scholarly journals Effects of the Sharing Economy on Sequential Innovation Products

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenfeng Liu ◽  
Jian Feng ◽  
Jinfeng Wang

The emergence of the sharing economy has affected consumers and traditional manufacturers. We focus on product sharing and analyze its impacts on the manufacturer that offers sequential innovation products. We develop a two-period model in which a monopoly manufacturer sells an old product and introduces a new product in each period; in the same period, an owner who bought a product for self-use from the manufacturer in the previous period may rent the product out because of the low self-use value in this period. Our analysis reveals that the sharing market increases or decreases the manufacturer’s profit, and this is mainly determined by the moral hazard cost and the salvage value of sharing products. Furthermore, the sharing market has an insignificant effect on the upgrading of products, but there is a bumping-down effect on old products’ sales. Finally, the effect of the sharing market on the revenue of the owner and the sharing platform mostly depends on the risk of moral hazard, and it also affects the manufacturer’s product rollover strategy.

Author(s):  
Dr. Rajagopal

The customer value concept is utilized to assess product performance and to determine the competitive structure of the new products. The analytical approach to the new product-market structuring based on customer value may be fitted well within the microeconomic framework. The measure of customer value as the product efficiency may be viewed from the customer’s perspective towards a ratio of outputs (e.g., perceived use value, resale value, reliability, safety, comfort) that customers obtain from a product relative to inputs (price, running costs) that customers have to deliver in exchange. The efficiency value derived can be understood as the return on the customer’s investment.


10.3982/qe564 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 693-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Setty

I model job‐search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job‐search effort is the worker's private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one‐period model with two effort levels, I show analytically that the monitoring precision increases and the utility spread decreases if and only if the inverse of the worker's utility in consumption has a convex derivative. The quantitative analysis that follows extends the model by allowing a continuous effort and separations from employment. That analysis highlights two conflicting economic forces affecting the optimal precision of monitoring with respect to the generosity of the welfare system: higher promised utility is associated not only with a higher cost of moral hazard, but also with lower effort and lower value of employment. The result is an inverse U‐shaped precision profile with respect to promised utility.


2010 ◽  
pp. 1998-2014
Author(s):  
Dr. Rajagopal

The customer value concept is utilized to assess product performance and to determine the competitive structure of the new products. The analytical approach to the new product-market structuring based on customer value may be fitted well within the microeconomic framework. The measure of customer value as the product efficiency may be viewed from the customer’s perspective towards a ratio of outputs (e.g., perceived use value, resale value, reliability, safety, comfort) that customers obtain from a product relative to inputs (price, running costs) that customers have to deliver in exchange. The efficiency value derived can be understood as the return on the customer’s investment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1503
Author(s):  
Zhenfeng Liu ◽  
Ya Xiao ◽  
Jian Feng

The sharing market includes the idle product sharing by the owner and the firm’s new product sharing. Companies participating in the sharing economy choose to withdraw from the market because it is always difficult to make a profit, due to heavy asset investment, but there is no such worry for owners who do not need cost input. At the same time, we have observed that the sharing products launched by companies are difficult to meet the rental needs of consumers. Based on the above findings, we have constructed a model where there is a market where a monopolistic manufacturer sells and rents out at the same time, and owners who purchased new products can choose to rent out products when they are idle. Because of the uncoordinated supply and demand matching of the sharing market and the excessively high unit cost input, our research found that: (1) the barriers for the manufacturer to enter the sharing market are always high—for example, the manufacturer will choose to enter the sharing market only when consumers have a high rate of availability of sharing products. Only when the cost of products in the sharing market is not low will the manufacturer choose to provide sharing services; (2) the competition between the two products in the sharing market weakens the demand cannibalize in the sales market; (3) the manufacturer enters the sharing market to promote the owner’s income. The owner’s earnings will increase with the rising of sharing products’ availability.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
KATE JOHNSON
Keyword(s):  

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