scholarly journals The Impact of Fixed-Cost Pooling Strategies on Test Collection Bias

Author(s):  
Aldo Lipani ◽  
Guido Zuccon ◽  
Mihai Lupu ◽  
Bevan Koopman ◽  
Allan Hanbury
2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 734-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Kroll ◽  
David Yechiam Aharon

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to develop alternative analytical measures for the degree of operating leverage (DOL) that reflect the impact of uncertain demand shocks in the product's market on optimal production levels, sales and profits of the firm. Design/methodology/approach – The elasticity measures are constructed according to a theoretical formulation of optimal production level that corresponds to demand shocks for given predetermined levels of fixed cost. Findings – The paper suggests two main findings. First, the analytical marginal DOL is at least twice the traditional DOL depending on the structure of the shock, the production function and demand's elasticity. The traditional DOL is equal to the measure only when large-scale negative demand prompts the firm to abandon production. Second, the paper also provides an analytical measure of DOL in terms of elasticity of profit to sales rather than to production level. Both theoretically and empirically elasticity of profit to sales can be better measured and better reflects risk. Research limitations/implications – This paper should be extended to encompass multiple shocks on demand and supply while investigating the empirical multi variants distribution of the shocks. Practical implications – The model can be used by managers who are well informed about the fixed and variable costs of their firm. The model determines the mean profit- risk trade off which is an important factor in all investment decision problems. Originality/value – Surprisingly and according to the best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt in the literature for alternative analytical DOLs’ formulations that is coherent with basic economic theories of optimal production level under risk.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-106
Author(s):  
David C. Kingsley ◽  
Daniel Muise

AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of communication in a public good game with a central authority. The central authority includes a fixed cost that increases with the level of monitoring which in turn determines the level of deterrence. The level of monitoring is both exogenously and endogenously determined. Across three treatments subjects either have no opportunity to communicate, communicateonlywhen the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed, or communicateonlywhen the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Results suggest that, in both treatments, average earnings are significantly higher with the opportunity to communicate. Most significantly, with the opportunity to communicate prior to endogenous selection, groups practically eliminate monitoring (imposing a low cost, non-deterrent, central authority), while maintaining a high level of contributions. Communication appears to make groups less dependent on institutional deterrence and allows them to reduce the costs of central authority.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-102
Author(s):  
Md Rayhan Hossain ◽  
Fawzia Adib Flowra ◽  
Saiful Islam ◽  
Shishir Kumar Dey ◽  
Sayeeda Sultana

The present study carried on 16 sampling ponds in Rajshahi City Corporation, Rajshahi, Bangladesh during the period from August, 2005 to April, 2006. The main theme of this work was to find out the impact on present status of improved traditional culture and mixed culture in various pond. This study involved the observations made on physical characteristics, ownerships system, ponds preparation, stocking combinations of fish seeds, post stocking management and maintenance, harvesting and cost analysis of 16 improved traditional managed ponds in Rajshahi City Corporation. The primary data for the study was taken from the growers of these ponds. After collecting primary data, it was analyzed by suitable statistical method. Physical characteristics of the sampling pond were found. Water depth more or less sufficient, water colour greenish, presence of sunlight was sufficient, water source was mainly drain and rain and various shaped of pond was found. Pond was prepared by traditional method using pesticides (Phostoxin, Rotanone, Sumithion, Quick fume), lime and fertilizers (Urea, TSP., Cow dung). The fish seed were stocked in different ponds. In Sac fry was stocked in 4 nursery ponds. Post stocking management and maintenance were included inorganic fertilizer (Urea, TSP), organic fertilizer cow dung, applied weekly and supplementary feeds were used daily. It was observed that 15 ponds were made profit and one pond had loss. Two types of ownership were found (three years and five years) in the study period. During the study time two types of harvesting method were found. They were partial and final harvest. Mainly two types of production cost such as variable cost (lease, pond preparation, pesticide use, fertilizer etc.) and fixed cost (cost of net, net preservation, tax of pond etc.) were observed in the study period.Asian J. Med. Biol. Res. March 2017, 3(1): 94-102


Author(s):  
Aldo Lipani ◽  
David E. Losada ◽  
Guido Zuccon ◽  
Mihai Lupu

Author(s):  
Kenta Nakamura ◽  
Shota Suzuki ◽  
Shigeru Tabeta

In order to simulate the bottom trawl fishery in Ise Bay, a typical semi-enclosed bay in Japan, a fishery simulator has been developed that consists of a fish behavioral model and a fishing operations model. The fish behavioral models are developed for two major target species, conger eel and mantis shrimp, which consider the fish migration as well as the growth and the population change. The fish behavioral models are combined with a fishing operation model, which predicts the behavior of trawling boats based on economic conditions and resource distribution as well as the fish catch amount by each boat. The model is applied to evaluate the effects of fishery management, and it is investigated that how the control of fishing efforts or number of owned fishing boats affects the profit of the target fishery. The mesh size of the trawling net which maximizes the total catch is estimated considering both conger eel and mantis shrimp. At the target ports, reduction of boats number will increase the profit because the effect of fixed cost change exceeds the impact of fish catch decrease. However, the optimum reduction rate is different in each port and interactive effect should be also considered.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LOVE ◽  
GREGORY PHELAN

AbstractThis paper studies how hyperbolic discounting affects stock market participation, asset allocation, and saving decisions over the life cycle in an economy with Epstein–Zin preferences. Hyperbolic discounting affects saving and portfolio decisions through at least two channels: (1) it lowers desired saving, which decreases financial wealth relative to future earnings; and (2) it lowers the incentive to pay a fixed cost to enter the stock market. We find that hyperbolic discounters accumulate less wealth relative to their geometric counterparts and that they participate in the stock market at a later age. Because they have lower levels of financial wealth relative to future earnings, hyperbolic discounters who do participate in the stock market tend to hold a higher share of equities, particularly in the retirement years. We find that increasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, holding risk aversion constant, greatly magnifies the impact of hyperbolic discounting on all of the model's decision rules and simulated levels of participation, allocation, and wealth. Finally, we introduce endogenous financial knowledge accumulation and find that hyperbolic discounting leads to lower financial literacy and inefficient stock market investment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (06) ◽  
pp. 1909-1939
Author(s):  
Heng Du ◽  
Tiaojun Xiao

This paper examines pricing strategies for two adaptive retailers competing on two products in the presence of complex consumer behavior, where consumers own heterogeneous product and store valuations and the number of potential consumers is random. Each retailer can choose one from two pricing strategies: the uniform pricing format (offering the same price for two products) or the differentiated pricing format (offering different prices). Utilizing agent-based model (each retailer is modeled as an autonomous agent with the reinforcement learning behavior), we find that: (i) the differentiated pricing format is not always the optimal choice; (ii) when the uncertainty of one product/store valuation is a little larger than that of the rival, both retailers should adopt uniform pricing. Besides, when wholesale price contract is endogenous, we find that supplier’s pricing behavior can change the impact of the fixed cost on the pricing strategy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepti Kohli

AbstractThis paper formulates a mathematical model that combines the dynamics of interest group formation with electoral politics, involving office-seeking and corrupt political candidates and voting population with well-defined policy as well as ideological preferences. The analysis provides several interesting insights into the factors affecting lobby membership, free-riding incentives of citizen-voters and aggregate monetary donations garnered by lobby groups. Besides this, the paper also explores the impact of the formation of distinct lobby groups, the presence of swing voters and the corrupt practices or financial embezzlement on the equilibrium policy choice of electoral contenders. The findings reveal that more honest spending of campaign donations by electoral contenders reduces both the size of the lobby (or membership) as well as aggregate campaign contributions in equilibrium. In contrast, a rise in the fixed cost of organization is found to augment lobby membership along with the total amount of campaign contributions. In addition, a reduction in the level of electoral uncertainty as well as a rise in the ideological or swing voter density is found to increase the effectiveness of campaign contributions in raising an electoral candidate’s perceived popularity and, therefore, a smaller lobby group with lower aggregate donations is deemed as sufficient in influencing electoral outcomes. Moreover, the results indicate that a lower utility difference derived by the citizen-voters when comparing the two electoral candidate’s policy choices translates into smaller dispersion of the voters’ ideological bias, and consequently results in an increase in the size of lobby groups and their corresponding aggregate donations. As regards the choice of equilibrium policy, evidence of full policy convergence is not found in the case when citizen-voters of the two groups have separable preferences. In addition, policy equilibrium for a more realistic case in which the two policy platforms exhibit strategic interaction by reacting to each other has also been estimated with the help of simulations. Finally, this paper helps in categorically deciphering the influence of the median voter effect (or the centripetal force) and the distinct centrifugal forces in the form of lobbying effect, swing voter effect and the financial embezzlement effect on the equilibrium policy choice by employing different parametric specifications of the model.


Author(s):  
Aldo Lipani ◽  
Joao Palotti ◽  
Mihai Lupu ◽  
Florina Piroi ◽  
Guido Zuccon ◽  
...  

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