Electoral campaign contributions: an obstacle to health-related sugary drinks regulation in Brazil? The case of the Chamber of Deputies

Objective: To assess corporate electoral campaign contributions from industries related to sugary drinks production and the characteristics of the elected officials financed by the sector. Design: Cross-sectional analysis of electoral campaign contributions from corporations related to sugary drinks production (sugary drink industries and sugary drink input industries) to candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil. Setting: Elections to the 55th Congress (2015-2019), held in October 2014. Participants: Candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil. Results: Forty-nine companies or corporate groups that produce sugary drinks and 52 corporations that produce inputs for sugary drinks manufacturing contributed to electoral campaigns of candidates in the 2014 Election. Contributions from this industry sector represented 7.3% of all corporate contributions and helped finance 11.7% of the candidates and 46.2% of the elected officials. The transnationals Ambev and Coca-Cola were the first and second biggest donors, respectively. Revenues mediated by political parties, from sugary drink industries, and from corporate members of some industry associations (Abir, Unica and CitrusBR) were more prevalent. Among elected officials, a significant association was found between being financed by the sector and representing the Southeast region, having higher education level and referring themselves as being professional politicians. In the multivariate model, financed candidates were 27% more likely to be elected. Conclusions: Corporations related to sugary drinks production have contributed to the electoral campaigns of almost half of the Federal Deputies in Brazil in 2014. This possibly facilitates access to decision-makers and could help buy influence on legislative proposals, including health-related food policies.

Optimal lobbying pricing

We study a game with two candidates and two interest groups. The groups offer two kinds of costly contributions to achieve political influence: (a) pre-election campaign contributions to their favourite candidates that increase their probability of winning the election and (b) post-election lobbying contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. The candidates are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying prices they will charge the groups if they are elected. We characterise the equilibrium values of the lobbying prices set by the candidates as well as the equilibrium levels of the campaign and lobbying contributions chosen by the groups. We show, endogenously, that in the case with symmetric groups and symmetric politicians, a candidate announces to charge the group that supports her in the election a lower lobbying price, justifying this way the preferential treatment to certain groups from the politicians in office. We also consider two extensions (asymmetric groups and politicians who do not commit to the announced prices) and show that the results of the benchmark model hold under specific conditions.

Nations of bankers and Brexiteers? Nationalism and hidden money

This article examines the relationship between nationalistic mobilisations, hidden funds and undisclosed campaign contributions, commonly known as dark money. Contextualising Brexit alongside the Icelandic economic crash of 2008 shows how nationalist mobilisation and racism can secure economic and political interests for a small minority and thus create space for what Zygmunt Bauman has called ‘evasion’ or ‘slippage’ as a primary technique of power in the present. Both the build-up to Brexit and the Icelandic economic crash were characterised by a strong national-centred rhetoric of ‘us-the-nation’ versus ‘others’ that diverted attention from massive minority interests, which had access to hidden funds. The Panama Papers showed that many of the same people celebrated in Iceland as the embodied representation of the country were simultaneously moving money into tax havens. Exposés have also revealed the way that dark money secretly funded campaigns using anti-migrant racism to facilitate the Brexiteers’ longer-term interests.

Campaign Contributions and Access to Congressional Offices: Patterns in Foreign Lobbying Data

Do lobbyists contribute money to legislators to build relationships in government? I show that lobbyists deploy resources strategically to get access to officials by analyzing newly available data on foreign lobbying in the U.S. government from 1998 to 2019, which contain information on lobbyists’ campaign contributions and contact with officials. Using supervised machine learning models, I identify lobbyist requests for access to members of Congress and classify them as either successful or unsuccessful. The data show that lobbyists request access almost exclusively to legislators to whom they made campaign contributions. Furthermore, lobbyists who contributed money to legislators are more likely to gain access to them than lobbyists who did not, but only if the legislators are ideologically similar and in the same party. While the data and research design I employ do not allow me to infer causal influence of contributions on access, these results suggest that lobbyists make contributions to foster an environment conducive to contact with like-minded officials.

Buying a Blind Eye: Campaign Donations, Forbearance, and Deforestation in Colombia

While existing work has demonstrated that campaign donations can buy access to benefits such as favorable legislation and preferential contracting, we highlight another use of campaign contributions: buying forbearance. Specifically, we argue that in return for campaign contributions, Colombian mayors who rely on donor-funding (compared to those who do not) choose not to enforce sanctions against illegal deforestation activities. Using a regression discontinuity design we show that deforestation is significantly higher in municipalities that elect donor-funded as opposed to self-funded politicians. Further analysis shows that only part of this effect can be explained by differences is contracting practices by donor-funded mayors. Instead, evidence from analysis of fire clearance, and of heterogeneity in the effects according to the presence of alternative formal and informal enforcement institutions, supports the interpretation that campaign contributions buy forbearance from enforcement of environmental regulations.