THE EFFECT OF PINNING CONTROL ON EVOLUTIONARY PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (25) ◽  
pp. 2581-2589 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
ZHEN LIU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pinning Control ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Control Degree

The evolutionary game on graphs provides a natural framework to investigate the cooperation behavior existing in natural and social society. In this paper, degree-based pinning control and random pinning control are introduced into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks, and the effects of control mechanism and control cost on the evolution are studied. Numerical simulation shows that forcing some nodes to cooperate (defect) will increase (decrease) the frequency of cooperators. Compared with random pinning control, degree-based pinning control is more efficient, and degree-based pinning control costs less than random pinning control to achieve the same goal. Numerical results also reveal that the evolutionary time series is more stable under pinning control mechanisms, especially under the degree-based pinning control.

scholarly journals Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0244814
Author(s):  
Zhenyu Shi ◽  
Wei Wei ◽  
Xiangnan Feng ◽  
Xing Li ◽  
Zhiming Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Achievement Motivation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Typical Feature ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Rule Base ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Prisoner’s dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual’s aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause defectors’ re-expansion, the concept of END- and EXP-periods are used to justify the mechanism of network reciprocity in view of time-evolution, typical feature nodes for defectors’ re-expansion called Infectors, Infected nodes and High-risk cooperators respectively are found. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner’s dilemma.

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