scholarly journals Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring

10.3982/qe564 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 693-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Setty
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Monitoring Precision ◽  
Period Model

I model job‐search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job‐search effort is the worker's private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one‐period model with two effort levels, I show analytically that the monitoring precision increases and the utility spread decreases if and only if the inverse of the worker's utility in consumption has a convex derivative. The quantitative analysis that follows extends the model by allowing a continuous effort and separations from employment. That analysis highlights two conflicting economic forces affecting the optimal precision of monitoring with respect to the generosity of the welfare system: higher promised utility is associated not only with a higher cost of moral hazard, but also with lower effort and lower value of employment. The result is an inverse U‐shaped precision profile with respect to promised utility.

scholarly journals Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Landais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Time Profile ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Search Effort ◽  
Benefit Level ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regression Kink Design

I show how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply literature, one can identify the moral hazard effects and liquidity effects of unemployment insurance (UI) using variations along the time profile of unemployment benefits. I use this strategy to investigate the anatomy of labor supply responses to UI. I identify the effect of benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink design using kinks in the schedule of benefits in the US. My results suggest that the response of search effort to UI benefits is driven as much by liquidity effects as by moral hazard effects. (JEL D82, J22, J65)

scholarly journals Evidence on Rule Manipulation and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Gibran Da Silva Teixeira ◽  
Giácomo Balbinotto Neto ◽  
Pedro Henrique Soares Leivas
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Length Of Stay ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Insurance Program ◽  
Using Data ◽  
National Labor Market

This article aims to examine the existence of rule manipulation and moral hazard in the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program. For empirical analysis, the rule manipulation test by Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016) was used, as well as fuzzy and sharp regression discontinuity. The data was built using data from the National Employment and Unemployment Survey from January 2008 to June 2014 due to the greater homogeneity of the rules for benefit access. Based on the results, the program is an influence on the length of employment of Brazilian workers given the existence of rule manipulation, assessed by the length of stay in the last job. Furthermore, it was found that heads of families and their children were less likely to search for employment. This findings were corroborated when data from the program beneficiaries only was assessed, showing a lower job search probability, between -21.80 p.p. and -15.08 p.p. for the children, and between -39.40 p.p. and -28.50 p.p. for the heads of families. Thus, it is possible to confirm the existence of both rule manipulation the access of the program, as well as moral hazard, which points to the need to restructure the program, and above all, have less influence on the national labor market.

scholarly journals Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Fuller ◽  
B. Ravikumar ◽  
Yuzhe Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Insurance Fraud ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Optimal Monitoring ◽  
Incentive Problem ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Unemployed

An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65)

Erratum

ILR Review ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-533
Author(s):  
John M. Barron ◽  
Otis W. Gilley
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Search Process ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Insurance Benefits ◽  
Search Intensity ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Disincentive Effect ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Job Search Intensity

The Impact of Unemployment Insurance on the Search Process A SERIOUS coding error in the data used in our recent article published in the April 1979 Review has been pointed out by Joe Stone of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our paper proposed a test of Mortensen's hy-pothesis that both future expected unem- ployment insurance benefits and benefits re-ceived during a current unemployment spell affect an individual's search intensity. Regression 1, which remains unchanged, still provides no support for Mortensen's proposed effect of unemployment insurance benefits to be received during the subse- quent unemployment spell on the current job-search intensity of the unemployed. Regression 3, which remains unchanged, still indicates a distortion in the search process-in particular in the methods of search chosen-for current recipients of unem- ployment insurance benefits and the un- employed who are eligible and have applied for these benefits. The error affects the results of the estimnation of Equation 2. It occurred because unemployed individuals who were eligible and had applied for benefits were assigned zero weeks left to receive these benefits rather than the maximum allowable duration of benefits according to the individual's state of residence. As a result, the value of unem- ployment insurance benefits for these individuals was inadvertently set equal to zero. Yet these individuals, other things equal, were shown in our original study to have a measured job-search intensity 74 percent higher than individuals currently receiving unemployment insurance, a difference related to the time involved in the ap- plication process rather than to actual job- search efforts. Reestimation of Equation 2 controlling for this effect and correcting for the measure- ment error in the value of unemployment benefits results in one important change. The coefficient on the value of unemployment insurance benefits, though still negative, is riot different from zero for standard significance levels. A serious consequence is that the traditional disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on search in- tensity is not supported by our test. One explanation for this finding may be that individuals with larger values of unemployment benefits have a greater incentive to overstate search intensity since such benefits are dependent on search activity.

Pembangunan Web Service Data Masyarakat Menggunakan REST API dengan Access Token

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Iqbal Perkasa ◽  
Eko Budi Setiawan
Keyword(s):  
Web Service ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Population Data ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Data ◽  
Community Data ◽  
The Government ◽  
Rest Api ◽  
Service Application ◽  
Service Data

Data is one of the most important things in this information and information technology era that evolving now. Currently, the government still has not used the public data maximally for administrative purposes. Utilization of this big population data is the creation of a web service application system with REST API where this data will be open and accessible to those who have access. One of the institutions that use this service is the Manpower and Transmigration Service where this system can make the Dinas staff more efficient to create and register job search cards using available community data. This application is able to provide and facilitate many parties, such as data administrators to monitor data usage, registration employee in input data, and people able to register independently. Index Terms—Web service, API, Rest api, People data

Les chefs de cabinets ministériels au Québec: la transition du gouvernement libéral au gouvernement péquiste (1976–1977)

1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micheline Plasse
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Civil Service ◽  
The State ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
The Government

This article first presents a brief survey of the role and functions filled by the personal aide (chef de cabinet) of a minister in Quebec. The analysis continues, in a comparative perspective, by tracing a sociological and professional portrait of the Liberal“chefs de cabinet” in April 1976 and their successors in the pequiste government in July 1977.We then test the hypothesis that the cleavage between the government and the dominant economic forces has increased since November 15, 1976 as a result of the ideology articulated by the“chefs de cabinet” regarding the social and economic aims of the state. This hypothesis was confirmed.The hypothesis that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” exercise a more pronounced influence on the decision-making process is also confirmed. Nevertheless, one cannot argue that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” usurped the power of the legislators; their influence is more political than technocratic. The growing influence of the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” neverthelsss helps to accentuate the tensions and conflicts between the higher civil service and the ministerial aides.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document