COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
2008 ◽
Vol 10
(03)
◽
pp. 257-278
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Keyword(s):
This contribution addresses the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992, Theory and Decision32] on the use of game theory in river basin management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-offers model, a single optimization program significantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont [2002, Journal of Economic Theory107]. Directions for future research are provided.
2015 ◽
2009 ◽
2003 ◽
Vol 2
(4)
◽
pp. 377-394
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2010 ◽
Vol 9
(9)
◽
pp. 1251-1258
◽
1984 ◽
Vol 16
(5-7)
◽
pp. 259-274
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