scholarly journals A Comparison between Theoretical and Experimental Measures of Consciousness as Integrated Information in an Anatomically Based Network of Coupled Oscillators

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio J. Ibáñez-Molina ◽  
Sergio Iglesias-Parro

The rise of mathematical developments in the theories of consciousness has led to new measures to detect consciousness in a system. The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is one of the best mathematical rooted attempts to quantify the level of consciousness in a system with Φ as the effective information generated in a system above its parts. Recently, the IIT has inspired the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) to detect conscious states in patients with disorders of consciousness, and it has shown to have almost perfect classification accuracy. In this study, we explore the statistical correspondence between the theoretical Φ and the experimental PCI through a neurocomputational model of coupled oscillators that can be artificially perturbed, which mainly focuses on the dynamics of collective synchronization between subsets of brain areas. Our results reveal that both measures are statistically related but, in principle, this relationship is far to be perfect. These results are discussed in the context of the model of coupled oscillators, which mainly focuses on the dynamics of collective synchronization between subsets of brain areas.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus Leung ◽  
Dror Cohen ◽  
Bruno van Swinderen ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya

AbstractThe physical basis of consciousness remains one of the most elusive concepts in current science. One influential conjecture is that consciousness is to do with some form of causality, measurable through information. The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposes that conscious experience, filled with rich and specific content, corresponds directly to a hierarchically organised, irreducible pattern of causal interactions; i.e. an integrated informational structure among elements of a system. Here, we tested this conjecture in a simple biological system (fruit flies), estimating the information structure of the system during wakefulness and general anesthesia. We found that causal interactions among populations of neurons during wakefulness collapsed to isolated clusters of interactions during anesthesia. We used classification analysis to quantify the accuracy of discrimination between wakeful and anesthetised states, and found that informational structures inferred conscious states with greater accuracy than a scalar summary of the structure, a measure which is generally championed as the main measure of IIT. Spatially, we found that the information structures collapsed rather uniformly across the fly brain. Our results speak to the potential utility of the novel concept of an “informational structure” as a measure for level of consciousness, above and beyond simple scalar values.Author summaryThe physical basis of consciousness remains elusive. Efforts to measure consciousness have generally been restricted to simple, scalar quantities which summarise the complexity of a system, inspired by integrated information theory, which links a multi-dimensional, informational structure to the contents of experience in a system. Due to the complexity of the definition of the structure, assessment of its utility as a measure of conscious arousal in a system has largely been ignored. In this manuscript we evaluate the utility of such an information structure in measuring the level of consciousness in the fruit fly. Our results indicate that this structure can be more informative about the level of consciousness in a system than even the scalar summary proposed by the theory itself. These results may push consciousness research towards the notion of multi-dimensional informational structures, instead of traditional summaries.


PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.


Author(s):  
Susan Schneider

How can we determine if AI is conscious? The chapter begins by illustrating that there are potentially very serious real-world costs to getting facts about AI consciousness wrong. It then proposes a provisional framework for investigating artificial consciousness that involves several tests or markers. One test is the AI Consciousness Test, which challenges an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural-language interactions. Another test is based on the Integrated Information Theory, developed by Giulio Tononi and others, and considers whether a machine has a high level of “integrated information.” A third test is a Chip Test, where speculatively an individual’s brain is gradually replaced with durable microchips. If this individual being tested continues to report having phenomenal consciousness, the chapter argues that this could be a reason to believe that some machines could have consciousness.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document