‘Humanitarian Intervention’

Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

This chapter examines whether so-called humanitarian intervention is a lawful exception to the international law prohibiting use of force when rescuing populations from widespread grave human rights violations, without UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VII. It considers what type or level of human rights violation or abuse justifies ‘humanitarian intervention’ if it were permitted, with reference to the R2P categories of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It discusses the UN Charter provisions and state practice on the prohibition on use of force, and criteria used to determine the legality of action deemed humanitarian intervention. The chapter describes tests that an intervention would have to pass and would be applicable to mitigate culpability, including gravity of the situation, political neutrality, the circumstances of the Security Council’s inability to act, and principles of necessity and proportionality. It argues that there is no humanitarian exception to the prohibition of the use of force in international law.

Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley

Reluctant for its first two decades to consider states’ human rights performance, the UN gradually developed an extensive network of machinery to examine human rights violations in some states and categories of violation in all states. Action was limited to investigation and condemnation. The overwhelming majority of states and commentators rejected the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ that had had some currency until the UN Charter’s proscription of the use of force by states. It took the UN sixty years to accept that the Security Council could and should take necessary coercive measures, including armed force, to confront the most extreme forms of human rights violation or atrocity such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In doing so, it sanctified a new doctrine and codified its scope. Political and material realities seem to require sober expectations about the UN’s actual ability to protect populations from these atrocities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

AbstractThis essay investigates the connection between humanitarian intervention and R2P within an historical, legal, and conceptual context. It challenges the widely held view that Africa lacks the capacity to intervene in areas of conflict and human rights violations, arguing instead that the continent possesses the will and instruments to protect human rights. The author notes that, while the UN Security Council retains the primary responsibility for promoting global peace and security, the R2P norm remains contested even within the UN. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were initially undertaken without UN approval, but were later sanctioned by the world body. These interventions undermined the idea of state sovereignty as independence from external interventions, which had previously constrained humanitarian missions in Africa. However, the essay argues that the R2P principle was boosted by the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 to prosecute persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide. In addition, the intervention clause in the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 supports the R2P principle while prohibiting unilateral interventions. Notwithstanding these developments, the author notes that the AU and Africa's regional bodies still have a long way to go in translating the R2P doctrine into practice.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
Dire Tladi

AbstractIn the summer of 2017, the International Law Commission adopted a draft article on exceptions to immunity. The Draft Article adopted provides that immunityratione materiaedoes not apply with respect to certain international crimes, namely crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide, war crimes, the crime of apartheid, torture, and enforced disappearances. These exceptions do not apply to immunityratione personae. The Draft Article was adopted after a vote and was severely criticized by some members of the Commission. It has also received mixed reaction from states, with some supporting its content while others have opposed it. In the aftermath of the adoption of the Draft Article, there has also been academic commentary, some of which has been critical. The (main) criticism levelled against the Draft Article is that it does not represent existing law and has no basis in the practice of states. This article seeks to evaluate the criticism by considering whether there is any state practice in support of the Draft Article proposed by the Commission.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-976
Author(s):  
Cóman Kenny ◽  
Yvonne McDermott

AbstractDoes international law govern how States and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solomon E. Salako

<p>The forcible protection of nationals abroad (a rescue mission) and humanitarian intervention (intervention of one state or a group of states in a territorial state where there is a threat or actual loss of life, forced migration or gross violation of human rights and which, at times, involves government replacement or nation building) are different doctrines which, in functional terms, overlap.</p><p>Since 1945, the <em>ius ad bellum</em> (the rules of international law governing the legality of the use of force) are stated in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, some states and an increasing number of scholars have attempted to discard the prohibition of the use of force and to create new exceptions such as preventive war, pro-democratic intervention and unilateral intervention.</p>The objects of this article are: (i) to assess critically the attempt to drive a horse and a coach through the provisions of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter; (ii) to show that a legal regime laid down by the UN Charter which is founded on a genuine <em>ius contra bellum </em>(law against war) remains unaffected; (iii) to show that the transmogrification of ‘political sovereignty’ to ‘popular sovereignty’ and the use of human rights as justifications for humanitarian intervention can be construed as a subterfuge; and (iv) to analyse the economic, political and strategic reasons for humanitarian intervention and to show how stretching international law to justify a ‘right’ is simply replaced by ‘might’.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 4-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy

In the summer of 2017, the UN International Law Commission adopted Draft Article 7 and an associated draft annex for its project on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The draft article identifies six “crimes under international law in respect of which immunity ratione materiae shall not apply”: genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; crime of apartheid; torture; and enforced disappearance. Given the divergences within the Commission when considering and adopting Draft Article 7 (as evidenced by the plenary debate in 2016 and 2017, the unusual recorded vote on whether to refer the matter to the Commission's drafting committee, and the Commentary), it is difficult to conclude that the Commission is expressing a view that Draft Article 7 reflects lex lata.


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