Universal Jurisdiction for Human Rights: From Legal Principle to Limited Reality

Author(s):  
Darren Hawkins
Author(s):  
Martin Mennecke

Universal jurisdiction permits states to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of certain widely condemned offences, irrespective of whether they possess any of the traditional territorial, nationality, or other jurisdictional links to the offence. As a legal principle, African states accept the principle of universal jurisdiction, but in the past decade they have pushed back against it due to the perception that the courts of various European states have unfairly targeted African government officials that they perceive as enemies. Against this background, the chapter examines the status of the universal jurisdiction debate and how it relates to the role of the International Criminal Court and that of the African Union and its member states, in addition to evaluating the proposals made by African states within the framework of the United Nations to address the African government concerns about double standards in the application of universal jurisdiction through a special ad hoc committee of the General Assembly.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-29
Author(s):  
Moritz Baumgärtel

The European Court of Human Rights has struggled to integrate the lived experience of migrants into the legal reasoning that underlies a determination of human rights violations. This article introduces the concept of migratory vulnerability in an effort to remedy that shortcoming by making an already existing legal principle fit for the daunting task posed by migration cases. The objective is to preserve (and potentially expand) the legal effects of the principle of vulnerability whilst approximating it to the more consistent conception of vulnerability theorists, which would remove some of its ambiguities and negative side effects. Migratory vulnerability describes a cluster of objective, socially induced, and temporary characteristics that affect persons to varying extents and in different forms. It therefore should be conceptualized neither as group membership nor as a purely individual characteristic, but rather determined on a case-by-case basis and in reference to identifiable social processes. Depending on its specific expression, migratory vulnerability may give rise to distinct legal effects such as enlarged scopes of protection, shifts in the burden of proof, procedural and positive obligations, a narrower margin of appreciation, and possibly even the ‘triggering’ of proceedings under Article 14 ECHR.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-135
Author(s):  
Salma Karmi-Ayyoub

Abstract This article will review criminal cases brought under universal jurisdiction (hereinafter “UJ”) laws against Israeli officials1 accused of committing human rights violations against Palestinians. It will describe the challenges to bringing such cases and suggest that political opposition is the main reason there has yet to be such a prosecution. It will propose that UJ remains a viable option for pursuing accountability for Palestinian human rights violations but will suggest ways in which the chance of success for future cases can be improved arguing, in particular, that cases more likely to succeed are those which focus on lower-level perpetrators, in which perpetrators or victims are nationals of forum jurisdictions and that are better integrated into broader advocacy strategies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-205
Author(s):  
Mitsue Inazumi

Abstract States in different regions have different visions and interpretations of international law on how to achieve the goal of protecting human rights, and these differences are causing some conflicts between European states and non-European states. This article examines such conflicts in the field of criminal justice – in the exercise of extradition, universal jurisdiction, and the death penalty. In the field of international criminal law, there are new norms emerging, for example, a rule (referred in this article as ‘the Rule’) that in a situation of concurrent jurisdictions, the court that conducts a fair trial by providing sufficient human rights protection should proceed with the prosecution. In accordance with the Rule, European states decide to exercise their own jurisdiction over cases committed abroad by foreigners, and refuse to extradite a suspect when he or she is likely to face a death penalty or impartial trial. However, the practices of European states in applying new norms in accordance with their understandings of a fair trial and prohibition of the death penalty invited opposition from those states whose national jurisdiction is denied or defeated. They are criticised as an infringement of state sovereignty, or as an unreasonable compulsion of Western values. Such opposition can be observed in the aggressive response from African states asserting that the universal jurisdiction exercised by European states over African officials for crimes committed in Africa contradicts the sovereign equality and independence of African states, thus evoking memories of colonialism. Also, although the influence of the prohibition of death penalty by European states is reflected on the Japan-EU Agreement on the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Japan continues to retain the death penalty.


2014 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This article provides a justification for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in cases of serious environmental damage. This justification rests in important ways on the theory of constituent power. The theory of constituent power has an intergenerational component that requires the protection of the environmental conditions that allow future generations to engage in constitution-making episodes. This article maintains that, by virtue of the connections between constituent power, the right to self-determination, and state sovereignty, the justification for the exercise of universal jurisdiction for serious environmental damage is at least as compelling as the justification for its exercise with respect to egregious human rights infringements. In those scenarios, courts exercising universal jurisdiction would be acting to protect the ability of present and future peoples to participate in the constitution and reconstitution of the states that make up the international community. Such a jurisdiction would rest on the authority of humanity as a whole rather than on that of any state or people.


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