Market equilibria and money

By the first welfare theorem, competitive market equilibria belong to the core and hence are Pareto optimal. Letting money be a commodity, this paper turns these two inclusions around. More precisely, by generalizing the second welfare theorem we show that the said solutions may coincide as a common fixed point for one and the same system.Mathematical arguments invoke conjugation, convolution, and generalized gradients. Convexity is merely needed via subdifferentiablity of aggregate “cost”, and at one point only.Economic arguments hinge on idealized market mechanisms. Construed as algorithms, each stops, and a steady state prevails if and only if price-taking markets clear and value added is nil.

ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

Kumaraswamy Vela Velupillai74 presents a constructivist perspective on the foundations of mathematical economics, praising the views of Feynman in developing path integrals and Dirac in developing the delta function. He sees their approach as consistent with the Bishop constructive mathematics and considers its view on the Bolzano-Weierstrass, Hahn-Banach, and intermediate value theorems, and then the implications of these arguments for such "crown jewels" of mathematical economics as the existence of general equilibrium and the second welfare theorem. He also relates these ideas to the weakening of certain assumptions to allow for more general results as shown by Rosser51 in his extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem in his opening section. This paper considers these arguments in reverse order, moving from the matters of economics applications to the broader issue of constructivist mathematics, concluding by considering the views of Rosser on these matters, drawing both on his writings and on personal conversations with him.

Overlapping Generations: The First Jubilee

Paul Samuelson's (1958) overlapping generations model has turned 50. Seldom has so simple a model been so influential. The paper, in spite of its ripe age, still elicits wonder. Starting from the uncontroversial observation that “we live in a world where new generations are always coming along” Samuelson built a model that violates the credo of the first fundamental welfare theorem with which we still inculcate undergraduates 50 years later. According to Samuelson, all is not necessarily well in the best of market economies: with overlapping generations, even absent the usual suspects such as distortions and market failures, a competitive equilibrium need not be Pareto efficient. Worst of all, this failure of the first welfare theorem in an overlapping generations model occurs in a framework that is, in many ways, more plausible and realistic than the world of agents living synchronous and finite existences in which the theorem is usually proved. Like Mona Lisa's enigmatic smile, the mysterious welfare properties of the overlapping generations model are, to a significant extent, responsible for its popularity—along with the many economic issues it has illuminated in the last half-century. I take it as my brief in this celebratory paper to provide, after a short exposition of the main results of the overlapping generations model under certainty, an explanation of why the welfare properties of the overlapping generations model differ so much from the canonical Arrow–Debreu framework and to review, in a deliberately nonencyclopedic mode, a few striking applications and extensions of Samuelson's deceptively straightforward model.