scholarly journals Neural Mechanisms of Reward Prediction Error in Autism Spectrum Disorder

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya G. Mosner ◽  
R. Edward McLaurin ◽  
Jessica L. Kinard ◽  
Shabnam Hakimi ◽  
Jacob Parelman ◽  
...  

Few studies have explored neural mechanisms of reward learning in ASD despite evidence of behavioral impairments of predictive abilities in ASD. To investigate the neural correlates of reward prediction errors in ASD, 16 adults with ASD and 14 typically developing controls performed a prediction error task during fMRI scanning. Results revealed greater activation in the ASD group in the left paracingulate gyrus during signed prediction errors and the left insula and right frontal pole during thresholded unsigned prediction errors. Findings support atypical neural processing of reward prediction errors in ASD in frontostriatal regions critical for prediction coding and reward learning. Results provide a neural basis for impairments in reward learning that may contribute to traits common in ASD (e.g., intolerance of unpredictability).

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olav E. Krigolson ◽  
Cameron D. Hassall ◽  
Todd C. Handy

Our ability to make decisions is predicated upon our knowledge of the outcomes of the actions available to us. Reinforcement learning theory posits that actions followed by a reward or punishment acquire value through the computation of prediction errors—discrepancies between the predicted and the actual reward. A multitude of neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that rewards and punishments evoke neural responses that appear to reflect reinforcement learning prediction errors [e.g., Krigolson, O. E., Pierce, L. J., Holroyd, C. B., & Tanaka, J. W. Learning to become an expert: Reinforcement learning and the acquisition of perceptual expertise. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 1833–1840, 2009; Bayer, H. M., & Glimcher, P. W. Midbrain dopamine neurons encode a quantitative reward prediction error signal. Neuron, 47, 129–141, 2005; O'Doherty, J. P. Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human brain: Insights from neuroimaging. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14, 769–776, 2004; Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 109, 679–709, 2002]. Here, we used the brain ERP technique to demonstrate that not only do rewards elicit a neural response akin to a prediction error but also that this signal rapidly diminished and propagated to the time of choice presentation with learning. Specifically, in a simple, learnable gambling task, we show that novel rewards elicited a feedback error-related negativity that rapidly decreased in amplitude with learning. Furthermore, we demonstrate the existence of a reward positivity at choice presentation, a previously unreported ERP component that has a similar timing and topography as the feedback error-related negativity that increased in amplitude with learning. The pattern of results we observed mirrored the output of a computational model that we implemented to compute reward prediction errors and the changes in amplitude of these prediction errors at the time of choice presentation and reward delivery. Our results provide further support that the computations that underlie human learning and decision-making follow reinforcement learning principles.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 715-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Lynn Kinard ◽  
Maya Gelman Mosner ◽  
Rachel Kirsten Greene ◽  
Merideth Addicott ◽  
Joshua Bizzell ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y.-C. Chen ◽  
Y.-W. Chen ◽  
Y.-F. Hsu ◽  
W.-T. Chang ◽  
C. K. Hsiao ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Mas-Herrero ◽  
Josep Marco-Pallarés

In decision-making processes, the relevance of the information yielded by outcomes varies across time and situations. It increases when previous predictions are not accurate and in contexts with high environmental uncertainty. Previous fMRI studies have shown an important role of medial pFC in coding both reward prediction errors and the impact of this information to guide future decisions. However, it is unclear whether these two processes are dissociated in time or occur simultaneously, suggesting that a common mechanism is engaged. In the present work, we studied the modulation of two electrophysiological responses associated to outcome processing—the feedback-related negativity ERP and frontocentral theta oscillatory activity—with the reward prediction error and the learning rate. Twenty-six participants performed two learning tasks differing in the degree of predictability of the outcomes: a reversal learning task and a probabilistic learning task with multiple blocks of novel cue–outcome associations. We implemented a reinforcement learning model to obtain the single-trial reward prediction error and the learning rate for each participant and task. Our results indicated that midfrontal theta activity and feedback-related negativity increased linearly with the unsigned prediction error. In addition, variations of frontal theta oscillatory activity predicted the learning rate across tasks and participants. These results support the existence of a common brain mechanism for the computation of unsigned prediction error and learning rate.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ballard ◽  
Eric M. Miller ◽  
Steven T. Piantadosi ◽  
Noah Goodman ◽  
Samuel M. McClure

ABSTRACTHumans naturally group the world into coherent categories defined by membership rules. Rules can be learned implicitly by building stimulus-response associations using reinforcement learning (RL) or by using explicit reasoning. We tested if the striatum, in which activation reliably scales with reward prediction error, would track prediction errors in a task that required explicit rule generation. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging during a categorization task, we show that striatal responses to feedback scale with a “surprise” signal derived from a Bayesian rule-learning model and are inconsistent with RL prediction error. We also find that striatum and caudal inferior frontal sulcus (cIFS) are involved in updating the likelihood of discriminative rules. We conclude that the striatum, in cooperation with the cIFS, is involved in updating the values assigned to categorization rules when people learn using explicit reasoning.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony I. Jang ◽  
Matthew R. Nassar ◽  
Daniel G. Dillon ◽  
Michael J. Frank

AbstractThe dopamine system is thought to provide a reward prediction error signal that facilitates reinforcement learning and reward-based choice in corticostriatal circuits. While it is believed that similar prediction error signals are also provided to temporal lobe memory systems, the impact of such signals on episodic memory encoding has not been fully characterized. Here we develop an incidental memory paradigm that allows us to 1) estimate the influence of reward prediction errors on the formation of episodic memories, 2) dissociate this influence from other factors such as surprise and uncertainty, 3) test the degree to which this influence depends on temporal correspondence between prediction error and memoranda presentation, and 4) determine the extent to which this influence is consolidation-dependent. We find that when choosing to gamble for potential rewards during a primary decision making task, people encode incidental memoranda more strongly even though they are not aware that their memory will be subsequently probed. Moreover, this strengthened encoding scales with the reward prediction error, and not overall reward, experienced selectively at the time of memoranda presentation (and not before or after). Finally, this strengthened encoding is identifiable within a few minutes and is not substantially enhanced after twenty-four hours, indicating that it is not consolidation-dependent. These results suggest a computationally and temporally specific role for putative dopaminergic reward prediction error signaling in memory formation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachit Dubey ◽  
Mark K Ho ◽  
Hermish Mehta ◽  
Tom Griffiths

Psychologists have long been fascinated with understanding the nature of Aha! moments, moments when we transition from not knowing to suddenly realizing the solution to a problem. In this work, we present a theoretical framework that explains when and why we experience Aha! moments. Our theory posits that during problem-solving, in addition to solving the problem, people also maintain a meta-cognitive model of their ability to solve the problem as well as a prediction about the time it would take them to solve that problem. Aha! moments arise when we experience a positive error in this meta-cognitive prediction, i.e. when we solve a problem much faster than we expected to solve it. We posit that this meta-cognitive error is analogous to a positive reward prediction error thereby explaining why we feel so good after an Aha! moment. A large-scale pre-registered experiment on anagram solving supports this theory, showing that people's time prediction errors are strongly correlated with their ratings of an Aha! experience while solving anagrams. A second experiment provides further evidence to our theory by demonstrating a causal link between time prediction errors and the Aha! experience. These results highlight the importance of meta-cognitive prediction errors and deepen our understanding of human meta-reasoning.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa J. Sharpe ◽  
Hannah M. Batchelor ◽  
Lauren E. Mueller ◽  
Chun Yun Chang ◽  
Etienne J.P. Maes ◽  
...  

AbstractDopamine neurons fire transiently in response to unexpected rewards. These neural correlates are proposed to signal the reward prediction error described in model-free reinforcement learning algorithms. This error term represents the unpredicted or ‘excess’ value of the rewarding event. In model-free reinforcement learning, this value is then stored as part of the learned value of any antecedent cues, contexts or events, making them intrinsically valuable, independent of the specific rewarding event that caused the prediction error. In support of equivalence between dopamine transients and this model-free error term, proponents cite causal optogenetic studies showing that artificially induced dopamine transients cause lasting changes in behavior. Yet none of these studies directly demonstrate the presence of cached value under conditions appropriate for associative learning. To address this gap in our knowledge, we conducted three studies where we optogenetically activated dopamine neurons while rats were learning associative relationships, both with and without reward. In each experiment, the antecedent cues failed to acquired value and instead entered into value-independent associative relationships with the other cues or rewards. These results show that dopamine transients, constrained within appropriate learning situations, support valueless associative learning.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-32 ◽  

Reward prediction errors consist of the differences between received and predicted rewards. They are crucial for basic forms of learning about rewards and make us strive for more rewards—an evolutionary beneficial trait. Most dopamine neurons in the midbrain of humans, monkeys, and rodents signal a reward prediction error; they are activated by more reward than predicted (positive prediction error), remain at baseline activity for fully predicted rewards, and show depressed activity with less reward than predicted (negative prediction error). The dopamine signal increases nonlinearly with reward value and codes formal economic utility. Drugs of addiction generate, hijack, and amplify the dopamine reward signal and induce exaggerated, uncontrolled dopamine effects on neuronal plasticity. The striatum, amygdala, and frontal cortex also show reward prediction error coding, but only in subpopulations of neurons. Thus, the important concept of reward prediction errors is implemented in neuronal hardware.


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