scholarly journals When I use a word . . . . Taking therapeutic care

BMJ ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. n3010
Author(s):  
Jeffrey K Aronson ◽  

Abstract: In healthcare there are different forms of taking care or taking precautions. When using a therapeutic intervention, one takes care by implementing it appropriately. When the appropriate intervention is pharmacological that means giving an appropriate formulation of a medication in an appropriate dosage regimen. If the intervention might cause harm, but the benefit:harm balance is favourable, one might do nothing apart from monitoring or one might introduce a preventive strategy, such as the use of mesna when giving an oxazaphosphorine such as cyclophosphamide. Vaccination and contraception are both examples of precautionary measures that have an excellent benefit:harm balance. But when the benefit:harm balance of an intervention is unfavourable the precaution to be taken is avoidance of the intervention. That, and only that, form of precaution, avoidance to avoid harm, is a defining feature of the precautionary principle.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Hopster

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative – cost-benefit analysis – does not deliver.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Hopster

AbstractA challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdullah Al Arif

There are endless debates on the status of the precautionary principle in the realm of international environmental law. The confusion often occurs on the use of phrases that express the concept of precaution, such as precautionary principle, precautionary approach and precautionary measures. The precautionary principle was incorporated in major international fisheries instruments amid all of these debates and confusions. This article seeks to examine the status of the precautionary principle in international fisheries law. This article also surveys the legislative and regulatory frameworks for exploitation, conservation and management of marine fisheries in Bangladesh to find the application of the precautionary principle in the marine fisheries regime of Bangladesh. The study reveals that the application of the precautionary principle is almost absent in the marine fisheries management frameworks in Bangladesh and calls for incorporation of the same for conservation of marine fisheries and marine biodiversity.


BMJ ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. n3059
Author(s):  
Jeffrey K Aronson ◽  

Abstract Two ideas precede the modern Precautionary Principle. First, that prevention is better than cure, exemplified by an aphorism in an early 13th century book of Jewish aphorisms, the Sefer Hasidim : “Who is a skilled physician? He who can prevent sickness.” Secondly, Thomas Sydenham’s 17th century assertion that in healthcare it is important above all not to do harm, “primum est ut non nocere.” These two ideas come together in the Vorsorgeprinzip, which was incorporated into German legislation for maintaining clean air in the 1960s and 1970s, and first appeared in English-language documents in 1982, which referred to taking a precautionary approach or precautionary measures, or more formally as the Precautionary Principle. The principle features in international documents such as the Rio Declaration and in many pieces of EU legislation relating to topics as diverse as genetically modified organisms, food safety, the safety of toys, and invasion of alien species of animals, plants, fungi, or microorganisms.


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