Examples Of “Lockheed” Type Executive Agreements And List Of Countries With Which United States Has Similar Agreements And Of Subjects Of Such Agreements

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-89
Author(s):  
Julian Nyarko

AbstractScholars have argued that Senate-approved treaties are becoming increasingly irrelevant in the United States, because their role can be fulfilled by their close but less politically costly cousin, the congressional-executive agreement. This study demonstrates that treaties are more durable than congressional-executive agreements, supporting the view that there are qualitative differences between the two instruments. Abandoning the treaty may therefore lead to unintended consequences by decreasing the tools that the executive has available to design optimal agreements.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 173-177
Author(s):  
Edward T. Swaine

Why does Wüsthof sell a fancy kitchen knife for US$2000, but mass-produce something similar for US$100? Why do some of us mail holiday cards, while sending anything similar by email? Why does the American Journal of International Law print its journal, when interested readers—and there should be many—can read articles like Julian Nyarko's “Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements” online? Come to think of it, why bother with Article II treaties, when they too have a near substitute, more easily produced, in congressional-executive agreements? On this last question, Nyarko's article offers an interesting approach and an intriguing finding: if we measure the commitment strength of agreements in terms of duration, treaties are measurably longer and, perhaps, stronger. Having spent several years working on treaty issues for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, I am acutely (and perhaps embarrassingly) interested in finding out why they matter. In this essay, I note some misgivings about how the article reckons the substitutability of agreements and about treating their age as a proxy for strength—perhaps Methuselah rivaled Samson's might at some point, but that was not how he distinguished himself—before closing by trying to imagine rival inferences that might be consistent with Nyarko's valuable insights.


1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 686-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert W. Briggs

A recent Congressional debate appears to have been one of the opening skirmishes on the question of whether the postwar commitments of the United States should be accepted by treaty or by unfettered executive discretion. On August 13, 1942, President Roosevelt transmitted to Congress a request for the passage of an enclosed draft joint resolution ostensibly “authorizing the execution of certain obligations under the treaties of 1903 and 1936 with Panama, and other commitments.” The President's message, after referring to the “thoroughly coöperative” attitude of the Panamanian Government in the present crisis and stating that “on March 5, 1941, the President of the Republic of Panama issued a manifesto making available for use by the United States certain defense sites in the territory of that Republic,” added that the time had come to make certain concessions long desired by the Republic of Panama. “Accordingly,” continued the message, “I deem it advisable that this Government convey to Panama the water and sewerage systems in the cities of Panama and Colon; that it relinquish its extensive real-estate holdings in the cities of Colon and Panama, so far as these holdings are not essential to the operation and protection of the Canal; and that it liquidate the credit of two and a half million dollars made available to the Republic of Panama by the Export-Import Bank for the construction of Panama's share of the Chorrera-Rio Hato Highway, a road essential to our defense requirements and constructed in accordance with standards made essential by these requirements.”


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