Aha! moments correspond to meta-cognitive prediction errors

Psychologists have long been fascinated with understanding the nature of Aha! moments, moments when we transition from not knowing to suddenly realizing the solution to a problem. In this work, we present a theoretical framework that explains when and why we experience Aha! moments. Our theory posits that during problem-solving, in addition to solving the problem, people also maintain a meta-cognitive model of their ability to solve the problem as well as a prediction about the time it would take them to solve that problem. Aha! moments arise when we experience a positive error in this meta-cognitive prediction, i.e. when we solve a problem much faster than we expected to solve it. We posit that this meta-cognitive error is analogous to a positive reward prediction error thereby explaining why we feel so good after an Aha! moment. A large-scale pre-registered experiment on anagram solving supports this theory, showing that people's time prediction errors are strongly correlated with their ratings of an Aha! experience while solving anagrams. A second experiment provides further evidence to our theory by demonstrating a causal link between time prediction errors and the Aha! experience. These results highlight the importance of meta-cognitive prediction errors and deepen our understanding of human meta-reasoning.

A Lifetime in Error: Helena P. Blavatsky and the Immaculate Conception

This article presents the cognitive error made by Helena P. Blavatsky concerning the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. Blavatsky’s error consisted in ascribing the term “Immaculate Conception” to the content of one of the basic tenets of the Christian faith, which is the Incarnation of the Lord. An additional mistake in connection with this error was the observation that it was only in the middle of the 19th century that the Church elevated this truth to the rank of dogma. The confusion of the conception of the Mother with the Incarnation of the Son, and the association of the latter with the term “Immaculate Conception” gave rise to further difficulties, when the new verse of the Litany of Loretto pointed to Mary as “immaculately conceived.” The doubled cognitive problem that H. P. Blavatsky had to face because of this led her to announce further fantastic theories about the Immaculate Conception, which were not challenged by anyone for the next 150 years. Her grave cognitive error is now widespread and responsible for the functioning in contemporary Western culture of popular expressions such as the “Immaculate Conception of Christ,” where the “immaculateness” of the conception means the absence of sexual intercourse leading to the conception of a child. As a result of the widespread use of expressions of this type the authentic content of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary remains unknown to many people. In the article, this issue is presented based on the sources, which testify to the agency of H. P. Blavatsky as regards the spread of this cognitive error in the Western culture.

How to Avoid Idolatry

Part III calls for a more theological analytic theology and defends analytic theology from some common theological objections. Many theologians regard any form of theistic metaphysics as idolatrous, and worries about “conceptual idolatry” are especially prominent in contemporary theology. In Chapter 7, I try to uncover what idolatry really is. Because idolatry involves false worship, it cannot be assimilated to mistaken believing: idolatry is more than a cognitive error. I first discuss standard and extended senses of “idolatry,” before turning to the tricky problem of conceptual idolatry. While idolatry requires more than false believing, I argue that analytic theologians can (and usually do) avoid idolatry by preserving the creator/creature distinction and theorizing with an attitude of worship.

Colloquium 4 Mythological Sources of Oblivion and Memory

In this work, I present a selection of mythological and cultural insights from Ancient Greece that make our ambiguous relationship with memory and oblivion explicit. From Plato to Dante, or from Orphism to Nietzsche, and even today, the experiences of memory and forgetting appear as two sides of one essential nucleus in our cultural tradition in general and in the history of philosophy in particular. I intend to present a panoramic view of the main mythological sources that mention these two experiences as well as their unequal consideration. I will thus stress the personifications of both figures, taking up their features and the moral, gnoseological, and even political implications that historically have been associated with them. This is especially apparent in the strong Platonic legacy latent in the history of philosophy, where every time it insists on defining knowledge as a form of memory, the peculiar attributes of forgetting unexpectedly surface, not as a mistake or cognitive error, but as an experience which is truly saving and therapeutic.

Horizontal and vertical tracing: a cognitive forcing strategy to improve diagnostic accuracy

Reducing diagnostic error is a major issue in medical care. Various strategies have been proposed to prevent diagnostic error. The most prevalent factor for the diagnostic error is a cognitive error by physicians; reducing the cognitive error should lead to a substantial reduction in diagnostic error. That said, few studies have described new strategies to increase diagnostic accuracy that focuses on the cognitive processes of physicians. The current study describes new diagnostic strategies using cognitive forcing. Horizontal tracing is a strategy to identify comorbidities reliably, and vertical tracing identifies an underlying condition.

Explaining the Disposition Bias among Investors: The Mediatory Role of Personality, Financial Literacy, Behavioral Bias and Risk Tolerance

Investors are frequently subjected to cognitive error. They often sell stocks that have increased in value, while keeping stocks that have dropped in value. We proposed a theoretical framework explaining what factors affect this disposition bias and how. According to the proposed theory, Disposition bias is affected through risk tolerance, financial literacy, and behavioural biases. Lower risk tolerance and low financial literacy can aggravate disposition bias. We also proposed that personality factors such as Superego, Parsimony, Orderliness, and Obstinacy also influences both the level of financial literacy as well as behavioural biases that in turn affect disposition bias. Empirical validity was established by conducted a survey using close ended questionnaire. Data was collected from 182 investors trading through 3 brokerage firms in Karachi. Confirmatory factor analysis and structured equation modelling were used for analysis. The results suggested that financial literacy significantly affect all behavioural biases (except Representativeness) as well as Disposition Bias. Higher financial literacy will tend to show less disposition bias and they better can make portfolio decision. Similarly, risk tolerance also affects disposition biases as a risk-averse investor will tend to show more disposition bias. Among the behavioural factors, Anchoring, overconfidence, and loss aversion affect disposition biases. Overconfidence also seems to affect risk tolerance. Personality traits like superego and parsimony seem to affect almost all the behavioural biases. Similarly, superego and parsimony affect risk tolerance. Similarly, Superego and obstinacy affected financial literacy. This finding will help investors to better manage their portfolio by mitigating these biases.