Egalitarian nonconsequentialism and the levelling down objection

Derek Parfit famously introduced a now commonly adopted distinction between telic and deontic distributive egalitarianism. This chapter argues that we can draw a similar distinction between telic and deontic relational egalitarianism. Interestingly, telic relational egalitarianism might be less vulnerable to the levelling-down objection than telic distributive egalitarianism. However, while some relational egalitarian concerns are best captured by telic relational egalitarianism, other concerns are better captured by deontic relational egalitarianism and yet others relating to intergenerational justice are better captured by telic distributive egalitarianism. Accordingly, insofar as we are egalitarians, we should be pluralist egalitarians in a more thoroughgoing way than Parfit entertained.

Teleological Egalitarianism vs. the Slogan

Utilitas ◽

10.1017/s0953820804001426 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 93-116 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

MARC RAMSAY

Keyword(s):

Moral Principle ◽

Moral Ideal ◽

Moral Basis ◽

Gains And Losses ◽

Levelling Down Objection ◽

Better Than

The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one that provides a suitable moral basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Contrary to Temkin, freedom, autonomy, virtue, and rights can all be understood in person-affecting terms, while equality of outcome cannot. Moreover, the Slogan is open to a variety of different ideas about how we should weight or rank people's gains and losses. This flexibility allows the Slogan to accommodate ideals such as prioritarianism and desert.

EQUALITY VERSUS PRIORITY: HOW RELEVANT IS THE DISTINCTION?

10.1017/s0266267115000085 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 31 (2) ◽

pp. 203-217 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Marc Fleurbaey

Keyword(s):

Social Preferences ◽

Abstract:This paper questions the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism, arguing that it is important to separate the reasons for particular social preferences from the contents of these preferences, that it is possible to like equality and separability simultaneously, and that some egalitarians and prioritarians may therefore share the same social preferences (though for different reasons). The case of risky prospects, for which Broome has proposed an interesting example meant to show that egalitarians and prioritarians cannot share the same preferences, is scrutinized. The levelling down objection is also examined.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (MODERATE) EGALITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM?

10.1017/s0266267103001032 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 19 (1) ◽

pp. 89-109 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

KARSTEN KLINT JENSEN

Keyword(s):

Alternative Definition ◽

Common View ◽

Standard Definition ◽

Common Definition ◽

The Common ◽

The Difference ◽

Definition Of ◽

Inequality Ordering ◽

Priority View ◽

It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. Once this context is made clear, it is easily seen that egalitarianism could be defined alternatively in terms of valuing a benefit to a person inversely to how well off he is relative to others. The levelling down objection does not follow from this definition. Moreover, the common definition does not separate egalitarian orderings from prioritarian ones. It is useful to do this by requiring that on egalitarianism, additively separable orderings should be excluded. But this requirement is stated as a condition on the alternative definition of egalitarianism, from which the levelling down objection does not follow.

GIVING UP LEVELLING DOWN

10.1017/s0266267103001044 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 19 (1) ◽

pp. 111-134 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

CAMPBELL BROWN

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Other Hand ◽

The so-called “Levelling Down Objection” is commonly believed to occupy a central role in the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians think that equality is good in itself, and so they are committed to finding value even in such equality as may only be achieved by “levelling down”–i.e., by merely reducing the better off to the level of the worse off. Although egalitarians might deny that levelling down could ever make for an all-things-considered improvement, they cannot deny that it may make things better in at least one respect. Prioritarians, on the other hand, do deny this; according to them, levelling down cannot make things better in any respect. In this paper I argue that the Levelling Down Objection leans far too heavily on a heretofore unanalysed notion: namely, the notion of “being better in this or that respect.” I propose what I take to be a plausible analysis of that notion, and show that, given the proposed analysis, the prioritarian is no less vulnerable to the Levelling Down Objection than is the egalitarian. I conclude that proponents of the Levelling Down Objection need either to suggest a better analysis or abandon the Levelling Down Objection altogether.

Ethically permissible inequity in access to experimental therapies

Clinical Ethics ◽

10.1177/1477750919839920 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 1-8

Author(s):

Bryanna Moore

Keyword(s):

Clinical Trial ◽

Clinical Ethics ◽

Healthcare Systems ◽

Experimental Therapy ◽

Public Healthcare ◽

Experimental Therapies ◽

Clinical ethics services are increasingly receiving case referrals regarding requests for access to experimental therapies. Sometimes, patients or families seek access to an experimental therapy that has not been subsidised by any government scheme, and for which no local clinical trial is underway. All else being equal, a patient may benefit from receiving an experimental therapy without making any other patient worse off. However, within public healthcare systems, treating only one patient with an experimental therapy, when others might also benefit from it, evokes a troubling sense of inequity. In this paper, I examine the relevance of Pareto principles and the ‘levelling down’ objection to ethical deliberation about patient or family-initiated requests for experimental therapies. While facilitating access to an experimental therapy may benefit a patient without making any other patients worse off, this does not dispel ethically relevant considerations concerning equity. When deliberating about cases involving inequity, clinicians and hospitals must balance directly improving the position of individual patients with avoiding contributing to or tolerating avoidable inequities. I argue that inequity in access to experimental therapies can be ethically permissible, but only if satisfies two conditions: firstly, the decision to provide one patient and not others with a promising experimental therapy must have a strong likelihood of contributing to future equity; and secondly, the inequity must be exercised in a way that shows respect for other patients who are not equally able to access the therapy in question.

Egalitarianism and the levelling down objection

Analysis ◽

10.1093/analys/58.2.166 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 58 (2) ◽

pp. 166-174 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

N. Holtug

Keyword(s):

Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice ◽

10.1007/s10677-010-9231-1 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 14 (2) ◽

pp. 197-206 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Thomas Porter

Keyword(s):

A NOTE ON CONDITIONAL EGALITARIANISM

10.1017/s0266267107001216 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 23 (1) ◽

pp. 45-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

NILS HOLTUG

Keyword(s):

Present Article ◽

Precise Definition ◽

Escape Route ◽

Definition Of ◽

Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called ‘levelling down’ objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, ‘betterness with respect to equality’). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable.

EQUALITY, PRIORITY OR WHAT?

10.1017/s0266267103001020 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 19 (1) ◽

pp. 61-87 ◽

Cited By ~ 48

Author(s):

LARRY S. TEMKIN

Keyword(s):

Pareto Principle ◽

This paper aims to illuminate some issues in the equality, priority, or what debate. I characterize egalitarianism and prioritarianism, respond to the view that we should care about sufficiency or compassion rather than equality or priority, discuss the levelling down objection, and illustrate the significance of the distinction between prioritarianism and egalitarianism, establishing that the former is no substitute for the latter. In addition, I respond to Bertil Tungodden's views regarding the Slogan, the levelling down objection, the Pareto Principle, leximin, the principle of personal good, strict moderate egalitarianism, the Hammond Equity Condition, the intersection approach, and non-aggregative reasoning.