(Mis)interpreting the Statute? The International Criminal Court, the Sentence of Life Imprisonment and Other Emerging Sentencing Issues: A Comment on the Trial Chamber I Decision on the Sentence in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 1037-1045
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

On 14 March 2012, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, ICC, in its first ever decision, convicted Mr Thomas Luganga Dyilo, as a coperpetrator, of ‘conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the UPC/FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities…’ On 10 July 2012, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to an effective term of 14 years’ imprisonment. In passing the sentence, the Trial Chamber held, inter alia, that in terms of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in cases where it sentences an offender to prison for a specified number of years, the sentence must not exceed 30 years’ imprisonment. The Trial Chamber also equated life imprisonment with ‘whole life.’ It is argued that in the light of the drafting history of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber incorrectly interpreted the Statute in those two respects. It is also argued that the ICC should have indicated which purpose the sentence it imposed was meant to serve.

Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-111
Author(s):  
Denis Pechegin

The increasing interpenetration of the main models of the process and the approval of international standards for the production of criminal cases raise the question of the development and improvement of the form of legal proceedings in the category of the most relevant in modern science. On the one hand, the attention of many scientists is focused on strengthening the competitive core of the process and ensuring, as far as possible, a balance of power between the parties. On the other hand, it is stated that legal proceedings that do not pursue the goal of achieving material truth, especially due to the absolute nature of the principle of competition, lead to excessive formalism that has nothing to do with fair trial. The solution to the problem of combining trial models (the balance of adversarial and investigative cores) is seen in the International Criminal Court. The procedure of criminal proceedings in the International Criminal Court is the result of special scientific modeling taking into account the indicated doctrinal trends, and the degree of generalization of approaches of leading legal families in the structure of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is so high that it allows us to speak about the universality of this procedural system. If the predecessors of the International Criminal Court preference were really given only one started (so, the ICTY was based on the example of the Anglo-Saxon adversarial procedure model with the “American accent”), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reflected the trend to the initial formation of a balanced trial procedures designed to overcome the deviations in the balance of power by introducing an adversarial process with “inquisitorial” elements: for example, the Pre-trial Chamber, duties of the Prosecutor fully and objectively investigate the circumstances of the case, the duties of the court of first instance to establish the truth in the case. However, this does not mean any disregard for the adversarial core at the pre-trial stage. The article is devoted to theoretical and practical aspects of the combination of adversarial and investigative cores in the activities of the pre-trial Chamber of the International criminal court and reflects the results of a study led by professor Anita Ušacka, honorary doctor of law, in the preparation of a Commentary to the Rome Statute in Russian.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 77 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 77 sets out the penalties the Court may impose on a person convicted of a crime. These include imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; a term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person; a fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; and a forfeiture of proceeds, property, and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 76 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 76 governs the imposition of sentence in the event of a conviction. If the accused is convicted, the Trial Chamber is required to establish the ‘appropriate sentence’. In so doing, the Statute instructs it to consider the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the sentence. Mitigating and aggravating factors relating to the commission of the crime itself, such as the individual role of the offender and of the treatment of the victims, will form part of the evidence germane to guilt or innocence and thus appear as part of the record of the trial.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 69 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 69 deals with specific evidentiary issues but lacks a general provision like the one in the Nuremberg Charter. This is addressed in article 64, stating that the Trial Chamber has the power to rule on the admissibility or reliability of evidence. According to a Trial Chamber, ‘the drafters of the Statute framework have clearly and deliberately avoided proscribing certain categories or types of evidence, a step which would have limited — at the outset — the ability of the Chamber to assess evidence “freely”’. Chambers enjoy ‘a significant degree of discretion in considering all types of evidence’. Another judge has said that article 69 provides for ‘the principle of free assessment of evidence. Hence, it is up to the competent Chamber to decide on the probative value of any piece of evidence introduced for the purpose of the confirmation hearing or the trial’.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 64 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 64 sets out the functions and powers of the Trial Chamber. It confirms that ‘[t]he functions and powers of the Trial Chamber set out in this article shall be exercised in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’. The general duties of the Trial Chamber include ensuring a ‘fair and expeditious’ trial, conducted with ‘full respect for the rights of the accused’ and ‘due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses’.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 319-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gauthier de Beco

AbstractThis note discusses the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts in the prosecution of war crimes before the International Criminal Court. It analyses the international humanitarian law applicable to both kinds of conflict, and the way in which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia succeeded in prosecuting war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. It also studies the two war crimes regimes provided for in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The note then examines how Pre-Trial Chamber I dealt with this issue in its Decision on the confirmation of charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and the problems it faced in doing so. It concludes with a plea for the abolition of the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts with respect to war crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-132
Author(s):  
Uzma S. Bishop-Burney

On September 27, 2016, the Trial Chamber (Chamber) of the International Criminal Court (ICC or tribunal) rendered its judgment in Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, wherein the defendant was convicted of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks on protected cultural objects. It is the ICC's first such conviction and the first time that an accused has entered a guilty plea at the tribunal pursuant to Article 65 of the Rome Statute (Statute). Al Mahdi pled guilty to co-perpetrating attacks on protected objects pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute for his role in the attack on, and destruction of, ten mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu. The Trial Chamber sentenced him to nine years in prison.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 110 deals with the modification of a sentence. Although a custodial sentence is served in a prison of a State of enforcement, where the convicted prisoner is subject to the rules and regulations applicable in the domestic system, early release is governed by the Rome Statute, not national legislation. The decision to modify the sentence pursuant to article 110 of the Rome Statute is irreversible, and not conditional, as in most domestic parole schemes. A sentence pronounced by the Court may subsequently be reduced, but only after the offender has served two-thirds of the term, with special provision in the case of life imprisonment.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 15 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 15 sets out the rules applicable to the exercise of proprio motu (that is, on the Prosecutor's own initiative) triggering of the jurisdiction of the Court. It is closely associated with article 53, dealing with the ‘[i]nitiation of an investigation’. Article 53 confirms that the Prosecutor has the discretion to decide to proceed with an investigation. This issue is partly addressed by article 15 because it contemplates the ‘triggering’ of an investigation by the Prosecutor and the mechanism by which authorization for this is provided by a Pre-Trial Chamber.


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