that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones.

Moral Aspirations

This chapter takes up the question of what it means for a person’s moral identity to be aspirational and how we can go about cultivating aspirational moral identities that are conducive to moral improvement. It considers the role of conflict and crisis in precipitating critical reflection on existing moral identities. It also considers the ways in which a person can enhance her capacities for the requisite kind of reflection, with a particular focus on perspective shifts, imagination, and the use of exemplars. The chapter draws on work by Agnes Callard and David Velleman to argue that aspirational moral identities are cultivated proleptically through developing and enacting imaginative self-conceptions that reflect moral aspirations. These imaginative self-conceptions take the form of what the chapter describes as fictive moral selves.

Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality

This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.

Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical

This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain several problems for such cognitivism: there are problems posed by the possibility of false beliefs about what one intends; and there are problems posed by the need to distinguish intended means from expected side effects. In response to a challenge from Velleman, I sketch an alternative approach, one that sees these planning norms as fundamentally practical norms and that notes a parallel with Peter Strawson’s treatment of the framework of reactive attitudes.