The UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Governance of Global Public Goods

This chapter analyses the relationship between global public goods (GPGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It argues that the Global 2030 Agenda of the United Nations constitutes an example of how the concept of GPGs has been given a normative dimension in international law, as well as of the difficulties that may be encountered in the process of operationalization of GPGs. The normative framework for the implementation of the SDGs relies on the use of indicators to evaluate state performance in achieving the SDGs. The choice of such indicators is crucial for appropriate decision making. However, both the usefulness and the legitimacy of indicators have been put into question. The chapter contends that the indicators are in fact normative – and intrinsically politically-driven – instruments. For this reason, the development of a global indicator framework should be expected to follow a democratic procedure involving all the relevant stakeholders.

We the People: Is the Polity the State?

When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different liberal-democratic states and depends on two underlying considerations: (1) the amount of discretion held by the state's officeholders; (2) the extent to which the democratic procedure is deliberative rather than aggregative.

The formation of the composition of the Constitutional Court of Russia in 1994–1995 (on the history of the issue and constitutional and legal aspects)

The modernisation of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 1993–2000 was a result of the political and legal transformations of the 1990s, and the period of its procedural inaction for a year and a half was by no means time lost. It was used to prepare a new law for the Constitutional Court, which was largely prepared by the Court itself and accompanied by disputes with the State Legal Department of the Russian Federation’s president and various factions of the State Duma of the first assembly (LDPR, KPRF). Discussions were primarily held about the status of the Constitutional Court, such as the Court’s term in office, as well as its number of members, which greatly determined the effectiveness of the future “second” Constitutional Court of the 1993–1995 model and its internal structure. Filling the Constitutional Court’s six vacant seats as defined by the 1993 Constitution was not carried out by electing judges as in the previous legislation, but instead by appointing them to each of the chambers on the suggestion of the head of state. This predetermined an acute political struggle, primarily to establish the procedure for selecting candidates for judicial positions and determining the role of the president in each chamber of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma factions, legal institutions, and scientific communities of legal scholars. The independent “game” of each of these elements delayed the process of starting a functioning Constitutional Court for many months, but the democratic procedure for electing the courts’ heads allowed the issue to resolve without delay.

Disentangling How Populism and Radical Host Ideologies Shape Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic Decision-Making

In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent to which citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish four modes of decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of democracy. While populism is primarily directed against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority decisions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on the general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical host ideologies confirm that the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible responses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.

The chimera of the All-Russian»founder»and the collapse of the illusions of the Ukrainian Central Rada (end of 1917 – beginning of 1918)

The article deals with an interesting but insufficiently and not clearly enough discussed in the historiographical process research perspective, which is related to the reconstruction, from the present day viewpoint, of the efforts and attempts of the national political elite to implement the idea of state autonomy of Ukraine through the mechanism of the so-called All-Russian Constituency (Constituent Assembly) during the existence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and taking into account the choice of the model of democratic social progress in the late 1917 – early 1918. This storyline is considered in the context of political activity of the Central Rada and its leaders M. Hrushevsky, V. Vinnychenko, other participants of the national-liberation movement of the Ukrainian Revolution (I. Mazepa, D. Doroshenko, etc.), implementation of certain steps to legitimize this institute as the supreme body of government and governance on the territory of Ukraine of that time, the consolidation of the political party on the basis of the traditions and experience of national government.Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of universals of the Central Rada in the course of strengthening its power positions, search and realization of the optimal formula of national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine, exercisingits right of final approval as the All-Russian "founder" (2nd Universal), formation of the UNR (3rd Universal) etc. The article makes an emphasis on the aggravation of the UNR relations with the Bolshevik government of Russia as a result of its ultimatum to the Rada and the unleashing of war against the UNR.The results of the elections in Ukraine which took place before the All-Russian and Ukrainian Constituent Assembly are described in the article. In addition, the rating of the main political forces in the regional dimension, first to be formed through such a democratic procedure, is studied. The substantiated conclusion is made about the actual failure of the phenomenon of the Constituency being dismissed by the Bolshevik government as a long-awaited tool in the public and political sphere for resolving the Ukrainian issue, the rapid decline in society under pressure of many factors of authority and influence of the Central Rada, the final collapse of its illusions to achieve a real autonomy of Ukraine under Moscow’s supervision.

GAMIFICATION POSSIBILITY USE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULATION CIVIL ACTIVITY PLATFORMS

The authors conducted the study of electronic referendum system of the Moscow government "Active Citizen" in order to determine the possibilities of gamification use on the platforms for civil participation, the influence of game mechanics on the civic activity of Russians. The methods of research were the following ones: qualitative analysis of "Active citizen" user feedback, presented on the official Internet portal, as well as user interviews (N = 30). The interview allowed to reveal the motivational attitudes of the respondents' representation on the platform "Active citizen", to evaluate the key parameters of the civil activity platform functioning and the elements of gamification. The result of the study determined that the civil platform creates an opportunity to discuss some important issues for the city. However, with the observation of democratic procedure appearance, there is the substitution of real participation in the state management for the possibility of discussion. The performed study showed the ambivalent nature of gamification use. The respondents demonstrate the polarity of gaming method perception during their transfer to civil platforms: for some participants the possibility of score accumulation is a pleasant bonus to the opportunity to take part in urban problem solution, while it becomes an aim for others and an opportunity to increase one's self-esteem. According to public opinion, the system of electronic referendums of the Moscow government "Active Citizen" will not reduce the demand in the long term

Democracy

Democracy means rule by the people, as contrasted with rule by a special person or group. It is a system of decision making in which everyone who belongs to the political organism making the decision is actually or potentially involved. They all have equal power. There have been competing conceptions about what this involves. On one conception this means that everyone should participate in making the decision themselves, which should emerge from a full discussion. On another conception, it means that everyone should be able to vote between proposals or for representatives who will be entrusted with making the decision; the proposal or representative with most votes wins. Philosophical problems connected with democracy relate both to its nature and its value. It might seem obvious that democracy has value because it promotes liberty and equality. As compared with, for example, dictatorship, everyone has equal political power and is free from control by a special individual or group. However, at least on the voting conception of democracy, it is the majority who have the control. This means that the minority may not be thought to be treated equally; and they lack liberty in the sense that they are controlled by the majority. Another objection to democracy is that, by counting everyone’s opinions as of equal value, it considers the ignorant as being as important as the knowledgeable, and so does not result in properly informed decisions. However, voting may in certain circumstances be the right way of achieving knowledge. Pooling opinions may lead to better group judgement. These difficulties with democracy are alleviated by the model which concentrates on mutual discussion rather than people just feeding opinions into a voting mechanism. Opinions should in such circumstances be better formed; and individuals are more obviously equally respected. However, this depends upon them starting from positions of equal power and liberty; rather than being consequences of a democratic procedure, it would seem that equality and liberty are instead prerequisites which are needed in order for it to work properly.

Democracy

Democracy means rule by the people, as contrasted with rule by a special person or group. It is a system of decision making in which everyone who belongs to the political organism making the decision is actually or potentially involved. They all have equal power. There have been competing conceptions about what this involves. On one conception this means that everyone should participate in making the decision themselves, which should emerge from a full discussion. On another conception, it means that everyone should be able to vote between proposals or for representatives who will be entrusted with making the decision; the proposal or representative with most votes wins. Philosophical problems connected with democracy relate both to its nature and its value. It might seem obvious that democracy has value because it promotes liberty and equality. As compared with, for example, dictatorship, everyone has equal political power and is free from control by a special individual or group. However, at least on the voting conception of democracy, it is the majority who have the control. This means that the minority may not be thought to be treated equally; and they lack liberty in the sense that they are controlled by the majority. Another objection to democracy is that, by counting everyone’s opinions as of equal value, it considers the ignorant as being as important as the knowledgeable, and so does not result in properly informed decisions. However, voting may in certain circumstances be the right way of achieving knowledge. Pooling opinions may lead to better group judgement. These difficulties with democracy are alleviated by the model which concentrates on mutual discussion rather than people just feeding opinions into a voting mechanism. Opinions should in such circumstances be better formed; and individuals are more obviously equally respected. However, this depends upon them starting from positions of equal power and liberty; rather than being consequences of a democratic procedure, it would seem that equality and liberty are instead prerequisites which are needed in order for it to work properly.

Theorizing the Institutional Sources of Global Governance Legitimacy

This chapter queries the widely prevalent distinction between input- and output-related sources of legitimacy in global governance. Instead, it suggests a typology of sources which builds on a related but analytically sharper distinction of procedure and performance. Moreover, the chapter emphasizes that legitimacy perceptions derive from democratic, technocratic, and fairness qualities of procedure and performance. The chapter thus arrives at a novel typology whereby the sources of legitimacy for global governance institutions can be classified in terms of democratic procedure, technocratic procedure, fair procedure, democratic performance, technocratic performance, and fair performance. The chapter further illustrates a range of indicators for these sources and considers how these bases of legitimacy may vary across types of global governance institutions, countries, societal groups, and time. The result is a wider, tighter, and more systematic understanding of the institutional grounds for perceptions of global governance legitimacy.