Making RtoP a Living Reality: Reflections on the 2012 General Assembly Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Relationship

This article reflects upon the UN General Assembly’s 2012 informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which was on the theme of ‘timely and decisive response’. It shows that although Member States recognize that ‘timely and decisive’ responses to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could sometimes prove controversial, none disputed the occasional necessity of robust enforcement measures when properly authorized by the Security Council and used as a last resort. Against this backdrop, the paper identifies and engages with three of the key challenges that emerged in the dialogue: the relationship between the the three pillars of RtoP, the problem of consistency in the application of the principle, and the challenge of making prevention a ‘living reality’. The paper identifies ways of navigating these challenges and proposes a pathway for the further consolidation of RtoP in international practice.

Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Putting the Responsibility to Protect into Practice

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Security Operations

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.

The Responsibility to Protect and the Fate of the Rohingya

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Un Security Council

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.

scholarly journals The Justice and Security Dialogue Project: Building the Resilience of Non-State Actors to Atrocity Crimes

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Colette Rausch
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Security Council ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Atrocity Crimes ◽  
Protection Pillar

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” obliges all states to protect populations from “atrocity crimes”—namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—under three “pillars” of protection. Pillar One requires a state to protect its own population from atrocity crimes. Pillar Two obliges the international community to help states to exercise this responsibility through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means. When both of these approaches fail, states must pursue a “Pillar Three” strategy: the UN Security Council must “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner.”

Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
The Face ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Relationship

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

The Myanmar-Rohingya Crisis, Civilian Protection, and the Dilemma of the Responsibility to Protect Norm Institutionalization

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-74
Author(s):  
Nicholas Idris Erameh ◽  
Victor Ojakorotu
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Civilian Protection ◽  
Mass Atrocity ◽  
To Come

Existing studies on the Myanmar-Rohingyan crisis have explored the contending issues from a narrow perspective. This underscores the need for broader engagement by interrogating the veracity of the claims of mass atrocities against the Rohingyans, nonauthorization of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), and implications for consolidating and internalizing the RtoP norm. This study argues that, while the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingyans satisfies four of the crimes upon which RtoP can be authorized, its nonauthorization suggests that in spite of its commitment to “Never Again,” the international community is yet to come to terms with issues bordering on mass atrocity and civilian protection. This inaction amidst widespread atrocities against the Rohingyans explains why the RtoP is not only contested, but also risks the chances of further nonutilization and institutionalization. Thus, the possibility that the RtoP would remain valuable depends on how the international criminal court and the global community prosecute those culpable of atrocities against the Rohingyans, adopt a clear rule of establishing when mass atrocity has been perpetuated and demand RtoP intervention, and ensure that these interventions are guided by the principle of Jus in Bellum and Jus ad Bello.

The Responsibility to Protect as International Crimes Prevention

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Organizational Policy ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Insufficient Attention

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.

The Emperor's New Clothes?

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekkehard Strauss
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Comprehensive Review ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Outcome Document

This publication attempts to assist the ongoing discussion on the operationalization of the responsibility to protect by the United Nations. After summarizing the negotiation process towards the agreement in the Summit Outcome Document, the practice of the application of the responsibility to protect by United Nations organs and other bodies since September 2005 is presented, before providing elements for a comprehensive review of existing United Nations capacities to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Finally, the publication proposes elements for an immediate strategy of the Secretary-General and the United Nations departments, funds and agencies to facilitate the application of the responsibility to protect in practice in the immediate future.

International Law and the Responsibility to Protect

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Welling Hall ◽  
Nadira Khudayberdieva
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals ◽  
Common Enemy ◽  
The Relationship

The notion of responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged as a legal challenge to what F. R. Teson called “the moral and legal enclosure of states.” The development of the R2P doctrine coincided with the surge in popularity of the democratic peace thesis, according to which the creation of a security community rests not on the existence of a common enemy, but on the “positive shared foundation of democracy and cooperation.” The R2P doctrine was developed by international lawyers in response to the failure of the international community to prevent or react effectively enough to the commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere during the last decade of the 20th century and the first of the 21st century. Some scholars of international law argue that R2P reconceptualizes sovereignty as a legal construct and expands the international toolkit for the peaceful prevention of deadly conflict. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, The Responsibility to Protect, lays emphasis on military intervention as a key component of R2P. Others, however, claim that R2P simply provides new, legal justifications for the use of force. International law scholarship on R2P is overwhelmingly dedicated to the question of when and how R2P might be invoked to support military intervention (jus ad bellum) and the relationship between R2P and international criminal tribunals (jus post bellum). One area that deserves attention from scholars is a “law instead of war,” or jus non bello.

The Dangerous Liaisons of the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Tardy
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Civilian Protection ◽  
Normative Basis

The parallel conceptual development and shared normative basis of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and civilian protection in peacekeeping operations have led to a rapprochement between the two emerging norms. In 2009, in his efforts to operationalize RtoP, the UN Secretary-General explicitly called for the mainstreaming of the goals relating to RtoP in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This article argues that the interdependence between RtoP and protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations should not be interpreted as being necessarily conducive to their parallel promotion or mutual strengthening. On the contrary, issue-linkage between them is likely to be counterproductive for three sets of reasons. First, RtoP is characterized by its exceptional nature and narrow agenda – in relation to the four threshold crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing – while the civilian protection in peacekeeping agenda is broad-ranging. Second, there are differences in the degrees of coercion that the two concepts can produce that make them sufficiently distinct not to be amalgamated in the conflict management toolbox. Third, the contentious nature of the two concepts, and in particular the coercive dimension of pillar three of RtoP, is such that a two obvious issue-linkage would be counterproductive as it would exacerbate the norm localisation challenge of two already resisted emerging norms.

scholarly journals Is a European Practice of Mass Atrocity Prevention Emerging? The European Union, Responsibility to Protect and the 2011 Libya Crisis

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 44-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara De Franco ◽  
Annemarie Peen Rodt
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Task Force ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Mass Atrocity ◽  
The Eu

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a “European practice of mass atrocity prevention” is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union’s approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

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