scholarly journals Mental health legislation and decision making capacity: Autonomy in Alzheimer's disease is ignored and neglected

BMJ ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 332 (7533) ◽  
pp. 118.3-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stewart
Author(s):  
A. Zigmond ◽  
A. J. Holland

<p>The powers enshrined in mental health legislation go directly to fundamental principles central to any caring and democratic society. The tension and dilemma that exists is, on the one hand, the importance of respect for an individual’s right to make decision’s affecting his/her own life to, on the other, the recognition that there are people with mental disabilities that may be vulnerable to abuse and/or neglect and who throughout their lives or at particular times need care and/or treatment, which they may not seek or be able to consent to themselves. In any society it is through case law and statute that an attempt is made to resolve this tension and to ensure that individual rights are not infringed and that those who need care and treatment receive what is in their best interest. Thus a change in such legislation requires the most rigorous of examination and must be judged on the grounds that it a) does not infringe accepted principles such as those of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention, b) is based on sound ethical principles and does not conflict with the established law of the country, and c) it is practicable and achieves the right balance with respect to the potential tension described above. As practising clinicians (one working in an acute psychiatric service the other in a district learning disability service) we are not in a position expertly to judge the first of these but we believe we can contribute to the second and the third. In this paper we consider specifically the reasons for, and the consequences that follow, the failure on the Government’s part to accept the central importance of decision-making capacity assessment in any new mental health legislation.</p><p>The Green Paper proposals for a new Mental Health Act for England and Wales have now been published. A broad definition of ‘mental disorder’ has been retained, a new system of tribunals is to be established and compulsory treatment in the community would become lawful. However, it rejects the recommendation of the expert committee chaired by Professor Richardson that the assessment of an individual’s decision-making capacity should be a determining factor in the use of compulsory detention. Given this, it does not address the relationship between this legislation and the proposed Mental Incapacity Act. The failure to recognise the central place of decision-making capacity in a modern Mental Health Act is, we believe, a serious omission as it is a reflection of a failure to acknowledge that the basic principle of autonomy is central to such legislation.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 2017 (24) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Christopher Maylea ◽  
Christopher James Ryan

<p>The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has led to a re-thinking of traditional mental health law around the world. Since Australia’s ratification of the CRPD, all but one of its eight jurisdictions have introduced reforms to mental health legislation. These are aimed, in part, towards compliance with the Conventions articles. This paper examines the meaning and operation of the reforms introduced in Australia’s second most populous state – Victoria.</p><p><br />We first describe the criteria for involuntary treatment set out in the new <em>Mental Health Act 2014</em> (Vic) (Austl.) (the Act). We then argue that when making an order for Involuntary Treatment, the Victorian Mental Health Tribunal (the Tribunal) is obliged to carefully consider a person’s decision-making capacity as part of ensuring that treatment is provided in the least restrictive way, and to only authorise the involuntary treatment over a person’s competent objection in very limited circumstances.</p><p><br />Having established the way in which the Act <em>should</em> operate, we then present two empirical studies which analyse the decisions of the Statements of Reasons of the Tribunal to gain some appreciation of how the Act is working. These indicate that seldom does the Tribunal consider the decision-making capacity of people brought before it, and that, even when this is considered, the relevant information is not being used protectively so as to uphold a right to competently refuse treatment. Instead, the Tribunal uses the presence or absence of decision-making capacity, insight or poor judgement, to determine if a person is mentally ill or if treatment is required to prevent serious harm. We conclude that the Tribunal’s practice is inconsistent with the principles of the Act and consequently the intention of Parliament.</p>


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. e68-e68
Author(s):  
Stephanie Cosentino ◽  
Janet Metcalfe ◽  
Mark Cary ◽  
Jason Karlawish

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 497-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liv Thalén ◽  
Katarina Heimann Mühlenbock ◽  
Ove Almkvist ◽  
Maria Eriksdotter ◽  
Erik Sundström ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Cronin ◽  
P. Gouda ◽  
C. McDonald ◽  
B. Hallahan

ObjectivesTo describe similarities and differences in mental health legislation between five jurisdictions: the Republic of Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, Ontario (Canada), and Victoria (Australia).MethodsAn in-depth examination was undertaken focussing on the process of involuntary admission, review of Admission Orders and the legal processes in relation to treatment in the absence of patient consent in each of the five jurisdictions of interest.ResultsAll jurisdictions permit the detention of a patient if they have a mental disorder although the definition of mental disorder varies between jurisdictions. Several additional differences exist between the five jurisdictions, including the duration of admission prior to independent review of involuntary detention and the role of supported decision making.ConclusionsAcross the five jurisdictions examined, largely similar procedures for admission, detention and treatment of involuntary patients are employed, reflecting adherence with international standards and incorporation of human rights-based principles. Differences exist in relation to the criteria to define mental disorder, the occurrence of automatic review hearings in a timely fashion after a patient is involuntarily admitted and the role for supported decision making under mental health legislation.


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