scholarly journals The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, And Trade Liberalization

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Hiscox

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences: namely, by changing the trade policymaking process in the United States, the RTAA is held responsible for the dramatic liberalization in U.S. policy beginning in the 1930s and 1940s. This article takes issue with this conventional wisdom. I argue that the standard accounts—which emphasize the importance of delegation for overcoming logrolling in Congress or for facilitating reciprocity in international trade negotiations—fail to provide an adequate explanation for just how the institutional innovation was achieved and sustained in the face of protectionist opposition. I suggest instead that trade liberalization was driven by exogenous changes in party constituencies and societal preferences that had crucial effects on congressional votes to extend the RTAA authority and liberalize trade after 1945. The preservation of the RTAA program was symptomatic rather than causal; as a consequence, it may well be abandoned in the future. The evolution of U.S. trade policy has been, and will continue to be, powerfully shaped by changes in the preferences of societal groups and in the positions taken by parties on the trade issue.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (6) ◽  
pp. 2169-2195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit K Khandelwal ◽  
Peter K Schott ◽  
Shang-Jin Wei

If trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions, trade liberalization can lead to greater-than-expected gains. We examine Chinese textile and clothing exports before and after the elimination of externally imposed export quotas. Both the surge in export volume and the decline in export prices following quota removal are driven by net entry. This outcome is inconsistent with a model in which quotas are allocated based on firm productivity, implying misallocation of resources. Removing this misallocation accounts for a substantial share of the overall gain in productivity associated with quota removal. (JEL F13, F14, L67, O14, O19, P23, P33)


2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Goldstein ◽  
Robert Gulotty

AbstractAmong scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurred. Through a close study of the US tariff schedule between 1928 and 1964, focusing on highly protected products, we examine which products were subject to liberalization and at what time. After 1934, delegation led to a change in trade policy, not because Congress gave up their constitutional prerogative in this domain but because presidents were able to target the potential economic dislocation that derives from import competition to avoid the creation of a congressional majority willing to halt the trade agreements program.


World Economy ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Laird ◽  
Patrick Messerlin

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (12) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
KERRI WACHTER
Keyword(s):  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (29) ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Kreiner

1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 1025-1027 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Z. Yanovski
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-426
Author(s):  
Z. Kudrna

This paper reviews the progress of banking reforms in China. Since 2002, the reform strategy has relied on publicly-financed bailouts, implementation of international best practices in bank governance and regulation, and listing of major banks in Hong Kong. The three largest banks have been stabilised, but we find little reason to expect this to be sustainable. Prudential indicators are comparable to international averages, but this is an outcome of bailouts and ongoing credit boom. Reforms of bank governance and regulatory frameworks that would alter banker’s incentives are implemented in a selective manner; principles that concentrate key powers in the centre are implemented vigorously, whereas those that require independent boards and regulators are ignored. Selectiveness of institutional reform means that the largest banks remain under state control and can be used as means of development policy for the better or the worse.


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