On Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-427
Author(s):  
Leo Katz

This essay offers a critique of Larry Temkin’s seminal new book, Rethinking the Good, at the heart of which is the highly counterintuitive claim that all things considered judgments are not transitive. I evaluate Temkin’s claims through the lens of social choice theory, pursue some of its larger implications and applications, and conclude with a very general worry having to do with the intimate connection between transitivity and logical consistency, namely whether, if Temkin is right, this would not bring all moral reasoning to an abrupt halt.

Think ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (30) ◽  
pp. 103-110
Author(s):  
S. Subramanian

A ‘good society’ is one which is governed by a number of prized social virtues. Amongst these virtues, surely, must be counted a deference to the values of personal liberty and inter-personal equity. (These, after all, are two of the three values embodied in the French Revolution's stirring exhortation to ‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’!) In urging, or professing, an acceptance of these values, there is the implicit judgment that the acceptance entails no possible problem of internal coherence or logical consistency. In this small essay, it will be shown that the apparently unproblematic judgment just mentioned could prove to be suspect. In particular, the reader is invited to consider that there are plausible, but mutually incompatible, ways in which the principles of ‘liberty’ and ‘equity’ can be formulated. The essay draws on the conventions and methods of a body of knowledge called ‘social choice theory’, which lies at the intersection of philosophy, political science, and economics.


Author(s):  
Iain McLean

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.


1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.


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