Present-biased Government, Creative Accounting and a Pitfall in Balanced Budget Rules

I propose a general equilibrium model with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting government that optimally decides upon using creative accounting in order to evaluate a balanced budget rule and a debt rule. In that context, I find that a binding balanced budget rule could fail to properly constrain public overindebtedness when government uses creative accounting while a debt rule is effective, since targets are set on total public liabilities. Results suggest that a balanced budget fiscal rule can also deteriorate welfare due to the higher interest rates derived from doing operations under the line, implying future expenditure cuts that are harmful for households, who value public goods and services. A debt rule is also preferred for its capacity to reverse some welfare losses generated by the present-biased government.

Generalisations of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

<p>This paper proposes several time preference specifications that generalise quasi-hyperbolic discounting, while retaining its analytical tractability. We define their discount functions and provide a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoffs. A calibration exercise demonstrates that these specifications deliver better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We characterise the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a general intra-personal game of agents with various time preferences. When applied to specific economic examples, our proposals yield policies that are close to those of true hyperbolic discounters. Furthermore, these approximations can be used in settings where an exact solution for hyperbolic agents is not available. Finally, we suggest further generalisations which would provide an even better fit.</p>

Generalisations of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

<p>This paper proposes several time preference specifications that generalise quasi-hyperbolic discounting, while retaining its analytical tractability. We define their discount functions and provide a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoffs. A calibration exercise demonstrates that these specifications deliver better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We characterise the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a general intra-personal game of agents with various time preferences. When applied to specific economic examples, our proposals yield policies that are close to those of true hyperbolic discounters. Furthermore, these approximations can be used in settings where an exact solution for hyperbolic agents is not available. Finally, we suggest further generalisations which would provide an even better fit.</p>

Choice bundling, unpacked: Observed and predicted effects on intertemporal choice in an additive model of hyperbolic delay discounting

One method known to increase preference for larger, later rewards (LLRs) over smaller, sooner rewards (SSRs) is choice bundling, in which a single choice produces a series of repeating consequences over time. The present study examined whether effects of choice bundling on preference for LLRs: (1) increase with the number of rewards in the bundle (i.e., bundle size); (2) are independent of differences in reward magnitude between conditions; and (3) accord with predictions of an additive model of hyperbolic delay discounting, in which the value of a bundle of rewards can be expressed as the summed discounted value of all rewards in that bundle. Participants (N = 252) completed a choice task to assess valuation of monetary LLRs at bundle sizes of 1 (control), 3, and 9 rewards per choice (ascending/descending order counterbalanced). To control for the magnitude effect, the total reward amounts were held constant across conditions. Choice bundling significantly increased LLR preference (p < .001), with the largest effect observed at the largest bundle size. The descending bundle-size order produced significantly greater LLR preference than the ascending order (p < .05), although order did not significantly interact with bundle size. Difference scores between observed measures and those predicted by an additive model of hyperbolic discounting were small and not significantly different than zero, but were not equivalent to zero. Future research should investigate the clinical utility of choice bundling for reducing the maladaptive health behavior (e.g., substance use) with which delay discounting is associated.

Discounting Under Severe Weather Threat

The human and economic costs of severe weather damage can be mitigated by appropriate preparation. Despite the benefits, researchers have only begun to examine if known decision-making frameworks apply to severe-weather-related decisions. Using experiments, we found that a hyperbolic discounting function accurately described participant decisions to prepare for, and respond to, severe weather, although only delays of 1 month or longer significantly changed decisions to evacuate, suggesting that severe weather that is not imminent does not affect evacuation decisions. In contrast, the probability that a storm would impact the participant influenced evacuation and resource allocation decisions. To influence people’s evacuation decisions, weather forecasters and community planers should focus on disseminating probabilistic information when focusing on short-term weather threats (e.g., hurricanes); delay information appears to affect people’s evacuation decision only for longer-term threats, which may hold promise for climate-change warnings.

Digital Nudge Efficacy and the Influence of Personality in Pre-Purchase Information Research

This study analyses digital nudging in the early stages of the customer journey. The experimental approach investigates the influence of digital nudging principles on decision making when searching for educational programs. The online experiment shows significant impact for three of the five digital nudging principles and greatly varying effect sizes. Social norms, anchoring and adjustment, and status quo nudging principles have a substantial impact when used in the pre-purchase stage. Loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting nudges have not shown a significant influence on choice behavior. Furthermore, extraverted individuals show significantly less behavioral change when confronted with a loss aversion nudge. These results imply a careful consideration of the chosen nudging principle and the target groups personalities when implementing digital nudges and start a novel discussion on the usage of digital nudges in the pre-purchase stage of the customer journey.

Who Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications

This paper investigates whether offers of commitment contracts, in the form of self-imposed choice-set restrictions and penalties with no financial upside, are well-targeted tools for addressing self-control problems. In an experiment on gym attendance (N = 1,248), we examine take-up of commitment contracts, and also introduce a separate elicitation task to identify actual and perceived time inconsistency. There is high take-up of commitment contracts for greater gym attendance, resulting in significant increases in exercise. However, this is take-up is influenced both by noisy valuation and incorrect beliefs about one’s time inconsistency. Approximately half of the people who take up commitment contracts for higher gym attendance also take up commitment contracts for lower gym attendance. There is little association between commitment contract take-up and reduced-form and structural estimates of actual or perceived time inconsistency. A novel information treatment providing an exogenous shock to awareness of time inconsistency reduces demand for commitment contracts. Structural estimates of a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and gym attendance imply that offering our commitment contracts lowers consumer surplus, and is less socially efficient than utilizing linear exercise subsidies that achieve the same average change in behavior.

Microfoundations of Discounting

An important question in economics is how people choose between different payments in the future. The classical normative model predicts that a decision maker discounts a later payment relative to an earlier one by an exponential function of the time between them. Descriptive models use nonexponential functions to fit observed behavioral phenomena, such as preference reversal. Here we propose a model of discounting, consistent with standard axioms of choice, in which decision makers maximize the growth rate of their wealth. Four specifications of the model produce four forms of discounting—no discounting, exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, and a hybrid of exponential and hyperbolic discounting—two of which predict preference reversal. Our model requires no assumption of behavioral bias or payment risk.