Rouba Al-Salem, “Security, Rights and Law: The Israeli High Court of Justice and Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank”

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-240
Author(s):  
Diana Buttu
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice M Panepinto

In the context of prolonged occupation, it has long been argued that the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC), in High Court of Justice (HCJ) formation, is facilitating the entrenchment of a permanent regime of legalized control by moving away from a model of exception to ordinary civilian jurisdiction over the West Bank. This was recently demonstrated in the Khan-al-Ahmar case, in which a group of settlers petitioned the ISC/HCJ demanding the execution of a pending Israeli demolition order over a school in a Bedouin village in Palestine. The court sided with the army, deferring to a political solution for the transfer of the entire Bedouin community elsewhere. Drawing on existing scholarship and the author’s first-hand impressions of the final hearing, this article interprets the Khan-al-Ahmar case as an illustration of how the exceptional military nature of the occupation has shifted to a permanent regime of legalized control overseen by an ordinary civilian court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-95
Author(s):  
Efrat Shir

On 26 of November 2018, Israel’s High Court of Justice decided that Mr Firas Tbeish, a Palestinian from the Hebron area in the West Bank, had not been tortured. This concluded of six-year legal battle undertaken by Mr Tbeish and the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel. The case summary outlines the context in which the decision was given, while paying particular attention to the (mis)conception of Istanbul Protocol reports in Israel’s legal system.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-163

The case was brought before the High Court on 29 February by villagers from Bayt Surik, Biddu, al-Kabiba, Ka'ane, Bayt Anan, Bayt Laqia, Bayt Ajaza, and Bayt Daku challenging the seizure of their lands and the disproportionate hardship caused by the wall's route; the defendants (““respondents””) were the Government of Israel and the military commander of the West Bank. Unlike the International Court of Justice at the Hague, the High Court was not called upon to consider the wall as a whole, but only a 40-km stretch (out of the 832-km total length) northwest of Jerusalem. The court ruled without deliberation in favor of Israel's right to build the wall on West Bank lands and the security nature of the project. Most of the opinion concerned the legality of the specific route. The court considered six separate orders pertaining to different segments of the wall and ruled that disproportionate hardship was caused to the inhabitants along about 30 km. For these segments, the court ordered the military commander to ““consider alternatives which, even if they result in a lower level of security, will cause a substantial (even if not complete) reduction of the damage to the lives of the local inhabitants”” (para. 76). In compliance with the order, the IDF on 8 July finalized a proposal for a new path for the wall in the Bayt Surik area, but Prime Minister Sharon and Defense Minister Mofaz had not formally approved it by the end of the quarter. The full text of the court ruling can be found on the High Court's Web site at www.court.gov.il.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 514-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Harpaz ◽  
Yuval Shany

On December 29, 2009, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, delivered its judgment inAbu Safiya v. The Minister of Defense,annulling an order issued by an Israeli Military Commander, which completely barred Palestinians from travelling on Route 443, a major road in the West Bank. This note criticizes theAbu Safiyajudgment as indicative, notwithstanding its specific outcome, of the Supreme Court's ongoing willingness to expand theratione materiaeandratione personaeof occupation law and to allow the military authorities to protect the interests of Israelis in the West Bank, even at the expense of the stronger rights conferred upon the local Palestinian population by thelex specialis—the laws of belligerent occupation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)


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