scholarly journals Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice

1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

To what extent can the European Court of Justice, an international court, make decisions that go against the interests of European Union member states? Neofunctionalist accounts imply that because the Court is a legal body it has vast political autonomy from the member states, whereas neorealist accounts imply that because member states can sanction the ECJ, the Court has no significant political autonomy. Neither theory can explain why the Court, which was once politically weak and did not stray far from the interests of European governments, now boldly rules against their interests. In explaining how the Court escaped member state control, this article develops a general hypothesis of the autonomy of the ECJ, focusing on how differing time horizons of political and judicial actors, support for the Court within the national judiciaries, and decision-making rules at the supranational level limit the member states' ability to control the Court.

Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter ◽  
Laurence R. Helfer ◽  
Osvaldo Saldías

This chapter explains why national political leaders decided to add a court to their integration project. After considering a variety of options, governments chose to model the Andean Tribunal on the European Union's Court of Justice (ECJ). But they did not slavishly copy the ECJ's design features and legal doctrines. Instead, they selectively adapted those that were appropriate to the more sovereignty-protective Andean context, preserving greater state control over the ATJ and its role in interpreting regional legislation. Thus, this chapter explains why these original adaptations later came to be seen as undermining the effectiveness of the Andean legal system and why, in a 1996 revised treaty, member states revised the institution to bring the ATJ jurisdiction and access rules closer to those of its European predecessor.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 456-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Lavranos

It is uncommon for a provision of the EC Treaty to remain all but unnoticed for fifty years by both legal literature and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. However, that is what happened to Article 292 EC, which states that ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ This provision can be taken to mean that if a dispute arises between European Union member states involving Community law, they shall bring the dispute exclusively before the European Court of Justice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  

Mutual trust is at the heart of the European Union. Although the Union lacks a general mechanism to enforce its rules and decisions, member states usually comply with them. This remarkable fact can in part be explained by self interest: although individual rules and decisions may be found harmful and are ducked from time to time, all member states know they win by sticking to the rules of the game. The member state that grudgingly applies a rule or a decision, trusts all the others to do the same most of the time. If this were not so, the system would break down, in spite of the European Court of Justice denying the rule of reciprocity legal status in the Union.


elni Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
pp. 18-24
Author(s):  
Pavel Černý ◽  
Jerzy Jendrośka

One of the main goals of the Directive 85/337/EEC, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (“EIA Directive”), expressed in its Preamble, is to ensure that projects that are likely to have significant environmental impact proceed only after prior assessment of their likely effect on the environment, based on appropriate information supplied by the developer and with proper avenues for public participation. The European Court of Justice (ECD) repeatedly narrowed down the (originally large) scope of discretion of the member states in deciding whether a project shall be subject to EIA or not by requiring the environmental impact assessment for any project which is likely to have serious impacts de facto. Central to this article is a description of the typical and most important gaps of implementation of the EIA directive, emerging from the specific traffic infrastructure cases. Prior to that, some general remarks on the typical characteristics and problems concerning transposition of the EIA Directive are made.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-242
Author(s):  
Anders Nørgaard Laursen

Abstract This paper reports on an investigation of a recent decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case C-48/13, Nordea Bank Denmark, concerning the Danish rules for reincorporation of losses from permanent establishments situated in European Union/ European Economic Area (EU/EEA) member states other than Denmark. The article includes comments on various EU tax law aspects of the case - namely the restriction test applied by the ECJ, the justifications brought forward by the intervening governments and the question of proportionality - and examines the consequences of the Danish tax law going forward.


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