Relational Egalitarianism

Derek Parfit famously introduced a now commonly adopted distinction between telic and deontic distributive egalitarianism. This chapter argues that we can draw a similar distinction between telic and deontic relational egalitarianism. Interestingly, telic relational egalitarianism might be less vulnerable to the levelling-down objection than telic distributive egalitarianism. However, while some relational egalitarian concerns are best captured by telic relational egalitarianism, other concerns are better captured by deontic relational egalitarianism and yet others relating to intergenerational justice are better captured by telic distributive egalitarianism. Accordingly, insofar as we are egalitarians, we should be pluralist egalitarians in a more thoroughgoing way than Parfit entertained.

The Levelling-Down Objection and the additive measure of the badness of inequality

The Levelling-Down Objection is a standard objection to monistic egalitarian theories where equality is the only thing that has intrinsic value. Most egalitarians, however, are value pluralists; they hold that, in addition to equality being intrinsically valuable, the egalitarian currency in which we are equal or unequal is also intrinsically valuable. In this paper, I argue that the Levelling-Down Objection still minimizes the weight that the intrinsic badness of inequality could have in the overall intrinsic evaluation of outcomes, given a certain way of measuring the badness of inequality, namely, the Additive Individual-Complaints Measure.

Ethically permissible inequity in access to experimental therapies

Clinical ethics services are increasingly receiving case referrals regarding requests for access to experimental therapies. Sometimes, patients or families seek access to an experimental therapy that has not been subsidised by any government scheme, and for which no local clinical trial is underway. All else being equal, a patient may benefit from receiving an experimental therapy without making any other patient worse off. However, within public healthcare systems, treating only one patient with an experimental therapy, when others might also benefit from it, evokes a troubling sense of inequity. In this paper, I examine the relevance of Pareto principles and the ‘levelling down’ objection to ethical deliberation about patient or family-initiated requests for experimental therapies. While facilitating access to an experimental therapy may benefit a patient without making any other patients worse off, this does not dispel ethically relevant considerations concerning equity. When deliberating about cases involving inequity, clinicians and hospitals must balance directly improving the position of individual patients with avoiding contributing to or tolerating avoidable inequities. I argue that inequity in access to experimental therapies can be ethically permissible, but only if satisfies two conditions: firstly, the decision to provide one patient and not others with a promising experimental therapy must have a strong likelihood of contributing to future equity; and secondly, the inequity must be exercised in a way that shows respect for other patients who are not equally able to access the therapy in question.

Defendiendo la igualdad de la objeción de nivelar a la baja | Defending the Equality from the Levelling Down Objection

Resumen: La objeción de nivelar a la baja es una de las principales objeciones que se le realizan a la igualdad, especialmente al igualitarismo como principio distributivo. Y cómo se responde a esta objeción, depende de qué tipo de igualitarismo se defienda y cuál sea, por lo tanto, la igualdad que se pretende. En el presente artículo, parto de una explicación general del concepto de igualdad y de los distintos tipos de igualitarismos y sus características centrales, para luego analizar los argumentos y justificaciones que dan los autores que discuten la objeción de nivelar a la baja. Todo ello con el objetivo de construir analíticamente una propuesta de igualdad más resistente. Abstract: The Levelling Down Objection is one of the main complaints against equality, specially against egalitarianism as a distributive principle. How this objection is responded depends on what version of egalitarianism is assumed, and therefore on which kind of equality is pursued. This article examines the concept of equality and the different egalitarian approaches as well as its main features. Then, the arguments and justifications given by the egalitarian authors to confront the levelling down objections are analyzed. The main goal is to analytically build a stronger more consistent idea of equality.

EQUALITY VERSUS PRIORITY: HOW RELEVANT IS THE DISTINCTION?

This paper questions the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism, arguing that it is important to separate the reasons for particular social preferences from the contents of these preferences, that it is possible to like equality and separability simultaneously, and that some egalitarians and prioritarians may therefore share the same social preferences (though for different reasons). The case of risky prospects, for which Broome has proposed an interesting example meant to show that egalitarians and prioritarians cannot share the same preferences, is scrutinized. The levelling down objection is also examined.

A NOTE ON CONDITIONAL EGALITARIANISM

Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called ‘levelling down’ objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, ‘betterness with respect to equality’). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable.

Teleological Egalitarianism vs. the Slogan

The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one that provides a suitable moral basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Contrary to Temkin, freedom, autonomy, virtue, and rights can all be understood in person-affecting terms, while equality of outcome cannot. Moreover, the Slogan is open to a variety of different ideas about how we should weight or rank people's gains and losses. This flexibility allows the Slogan to accommodate ideals such as prioritarianism and desert.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (MODERATE) EGALITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM?

It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. Once this context is made clear, it is easily seen that egalitarianism could be defined alternatively in terms of valuing a benefit to a person inversely to how well off he is relative to others. The levelling down objection does not follow from this definition. Moreover, the common definition does not separate egalitarian orderings from prioritarian ones. It is useful to do this by requiring that on egalitarianism, additively separable orderings should be excluded. But this requirement is stated as a condition on the alternative definition of egalitarianism, from which the levelling down objection does not follow.