scholarly journals The Justice and Security Dialogue Project: Building the Resilience of Non-State Actors to Atrocity Crimes

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 273-278
Author(s):  
Colette Rausch

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” obliges all states to protect populations from “atrocity crimes”—namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing—under three “pillars” of protection. Pillar One requires a state to protect its own population from atrocity crimes. Pillar Two obliges the international community to help states to exercise this responsibility through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means. When both of these approaches fail, states must pursue a “Pillar Three” strategy: the UN Security Council must “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner.”

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

This article reflects upon the UN General Assembly’s 2012 informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which was on the theme of ‘timely and decisive response’. It shows that although Member States recognize that ‘timely and decisive’ responses to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could sometimes prove controversial, none disputed the occasional necessity of robust enforcement measures when properly authorized by the Security Council and used as a last resort. Against this backdrop, the paper identifies and engages with three of the key challenges that emerged in the dialogue: the relationship between the the three pillars of RtoP, the problem of consistency in the application of the principle, and the challenge of making prevention a ‘living reality’. The paper identifies ways of navigating these challenges and proposes a pathway for the further consolidation of RtoP in international practice.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-100
Author(s):  
Bridget Moix

Ten years ago the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet today, horrific violence against civilians continues in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This article examines some of the progress and gaps in the international community’s efforts to better protect civilians against mass violence over the past decade. It proposes two emerging directions for advancing the R2P agenda in the coming years: 1) greater focus on upstream prevention, and 2) increased support for locally-led peacebuilding and prevention actors and capacities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

States have recently agreed that there is a responsibility to protect populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The international community, however, often lacks the resources and willingness to carry out a key part of this responsibility, that is, to undertake humanitarian intervention effectively when required. One potential solution to this problem is to outsource intervention to private military and security companies. In this article, I consider this option. In particular, I present a largely consequentialist argument which asserts that, when two conditions are met, using these companies to bolster the capacity to undertake humanitarian intervention might be morally justifiable overall.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Mayersen

Within the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, there is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Beneath the statement that states and the international community are charged with the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, lies the implication that vulnerable populations cannot protect themselves. In periods of crisis, when the international community might consider mobilising a response under pillar three, this is often the case. Yet outside of such crises, when pillar one – the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its own populations – and pillar two – assistance from the international community to meet this responsibility – might be invoked in a preventive capacity, vulnerable populations may not be wholly reliant upon protection from external actors. In these circumstances, persecuted groups may actively seek to protect themselves, and may be successfully able to do so. In this paper, I challenge the current understanding of prevention within R2P as an externally imposed process, by considering how persecuted groups have themselves acted in ways that mitigate their vulnerability to mass atrocities. The paper considers a number of historical case studies in which targeted groups were able to leverage their own agency, often with assistance from others, to reduce this vulnerability. These include cases that culminated in genocide, namely the experiences of German and Austrian Jews under Nazi rule, and negative cases studies in which a demonstrable risk of mass atrocities was not realised, such as the experiences of Yemenite Jews in the first half of the twentieth century and those of the Bahá’í community in Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. These cases suggest that assisting persecuted populations to empower themselves can be an effective way to promote resilience to mass atrocities. In the final section of the paper, I explore why this approach is often overlooked, despite its capacity for some success. I consider the potential benefits and costs of a greater focus on utilising the agency of vulnerable groups in endeavours to prevent mass atrocities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-74
Author(s):  
Nicholas Idris Erameh ◽  
Victor Ojakorotu

Existing studies on the Myanmar-Rohingyan crisis have explored the contending issues from a narrow perspective. This underscores the need for broader engagement by interrogating the veracity of the claims of mass atrocities against the Rohingyans, nonauthorization of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), and implications for consolidating and internalizing the RtoP norm. This study argues that, while the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingyans satisfies four of the crimes upon which RtoP can be authorized, its nonauthorization suggests that in spite of its commitment to “Never Again,” the international community is yet to come to terms with issues bordering on mass atrocity and civilian protection. This inaction amidst widespread atrocities against the Rohingyans explains why the RtoP is not only contested, but also risks the chances of further nonutilization and institutionalization. Thus, the possibility that the RtoP would remain valuable depends on how the international criminal court and the global community prosecute those culpable of atrocities against the Rohingyans, adopt a clear rule of establishing when mass atrocity has been perpetuated and demand RtoP intervention, and ensure that these interventions are guided by the principle of Jus in Bellum and Jus ad Bello.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

On September 9, 2013, diplomats and civil society activists gathered in a ballroom in New York to welcome Jennifer Welsh as the UN Secretary-General's new Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In her first public appearance in that role, Special Adviser Welsh explained that one of her top priorities would be “to take prevention seriously and to make it meaningful in practice.” “In the context of RtoP,” Welsh added during the discussion, “we are talking about crimes, and crimes have implications in terms of how we deal with them. You'll hear me say that a lot.” Welsh's approach of treating RtoP as a principle that is primarily concerned with prevention and is firmly linked to international crimes neatly captures the evolution of RtoP since its formal acceptance by states at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit's Outcome Document not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of RtoP but also restricted the scope of RtoP to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The crime and prevention–focused version of RtoP has subsequently been defended and promoted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and by UN member states. This article seeks to systematically explore some of the implications of linking RtoP to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of RtoP, the so-called responsibility to prevent. What, then, are the consequences of approaching the responsibility to prevent as the prevention of international crimes?In order to systematically examine this question, this article turns to literature from criminology. While the criminological perspective has so far been neglected in debates on RtoP, the prominent criminologists John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond argue vehemently that “criminology is crucially positioned to contribute understanding and direction to what the United Nations has mandated as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ groups that are threatened with mass atrocities.” For the purpose of this article, the label “criminology” comprises domestic criminology, supranational criminology, and international criminal law. While insights from supranational criminology and international criminal law are directly applicable to international crimes, translating knowledge generated in relation to crimes at the domestic level to atrocity crimes at the international level is, of course, not without challenges. Reasoning by analogy is an important method in this regard, though given the anarchical nature of international society some analogies will inevitably be imperfect. The benefits of such an approach, if carefully employed, however, outweigh the risks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Arsalan H. AlMizory

Over the past few years, the question whether international law permits the use of force not in response to existing violence but to avert and prevent mass atrocity crimes occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign State has taken on added significant in the aftermath of the humanitarian tragedies of the 1990s. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a complicated and emerging norm of international law, which represents the start of a new era for the United Nations (UN), seeks to provide a means for the Security Council to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The research discusses that when the Security Council is deadlock and peaceful measures have been exhausted, it is important to have a legal basis of using limited armed force as a last resort in the name of humanitarian intervention, to avert overwhelmingly atrocity crimes that a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to prevent. The research analyzes the case of Syria as a case study, which demonstrates that the presence of certain conditions enables the UN Security Council to implement R2P norm to save civilian populations from mass human rights violations.


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