The Responsibility to Protect and the Fate of the Rohingya

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Colette Rausch

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” obliges all states to protect populations from “atrocity crimes”—namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—under three “pillars” of protection. Pillar One requires a state to protect its own population from atrocity crimes. Pillar Two obliges the international community to help states to exercise this responsibility through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means. When both of these approaches fail, states must pursue a “Pillar Three” strategy: the UN Security Council must “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

This chapter examines whether so-called humanitarian intervention is a lawful exception to the international law prohibiting use of force when rescuing populations from widespread grave human rights violations, without UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VII. It considers what type or level of human rights violation or abuse justifies ‘humanitarian intervention’ if it were permitted, with reference to the R2P categories of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It discusses the UN Charter provisions and state practice on the prohibition on use of force, and criteria used to determine the legality of action deemed humanitarian intervention. The chapter describes tests that an intervention would have to pass and would be applicable to mitigate culpability, including gravity of the situation, political neutrality, the circumstances of the Security Council’s inability to act, and principles of necessity and proportionality. It argues that there is no humanitarian exception to the prohibition of the use of force in international law.


Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

Reluctant for its first two decades to consider states’ human rights performance, the UN gradually developed an extensive network of machinery to examine human rights violations in some states and categories of violation in all states. Action was limited to investigation and condemnation. The overwhelming majority of states and commentators rejected the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ that had had some currency until the UN Charter’s proscription of the use of force by states. It took the UN sixty years to accept that the Security Council could and should take necessary coercive measures, including armed force, to confront the most extreme forms of human rights violation or atrocity such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In doing so, it sanctified a new doctrine and codified its scope. Political and material realities seem to require sober expectations about the UN’s actual ability to protect populations from these atrocities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

The responsibility to protect was invoked by the United Nations (UN) Security Council in support of its authorization of a military intervention in Libya in 2011. In the wake of the intervention, Brazil approached the UN with a new doctrine: the responsibility while protecting. The responsibility while protecting implies a greater degree of caution on the part of the international community in its exercise of the responsibility to protect. Intentionally or unintentionally, Brazil mixes aspects of the jus ad bellum with aspects of the jus in bello in the new doctrine. This is controversial and potentially detrimental to both areas of law. An additional layer of limitations on the use of armed force in multinational peace operations is introduced beyond the existing restrictions on warfare following from international humanitarian law. A lack of clarity pertaining to the use of force and to the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly in this respect in the exercise of the responsibility to protect contribute to making the responsibility while protecting seem increasingly enigmatic. Interpreted constructively, however, the responsibility while protecting simply urges the international community to follow international law. This would be good.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

This article reflects upon the UN General Assembly’s 2012 informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which was on the theme of ‘timely and decisive response’. It shows that although Member States recognize that ‘timely and decisive’ responses to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could sometimes prove controversial, none disputed the occasional necessity of robust enforcement measures when properly authorized by the Security Council and used as a last resort. Against this backdrop, the paper identifies and engages with three of the key challenges that emerged in the dialogue: the relationship between the the three pillars of RtoP, the problem of consistency in the application of the principle, and the challenge of making prevention a ‘living reality’. The paper identifies ways of navigating these challenges and proposes a pathway for the further consolidation of RtoP in international practice.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-100
Author(s):  
Bridget Moix

Ten years ago the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet today, horrific violence against civilians continues in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This article examines some of the progress and gaps in the international community’s efforts to better protect civilians against mass violence over the past decade. It proposes two emerging directions for advancing the R2P agenda in the coming years: 1) greater focus on upstream prevention, and 2) increased support for locally-led peacebuilding and prevention actors and capacities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

States have recently agreed that there is a responsibility to protect populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The international community, however, often lacks the resources and willingness to carry out a key part of this responsibility, that is, to undertake humanitarian intervention effectively when required. One potential solution to this problem is to outsource intervention to private military and security companies. In this article, I consider this option. In particular, I present a largely consequentialist argument which asserts that, when two conditions are met, using these companies to bolster the capacity to undertake humanitarian intervention might be morally justifiable overall.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-140
Author(s):  
Allan Mukuki

States are collapsing and genocidal acts are being committed or may happen any moment. In these instances, states look to the United Nations (UN) to act in order to prevent genocide from happening. This article seeks to determine if there exists an obligation under international law for the UN to prevent genocide, and in that event, can the UN be held responsible under international law for failure to comply with this obligation? This article further analyses these questions by looking at the aspect of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which elicits an obligation to prevent genocide first to states and then to the UN. At the very minimum, every state must protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In the case of states failing to undertake this obligation, the UN is bound to step in and undertake this obligation. Hence, this is a responsibility that is an obligation to states first and then to the UN. In summation, this article establishes that the obligation to prevent genocide is a customary international law obligation. Further, the UN is bound by this obligation. However, it is shown that the procedures that are available to address its failure to uphold this obligation are inconsequential since the UN has absolute immunity and any decision, even if holding the UN responsible, cannot be enforced as against it. Neverthless, this article provides some recommendation(s) as to how the UN can play a role in ensuring accountability for failures within its ambit.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie-Eve Loiselle

The responsibility to protect concept has evolved rapidly in the last decade but its normative and legal status is still disputed. This paper assesses the degree of recognition the concept has attracted since its inception and the significance of resolutions 1970 and 1973 for the transformation of the responsibility to protect into a new norm of customary international law. It argues that despite claims about the centrality of the concept in the decision to intervene in Libya, the language of both resolutions, and the statements made by members of the Security Council surrounding their adoption, indicate that member states did not consider that they were legally bound to protect the population of Libya. Consequently, the intervention in Libya has not promoted the development of a legal obligation upon the international community to protect the world’s populations against gross violations of human rights.


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