A queueing-theoretic model for resource allocation in one-dimensional distributed analytics network?

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-29
Author(s):  
Nitish K. Panigrahy ◽  
Prithwish Basu ◽  
Don Towsley ◽  
Ananthram Swami ◽  
Kevin S. Chan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Distributed Analytics

scholarly journals Dynamic SPICE-model of resource allocation in marketing networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 8-23
Author(s):  
Movlatkhan T. Agieva ◽  
◽  
Olga I. Gorbaneva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Target Audience ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Spice Model ◽  
Private Interests

We consider a dynamic Stackelberg game theoretic model of the coordination of social and private interests (SPICE-model) of resource allocation in marketing networks. The dynamics of controlled system describes an interaction of the members of a target audience (basic agents) that leads to a change of their opinions (cost of buying the goods and services of firms competing on a market). An interaction of the firms (influence agents) is formalized as their differential game in strategic form. The payoff functional of each firm includes two terms: the summary opinion of the basic agents with consideration of their marketing costs (a common interest of all firms), and the income from investments in a private activity. The latter income is described by a linear function. The firms exert their influence not to all basic agents but only to the members of strong subgroups of the influence digraph (opinion leaders). The opinion leaders determine the stable final opinions of all members of the target audience. A coordinating principal determines the firms' marketing budgets and maximizes the summary opinion of the basic agents with consideration of the allocated resources. The Nash equilibrium in the game of influence agents and the Stackelberg equilibrium in a general hierarchical game of the principal with them are found. It is proved that the value of opinion of a basic agent is the same for all influence agents and the principal. It is also proved that the influence agents assign less resources for the marketing efforts than the principal would like.

scholarly journals Resource Allocation in One-dimensional Distributed Service Networks with Applications

2020 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 102110
Author(s):  
Nitish K. Panigrahy ◽  
Prithwish Basu ◽  
Philippe Nain ◽  
Don Towsley ◽  
Ananthram Swami ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Service Networks ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Distributed Service

Green Energy Model for Grid Resource Allocation

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achal Kaushik ◽  
Deo Prakash Vidyarthi
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Energy Efficient ◽  
Computational Grid ◽  
Energy Model ◽  
Green Energy ◽  
Energy Utilization ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Performance Study ◽  
Characteristic Parameters ◽  
Grid Resource

The computational grid helps in faster execution of compute intensive jobs. Many characteristic parameters are intended to be optimized while making resource allocation for job execution in computational grid. Most often, the green energy aspect, in which one tries for better energy utilization, is ignored while allocating the grid resources to the jobs. The conventional systems, which propose energy efficient scheduling strategies, ignore other Quality of Service parameters while scheduling the jobs. The proposed work tries to optimize the energy in resource allocation to make it a green energy model. It explores how effectively the jobs submitted to the grid can be executed for optimal energy uses making no compromise on other desired related characteristic parameters. A graph theoretic model has been developed for this purpose. The performance study of the proposed green energy model has been experimentally evaluated by simulation. The result reveals the benefits and gives an insight for an energy efficient resource allocation.

A PROCEDURE FOR THE ALLOCATION OF TWO-DIMENSIONAL RESOURCES IN A MULTIAGENT SYSTEM

2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 381-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARTHIK IYER ◽  
MICHAEL N. HUHNS
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Multiagent System ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Existence Of A Solution ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
Allocation Procedure ◽  
Sufficiency Condition ◽  
Higher Dimensional ◽  
Partial Overlap

This paper presents a constructive solution to the classic problem of land division. It is the first solution that enables the allocation of higher-dimensional resources without degenerating them first into a series of one-dimensional resource allocation problems. We base our allocation procedure on the topology of overlaps among the regions of interest of different agents. Our result is an algorithm suitable for computer implementation, unlike earlier ones that were only existential in nature. It uses the notion of degree of partial overlap to create a sufficiency condition for the existence of a solution, and proposes a procedure to find the overlaps in such a case. The proposed solution is fair, strategy-proof, non-existential, and does not explicitly need the resource to be measurable. The agents do not have to reveal their private utility functions. We extend our earlier result for one-dimensional resource allocation to this two-dimensional one and explain the distinctive issues involved.

A game‐theoretic model for resource allocation with deception and defense efforts

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiong Zhang ◽  
Keith W. Hipel ◽  
Bingfeng Ge ◽  
Yuejin Tan
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document