Does integration lead to lower costs of equity?

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-112
Author(s):  
Jessica Dye ◽  
Aaron Gilbert ◽  
Gail Pacheco
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Market Integration ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
World Market ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Firm Level

Recent evidence has suggested that the benefits of equity market integration may not be shared equally by all firms. Making use of a firm-level measure of integration we investigate whether one of the documented benefits of equity market integration, lower cost of equity capital (COEC), holds for all Australian firms. Empirical evidence suggests that the degree of integration is reflected in firm COEC, albeit not in the expected way. Our results indicate that increased integration at the firm level leaves firms exposed to higher COEC when world market conditions are volatile.

scholarly journals The Effect of Chief Executive Officer Dominance and Shareholder Rights on Cost of Equity Capital in Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Yawar Miraj Khilji ◽  
Shehzad Khan ◽  
Muhammad Faizan Malik
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
The Impact

This Research explores the effect of Chief executive Dominance and Shareholder rights on Cost of equity of listed companies in an emerging equity market, Pakistan. The research is for the period of 2012 to 2018 for which firm level data of top 100 non-financial listed firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange has been examined by using descriptive statistics, a correlation -matrix, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Model approach. The impact of controlled variables which includes firm size, Financial Leverage, and Book to market ratio influence on the firms cost of equity has also been investigated. Research results indicate that when Chief executive officers align their interest with that of shareholders, the risk of agency problem is mitigated thus leading to lower cost of equity.

scholarly journals Impact of Corporate Political Connections on Cost of Equity: A Dynamic Panel Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-65
Author(s):  
Aamir Amanat ◽  
Ahmed Imran Hunjra ◽  
Salman Ali Qureshi ◽  
Muhammad Hanif ◽  
Muhammad Razzaq Athar
Keyword(s):  
Lower Cost ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Financing Cost ◽  
Corporate Political Strategies ◽  
The Impact

We analyze the impact of corporate political connections on the cost of equity of non-financial firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange. We extract data from the DataStream and Election Commission of Pakistan for the years 2001 to 2018. The Generalized Method of Moments is used for data analysis. This research finds that firms use political connections to enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. Further, firms with strong ties to political power obtain more benefits on financing cost as compared to non-connected firms. Besides, we also find that firms affiliated with a large business group enjoy a lower cost of equity than non-affiliated connected firms. The findings may be helpful for regulators to formulate suitable policies concerning the use of corporate political strategies and to assist unconnected and non-affiliated firms to access finance easily.

Earnings Smoothness, Average Returns, and Implied Cost of Equity Capital

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 315-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
John McInnis
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Implied Cost Of Capital ◽  
Earnings Smoothness

ABSTRACT: Despite a belief among corporate executives that smooth earnings paths lead to a lower cost of equity capital, I find no relation between earnings smoothness and average stock returns over the last 30 years. In other words, owners of firms with volatile earnings are not compensated with higher returns, as one would expect if volatile earnings lead to greater risk exposure. Although prior empirical work links smoother earnings to a lower implied cost of capital, I offer evidence that this link is driven primarily by optimism in analysts' long-term earnings forecasts. This optimism yields target prices and implied cost of capital estimates that are systematically too high for firms with volatile earnings. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the notion that attempts to smooth earnings can lead to a lower cost of equity capital.

scholarly journals Equity-Based Compensation For Outside Directors And Cost Of Equity Capital

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Induck Hwang ◽  
Hyungtae Kim ◽  
Sangshin Pae
Keyword(s):  
Lower Cost ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Implied Cost Of Equity

<p>This study provides evidence on the association between equity-based compensation for outside directors and the implied cost of equity capital. Based on the premise that equity-based compensation for outside directors better aligns the interests of the directors with those of shareholders, we investigate whether the more equity-based compensation is granted to outside directors, the lower cost of equity capital firms enjoy. We find a negative relationship between the proportion of equity-based compensation to total compensation for outside directors and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that equity-based compensation for outside directors, by motivating the directors to play their monitoring role more faithfully, reduces agency risks resulting in the lower cost of equity capital.</p>

Business Strategy and the Cost of Equity Capital: An Evaluation of Pure versus Hybrid Business Strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Khedmati ◽  
Edwin KiaYang Lim ◽  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Farshid Navissi
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Business Strategy ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Business Strategies ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Cost Leadership ◽  
Pure Product ◽  
The Cost

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of pure (product differentiation or cost leadership) versus hybrid (a mix of product differentiation and cost leadership) business strategies on the cost of equity capital. Our results suggest that firms with a pure, relative to a hybrid, business strategy have a significantly lower cost of equity, and the cost of equity effect is equally driven by pure product differentiation and pure cost leadership strategies. We also find that firms following a pure business strategy are associated with lower systematic risk. Further, the lower cost of equity effect of a pure product differentiation strategy is more pronounced in high-technology industries and in regions with greater innovative capital. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness checks including change specification regressions and various methods for addressing endogeneity. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Are Banks Special?

2018 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 1840004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Crouhy ◽  
Dan Galai
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Capital Structure

This paper addresses the following question: Are banks special firms that can achieve their goals only with high leverage, above and beyond what is considered acceptable for industrial corporations? This question is related to the issue of the cost of capital and how it is affected by leverage. If we accept the Modigliani–Miller (M&M) theorem (1958), then the capital structure is irrelevant for both the cost of capital and the value of the bank. Specifically, the M&M hypothesis argues that higher levels of equity capital reduce bank leverage and risk, leading to an offsetting decline in banks’ cost of equity capital. Hence, we ask the question whether banks are special firms such that M&M theorem does not apply to banks. We show that M&M propositions cannot be applied for banks primarily because of explicit guarantees and subsidies that provide incentives for increasing leverage. Then, some of the risk faced by the bank is transferred at no cost to the providers of these guarantees and subsidies, giving banks the incentive to increase leverage as much as they can. We show that under perfect market conditions, when risk is fairly priced, this opportunity vanishes.

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