scholarly journals Samsons or Methuselahs? The (Potential) Virtue of Article II Treaties

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 173-177
Author(s):  
Edward T. Swaine

Why does Wüsthof sell a fancy kitchen knife for US$2000, but mass-produce something similar for US$100? Why do some of us mail holiday cards, while sending anything similar by email? Why does the American Journal of International Law print its journal, when interested readers—and there should be many—can read articles like Julian Nyarko's “Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements” online? Come to think of it, why bother with Article II treaties, when they too have a near substitute, more easily produced, in congressional-executive agreements? On this last question, Nyarko's article offers an interesting approach and an intriguing finding: if we measure the commitment strength of agreements in terms of duration, treaties are measurably longer and, perhaps, stronger. Having spent several years working on treaty issues for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, I am acutely (and perhaps embarrassingly) interested in finding out why they matter. In this essay, I note some misgivings about how the article reckons the substitutability of agreements and about treating their age as a proxy for strength—perhaps Methuselah rivaled Samson's might at some point, but that was not how he distinguished himself—before closing by trying to imagine rival inferences that might be consistent with Nyarko's valuable insights.

Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam

Among the more controversial provisions of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), are the sections dealing with the act of state doctrine in Tentative Draft No. 4. Section 428 provides: “Subject to §429, courts in the United States will refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the state’s own territory.” This provision, of course, is based on the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino. The Court there stated, “the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government” even if it is alleged that the taking is contrary to international law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Norton

One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute law. What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.Junius†Less than twenty years ago, a large majority of the United Nations General Assembly declared the customary international law of expropriation dead. Eighty-six governments supported a resolution holding that a state expropriating foreign property “is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and … any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of [that] State.” Scholars cited this and other General Assembly resolutions as evidence that international law no longer required full compensation for the expropriation of foreign property. This view had sufficient support to precipitate an acrimonious dispute in the preparation of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which reaffirmed only in its later drafts the traditional “Hull formula.”


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

A hotly debated issue raised in this publication’s October 1986 Agora and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restatement took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time should prevail. Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agreements have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the United States, “arguably later customary law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement.”’


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-764
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Diane Marie Amann

United States v. Balsys. 118 S.Ct. 2218.U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1998.Resolving a long-open question, the U.S. Supreme Court held in this 7-2 decision that a witness in a domestic proceeding may not invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination if the witness fears that the testimony may be used in a prosecution outside the United States. Although grounded in domestic law, the three opinions in Balsys reveal tension between the judiciary's traditional deference to the political branches in foreign relations matters and its concern over the risk that individuals subject to prosecution abroad will suffer deprivation of liberty because of that deference.


Author(s):  
Paul B. Stephan

This chapter considers the rise of foreign relations law as a way of thinking about the legal dimensions of international relations. It connects this development to the emergence of comparative international law and anxieties about fragmentation in international law. Each of these fields challenges conventional ways of thinking about international law and thus seems to bolster those who would dismiss international law as irrelevant or ineffectual. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first describes contemporary foreign relations law as a distinct field that emerged in the United States in the late 1990s and developed independently in parts of the British Commonwealth and Europe. It traces the parallels with and differences between foreign relations law and comparative international law. The second section considers the possibility these complementary trends, as well as concerns about fragmentation, pose a threat to international law as conventionally conceived. The third section responds to these concerns.


Author(s):  
Sarah H Cleveland ◽  
Paul B. Stephan

This introductory chapter serves as a foreword for the volume. It sketches the history of past restatements and the evolution of the latest one. The first (confusingly called Second) Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States brought widespread attention to the term “foreign relations law.” It staunchly defended the proposition that foreign relations, no matter how imbued with discretion and prerogative, still must rest on law. The Third Restatement, prepared during a period of what to many seemed constitutional retrenchment and a loosening of judicial supervision over public life, offered a robust defense of the proposition that, “In conducting the foreign relations of the United States, Presidents, members of Congress, and public officials are not at large in a political process; they are under law.” Moreover, it insisted that the judiciary, as much as the executive and Congress, creates and enforces this law. To the extent that the Third Restatement rested its claims on its view of the state of customary international law, other influential actors pushed back. The Fourth Restatement revisits the Third’s claims, especially about the central role of the judiciary, in light of the evolution of both U.S. and international law and practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-135
Author(s):  
William S Dodge

Abstract In 2018, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, which restates the law of the United States governing jurisdiction, state immunity, and judgments. These issues arise with great frequency in international cases brought in US courts, including cases involving Chinese parties. This article provides an overview of many of the key provisions of the Restatement (Fourth). The article describes the Restatement (Fourth)’s treatment of the customary international law of jurisdiction, as well the rules of US domestic law based on international comity that US courts apply when deciding international cases.


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