Grand strategy and economic interests are tightly interconnected: a state’s economy affects its choice of strategy, and its choice of strategy affects its economy. A full account of this relationship must distinguish among three perspectives on state and societal preferences. Under most varieties of realism, the state is autonomous from society and motivated by survival. Wealth is a vital source of military power, and military power is necessary for survival; thus, the state seeks to increase its wealth relative to its rivals. This paradigm provides much insight into the dynamics of interstate competition, but its assumption that grand strategy is insulated from domestic politics sharply limits its analytic utility. Liberals, Marxists, and neoclassical realists go deeper. They do not ignore the survival motive, but they also consider how the state might be biased in favor of a particularist set of economic interests. When this bias is consistent, persisting across changes in government, it constitutes a national preference; when it varies across governments, it is a subnational preference. Research into the latter shows great promise for the development of new insights into the root causes of grand strategy.