Till Human Voices Wake Us

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Kidd White

The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity. Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Yee Karen Lee

AbstractThe idea of “human dignity” is accorded a prominent status in domestic constitutions and international human rights law. Its symbolism as a universal ground of human rights sits awkwardly with the absence of a precise definition. The concept has evolved over history and has been interpreted in various ways by people holding different worldviews. The elusive nature of human dignity creates challenges when it is evaluated across cultures. Despite its common association with the concept of liberal democracy, the idea of human worthiness is not necessarily absent in Asian societies, many of which function under alternative political systems.A cross-cultural perspective requires putting aside ethnocentrism and exploring the convergence of views from different belief systems. Examples from Confucianism and Islam may provide insights on how human dignity is understood and realized in various Asian contexts.


Author(s):  
Carozza Paolo G

This article examines the issue of human dignity in relation to human rights. It analyses the functions and principle of human dignity and its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. It suggests that human dignity seems to help justify expansive interpretations of human rights and strengthens the centrality and importance of the right in question and limiting possible exceptions or limitations to that right. This article also contends that the difficulty of reaching greater consensus on the meaning and implications of human dignity in international human rights law may be attributed to the fact that it refers to both a foundational premise of human rights and to a principle that affect interpretation and application of specific human rights.


Author(s):  
Melanie Studer ◽  
Kurt Pärli

In Switzerland, the participation in certain work programmes is an eligibility criterion to social assistance benefits and the constitutionally granted right to the financial means required for a decent standard of living. This chapter examines whether the implementation of these programmes is in accordance with fundamental rights and more precisely, whether they respect the normative framework elaborated in Chapter 4. As will be shown, the right to financial assistance when in need has close links to human dignity. Therefore, the evaluation of the mentioned work programmes against the human rights background leads to some critical conclusions on their compatibility with international human rights law in general and human dignity in particular. Especially, the authors argue that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s case law lacks a comprehensive approach for the evaluation of human rights infringements in this context.


2019 ◽  
pp. 270-280
Author(s):  
Henk Addink

Good governance is a legal concept and a cornerstone of the modern state and presented in the book as the third cornerstone of a modern stone (alongside the rule of law and democracy). We concluded in relation to the development of the concept of good governance in part I that principles of good governance can only be legal principles when they have been somehow codified legal effect. The good governance principles became more concrete by enumerating six groups of principles (properness, transparency, participation, effectiveness, accountability, and human rights) which are found in many documents of national, regional, and international context. From the legal theory approach on good governance we discussed the character of these principles. In part II we specified the principles of good governance and starting with the principle of properness, which has also been developed under the name of the principle of natural justice. The second, the principle of transparency, is connected to the principle of participation which both have roots in the concept of democracy. The principles of effectiveness and accountability both have a relationship to the institutional structure and functioning. The last principle is the human rights principle which is linked to the rule of law but also to democracy. Several principles of good governance were already developed in regulations and in codes which are the building blocks for the development of the right to good governance. The implementation of good governance and the comparison between countries were explained in Part III. After that, the regional level was discussed—the European Union and the Council of Europe were chosen as models as far as it was comparable. The last chapter was about the implementation on the international level.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Gueraldi

This article identifies some challenges faced by the Brazilian State in eradicating human trafficking. International Human Rights Law is the instrument I adopt as a conceptual paradigm for analysis of the State’s conduct, arguing that Brazilian National Policy implemented since 2008 does not meet the preventative needs, the repression of perpetrators, nor victim protection as proposed by International Human Rights Law. The conduct of State powers shows that human trafficking is still conceived as a criminal offense, rather than as a human rights violation. Existing published Brazilian studies commonly approach human trafficking in terms of criminal law. I analyze it under the umbrella of International Human Rights Law, disassociating human trafficking from an exclusively feminist approach, and describing it in terms of a global human rights violation pattern related to international migration flows. I emphasize some interior legal concepts commonly overlooked by juridical doctrine, such as vulnerability and exploitation, with attention to cultural attitudes that help determine policy.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 901-953 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic McGoldrick

Thisessay assesses the significance of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 on legal theory and practice. Part II considers its constitutional context and significance; Part III deals with whether the European Convention on Human Rights has been ‘incorporated’. Part IV deals with its entry into force. The two principal methods used by the HRA to relate to (1) statutory interpretation and (2) a duty on public authorities or those exercising public functions. We consider these in turn. Part V analyses the interpretative obligation contained in the Act, the power for higher courts to make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, and effects of such a declaration. Part VI explores the new statutory duty imposed by the Act. Part VII assesses the Act's remedial provisions. Part VIII notes the particular provision made for freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Part IX discusses the issues of ‘horizontal effect’ and the ‘margin of appreciation’. Part X concludes with an assessment of the significance of the HRA on legal theory and practice—just how big a difference has it made and will it make?


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-88
Author(s):  
Helge Årsheim

International human rights law (ihrl) has traditionally enjoyed an uneasy relationship with customary, religious, and indigenous forms of law. International courts and tribunals have considered these non-state forms of law to represent both structural and material challenges to the implementation of human rights norms at the domestic level. Over the course of the last decades, however, the theory and practice of human rights has increasingly started recognizing and accommodating multiple legal orders. This article traces the gradually increasing accommodation of legal pluralism in ihrl in the monitoring practice of four un human rights committees over a period of 20 years, looking in particular at the increasing recognition of religious forms of legality across the committees.


Author(s):  
Christopher McCrudden

An account of what we know about the use by domestic courts of international human rights law is identified, based on the findings in this volume and earlier work on the use of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). From that, three aspects of the domestic functions of international human rights treaties are tentatively identified as particularly significant: international human rights law is only partly internationally-directed; domestic courts very seldom appear to be acting as ‘agents’ of international human rights law; and ‘human dignity’ (sometimes by itself, sometimes alongside ‘autonomy’ and ‘equality’) acts as an important meta-principle in the domestic use of international human rights law. The implications these functions have for normative theorising about human rights, in particular practice-dependent theories of human rights, is considered, and a theory of human rights law consistent with this practice is identified.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document