Relative Performance Versus Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market
2019 ◽
Vol 19
(1)
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pp. 16-27
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Keyword(s):
This article, considering relative performance vs. market share delegation in a vertically related market, shows how the order of firms’ move and the type of delegation contract would affect the input-pricing decision of the upstream monopolist and examines which delegation contract is a dominant strategy for downstream firms. The major finding is that having considered input-price commitment and delegation decision together, input price–delegation–quantity competition order coupled with relative performance delegation is the dominant strategy for downstream rivals in a vertically related market. JEL: D21, D43, L13, L21
2017 ◽
Vol 27
(5)
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pp. 905-931
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2015 ◽
Vol 2015
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pp. 1-13
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2012 ◽
Vol 34
(1)
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pp. 40-43
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2007 ◽
Vol 9
(1)
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pp. 49-56
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Keyword(s):
2014 ◽
Vol 69
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pp. 253-270
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Keyword(s):