Analysing African Ethics

Chapter 3 spells out the analytic method used in Part II to evaluate theories of right action suggested by the African tradition. The central criteria invoked to ascertain whether a general moral principle counts as African and philosophically justified are the extent to which it entails and explains two classes of intuitions. One sort consists of particular moral judgements that are salient amongst sub-Saharan peoples or at least their philosophical exponents, for instance that reconciliation is the proper end of criminal justice and that consensus is apt in politics. The other sort comprises particular moral judgements widely accepted across the globe, especially as they figure into English-speaking philosophical discussions of morality, e.g., racial epithets are wrong. The (secular) moral theory that best entails and explains these two groups of intuitions is advanced as both African and justified in respect of a multicultural audience of moral philosophers.

The Bullet-Biting Response to the Non-Identity Problem

According to the bullet-biting response to the non-identity problem: Given a choice between creating a well-off child, A, and a different child, B, that is significantly worse off than A, it is not impermissible to create B. David Boonin has presented an argument for the bullet-biting response. He claims that although the conclusion of his argument is implausible, the rejection of the argument is even more implausible. But Boonin’s argument is more implausible than he realizes. Three specific premises, together with the claim that creating a child cannot make that child better or worse off than she would otherwise have been, jointly entail that it is not impermissible to create children whose lives contain only pain and suffering. This is a damning objection to Boonin’s argument. I argue that this objection cannot be avoided without undermining the other premises of Boonin’s argument. Finally, I suggest a fairly weak moral principle that avoids the bullet-biting response. According The Weak Principle (WP): If you are choosing between only Act 1 and Act 2, then Act 1 is impermissible if (a) the outcome of Act 2 is significantly better than the outcome of Act 1, (b*) Act 2 wouldn’t cause anyone to incur a significant cost, and (c) Act 2 wouldn’t violate anyone’s rights.

Human Dignity and Its Premises in the Pandemic Crisis

Human dignity is a component that is part of the quality of existing as a human being even if the latter is the product of creationism or evolutionism. In its content, dignity is the carrier of complex scientific valences, combining the philosophical-religious paradigm with the legal one. In this context, the literature presents human dignity as an aspect traditionally associated with the division of public law, which evokes a super-positive reality, synthesizing elements of religion, ethics and morals located in a position superior to positive law, orienting the latter. The modern meaning given to human dignity oscillates between the illustrative character and the prescriptive character being constituted, in a complex sense, by the fusion between the moral content and the coercive right (Habermas, 2010, pp. 464-480) and, from another perspective, a stable notion that presupposes an objective moral principle that makes possible the legal recognition of human rights. The inability to include human dignity as a right in a unitary conceptualization leads, first of all, to the vast philosophical hermeneutics that is implicit in the discourse on dignity.

ETHICS IN PUBLIC RELATIONS: ETHICAL THEORIES, CODES AND CONFLICTS

Public relations, an important element of the media society, is a management function which helps establish and nurture the links of mutual communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between the organization and the surrounding public. The development of the public relations profession is commonly seen as a progressive evolution from unsophisticated and unethical early practice to the planned, strategic, ethical campaigns of the modern age. However, when discussing the practice of public relations in the XXI century, there are certain doubts, or rather, ethical conflicts. Being the key moral principle and the fundamental philosophical concept, truth should be the goal of every relationship and communication. However, in the public relations practice, truth is occasionally suppressed due to its partial placement. The process of communication itself functions to a significant extent through the mass media, and the violation of ethics in that respect is the trade in media space, which is a difficult form of violation of the philosophy of morality. The main purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of ethics and its development in public relations. This paper analyzes the ethics of public relations as a self-regulation platform for this profession. The application of ethical theories based on utilitarian and deontological approaches has also been discussed. In addition, codes of ethics applied in the PR profession are presented, as well as examples of unethical actions in the public relations profession.

Tax avoidance in New Zealand: in search of principles

<p>This paper analyses the judicial application of New Zealand’s general anti-tax avoidance rule contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 in the light of three 20th Century jurisprudential theories of legal reasoning. It focuses specifically on the role of moral principles in the process of judicial decision-making and explores whether existing case law on the avoidance provision can be seen as supporting the hypothesis that judges apply moral principles when reaching decisions. Following the test laid down for tax avoidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the paper concludes that judges have the ability, in some cases, to reach their decision about whether there has been tax avoidance by applying the moral principle that tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar.</p>

Tax avoidance in New Zealand: in search of principles

<p>This paper analyses the judicial application of New Zealand’s general anti-tax avoidance rule contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 in the light of three 20th Century jurisprudential theories of legal reasoning. It focuses specifically on the role of moral principles in the process of judicial decision-making and explores whether existing case law on the avoidance provision can be seen as supporting the hypothesis that judges apply moral principles when reaching decisions. Following the test laid down for tax avoidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the paper concludes that judges have the ability, in some cases, to reach their decision about whether there has been tax avoidance by applying the moral principle that tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar.</p>

Moral Relativism and Moral Universalism: a Coherentist Approach

<p>In the following work I examine the long-standing dispute between the moral relativist and their opponent, who I call the moral universalist. I examine this dispute from a coherentist perspective. For both moral relativism and moral universalism I identify a key conviction underlying the position and I attempt to deliver a theory that accommodates both of these two convictions in a coherent fashion. This involves distinguishing between distinct types of moral principle and showing how the relativist's conviction is a reaction to one type while the universalist's conviction is a reaction to another type. These types of moral principle are not mutually exclusive, however, and a large part of my project will be to explain how each type of principle is able to be included as part of a coherent whole.</p>

Moral Relativism and Moral Universalism: a Coherentist Approach

<p>In the following work I examine the long-standing dispute between the moral relativist and their opponent, who I call the moral universalist. I examine this dispute from a coherentist perspective. For both moral relativism and moral universalism I identify a key conviction underlying the position and I attempt to deliver a theory that accommodates both of these two convictions in a coherent fashion. This involves distinguishing between distinct types of moral principle and showing how the relativist's conviction is a reaction to one type while the universalist's conviction is a reaction to another type. These types of moral principle are not mutually exclusive, however, and a large part of my project will be to explain how each type of principle is able to be included as part of a coherent whole.</p>