3 Executive Agreements and Political Commitments

This chapter considers the status in the U.S. legal system of “executive agreements”—that is, international agreements concluded by the United States outside of the senatorial advice-and-consent process specified in Article II of the Constitution. After describing the substantial growth during the twentieth century in the number of executive agreements, the chapter discusses the different types of these agreements: executive agreements concluded pursuant to authorization in a prior treaty; ex ante congressional–executive agreements concluded with prior authorization from Congress; ex post congressional–executive agreements concluded with congressional approval after they are negotiated; and sole executive agreements concluded by the president. The chapter also discusses the extent to which executive agreements are interchangeable with Article II treaties for purposes of domestic law, with respect to the preemption of state law, displacement of federal statutes, and federalism limitations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the growing phenomenon of non-binding political commitments.

The Sinai II Agreements of 1975

The fifth and final chapter examines the controversial and secret executive agreements connected to Sinai II, concluded in September 1975, in the context of a congressional effort to restrict the broad use of such agreements. The agreements committed the United States to providing for Israel’s military and economic security and pledged to not advance any steps in the peace process without Israel’s approval. Numerous legislators argued that the agreements marked a fundamental and questionable shift in U.S.-Israel relations and that they resembled treaties, which required Senate approval. Based on research from the Congressional Record, Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and congressional hearing reports, the chapter shows that legislators felt handcuffed. They felt obligated to pass a resolution to allow for U.S. technicians to man an early-warning station in the Sinai Peninsula in order to preserve the agreement between Israel and Egypt. But by passing the resolution, Congress also authorized, by what Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) called “backdoor” approval, the executive agreements that committed the United States to providing for the future economic, military, and energy needs of Israel, regardless of Israel’s willingness to adhere to the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242.

The Constitution of the United States and Foreign Relations

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.

The Philippines

This chapter assesses international law in the Philippines. The primary entry points of international law in Philippine jurisdiction are the Incorporation Clause and the Treaty Clause of the 1987 Charter. The chapter considers the paradoxical phenomenon of the supposedly dualist device of treaties opening a quasi-monist door to international legal obligations in the form of executive agreements that do not require the concurrence of the Senate but become binding on the Philippines by Executive imprimatur. Moreover, as quasi-monist devices, executive agreements function both as a sword, giving direct effect to international law—especially in the protection of rights—and as a shield, raising barriers to public or international accountability according to political considerations. The four other entry points for international law in Philippine practice include the direct effect by the Supreme Court’s rule-making powers, constitutionalization, statutory application, and international law in the State of Exception.

Senate Treatment of Select International Agreements, 2013–2018

When I finished reading Julian Nyarko's “Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements,” I found my mind wandering through memories of the more than five years I spent working on Capitol Hill as Counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)—a role that often required me to figure out how best to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of Congress in the face of the various types of international agreements the executive branch produced. This essay recounts my impressions of how the Senate handled different agreements in the 2013–2018 timeframe—Article II treaties, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Unlike Professor Nyarko's ambitious and impressive work to categorize and statistically analyze the durability of Article II treaties and executive agreements—which I applaud and find useful—this essay is modest in purpose. I contend that how Congress handles different types of agreements is largely a product of specific political dynamics—including political ownership, policy entrepreneurism, and electoral risk—that can be unpredictable. Because of these dynamics, the differences that Nyarko reveals regarding the durability of Article II treaties and executive agreements are unlikely to produce a significant change in official practice.

Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements

Scholars have argued that Senate-approved treaties are becoming increasingly irrelevant in the United States, because their role can be fulfilled by their close but less politically costly cousin, the congressional-executive agreement. This study demonstrates that treaties are more durable than congressional-executive agreements, supporting the view that there are qualitative differences between the two instruments. Abandoning the treaty may therefore lead to unintended consequences by decreasing the tools that the executive has available to design optimal agreements.

Samsons or Methuselahs? The (Potential) Virtue of Article II Treaties

Why does Wüsthof sell a fancy kitchen knife for US$2000, but mass-produce something similar for US$100? Why do some of us mail holiday cards, while sending anything similar by email? Why does the American Journal of International Law print its journal, when interested readers—and there should be many—can read articles like Julian Nyarko's “Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements” online? Come to think of it, why bother with Article II treaties, when they too have a near substitute, more easily produced, in congressional-executive agreements? On this last question, Nyarko's article offers an interesting approach and an intriguing finding: if we measure the commitment strength of agreements in terms of duration, treaties are measurably longer and, perhaps, stronger. Having spent several years working on treaty issues for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, I am acutely (and perhaps embarrassingly) interested in finding out why they matter. In this essay, I note some misgivings about how the article reckons the substitutability of agreements and about treating their age as a proxy for strength—perhaps Methuselah rivaled Samson's might at some point, but that was not how he distinguished himself—before closing by trying to imagine rival inferences that might be consistent with Nyarko's valuable insights.

Duration ≠ Seriousness of Commitment: An Empirical and Theoretical Critique of Nyarko's Treaties vs. Executive Agreements

In “Giving the Treaty a Purpose,” Julian Nyarko distinguishes between treaties and executive agreements and argues that treaties signal a higher level of commitment to our partners in cooperation than do executive agreements because treaties are more durable. Nyarko uses survival-time analysis to demonstrate that treaties last longer than executive agreements—that is, treaties are less likely to drop out of the Treaties in Force (TIF) series in any given year. The longer life of treaties is Nyarko's proxy for their greater durability. Nyarko argues that his result holds “even after controlling for a number of covariates that could influence the durability of the agreement,” like particular presidents, subject areas, and partner countries as well as the degree of divided government. Nonetheless, Nyarko's list omits the most important variable affecting durability as he defines it: intended duration. Sometimes the intended duration of a piece of formal international law is finite. Indeed, as I will explain in this response, under certain (and common) conditions, this choice of a finite duration is what makes the commitment credible (or, in Nyarko's language, reliable).