Reducing the round complexity of a sealed-bid auction protocol with an off-line TTP

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuji Watanabe ◽  
Hideki Imai
Keyword(s):  
Round Complexity ◽  
Sealed Bid

The Role of Transparency in Procurement: Revealed vs. Concealed Scoring Rules in Sealed-bid A+B Auctions

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernardo F. Quiroga ◽  
Brent Moritz ◽  
V. Daniel R. Guide, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Sealed Bid

Quantum-based Privacy-Preserving Sealed-bid Auction on the Blockchain

Optik ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167039
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Sealed Bid

scholarly journals Market buoyancy, information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market

Urban Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 004209802199178
Author(s):  
Nan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
North East ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Strategy Changes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Role Of Information

In housing markets there is a trade-off between selling time and selling price, with pricing strategy being the balancing act between the two. Motivated by the Home Report scheme in Scotland, this paper investigates the role of information symmetry played in such a trade-off. Empirically, this study tests if sellers’ pricing strategy changes when more information becomes available and whether this, in turn, affects the trade-off between the selling price and selling time. Using housing transaction data of North-East Scotland between 1998Q2 and 2018Q2, the findings show that asking price has converged to the predicted price of the property since the introduction of the Home Report. While information transparency reduces the effect of ‘overpricing’ on selling time, there is little evidence to show that it reduces the impact of pricing strategy on the final selling price in the sealed-bid context.

scholarly journals Multi-Winner Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Single-Sided Auction Theoretic Modelling Approach with Sequential Bidding

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 602
Author(s):  
Monisha Devi ◽  
Nityananda Sarma ◽  
Sanjib K. Deka
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Communication Networks ◽  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Radio Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sequential Bidding

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing the spectrum to identify the idle frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need to be designed to provide an effectual use of the radio resource. In this paper, we propose a single-sided sealed-bid sequential-bidding-based auction framework that extends the channel-reuse property in a spectrum-allocation mechanism to efficiently redistribute the unused channels. Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models. We address two such constraints, viz. the dynamics in spectrum opportunities and varying availability time of vacant channels, and formulate an allocation problem that maximizes the utilization of the radio spectrum. The auctioneer strategises winner determination based on bids collected from SUs and sequentially leases the unused channels, while restricting the channel assignment to a single-channel-multi-user allocation. To model the spectrum-sharing mechanism, we initially developed a group-formation algorithm that enables the members of a group to access a common channel. Furthermore, the spectrum-allocation and pricing algorithms are operated under constrained circumstances, which guarantees truthfulness in the model. An analysis of the simulation results and comparison with existing auction models revealed the effectiveness of the proposed approach in assigning the unexploited spectrum.

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Buying inand the sealed bid market

1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-230
Author(s):  
G.Geiss Charles ◽  
John M. Kuiilman
Keyword(s):  
Sealed Bid
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