What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?

Author(s):  
Jumpei Hamamura
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Michael J. Petersen ◽  
Janet A. Samuels

ABSTRACT In a setting involving a firm using multiple performance measures, we experimentally examine the effect of an evaluator's perspective on the relative performance evaluations of two managers. The performance outcomes of the two managers are linearly equivalent, but one manager's performance includes an equivalent number of above target and below target outcomes (e.g., the mixed manager), while the other manager's performance only includes above target outcomes (e.g., the positive manager). In this setting, we provide new evidence on the negativity bias and whether the bias is moderated based on evaluators' role and the importance of the measures with negative outcomes. Participants are assigned to the role of the supervisor, the mixed manager, or the positive manager and asked to evaluate each manager's performance. We predict and find that participants in all three roles exhibit the negativity bias. In addition, we predict that the strength of the negativity bias exhibited by mixed or positive managers relative to the supervisor's negativity bias depends on whether the measures with negative outcomes are more or less important. As expected, we find that when negative outcomes involve less important measures, the relative performance evaluations of mixed (positive) managers are similar to (differ from) those of supervisors. In contrast, when negative outcomes involve more important measures, the relative performance evaluations of positive (mixed) managers are similar to (differ from) supervisors. Understanding whether and when managers' relative performance evaluations differ from their supervisors is important, in part, because conflicts and potentially dysfunctional behavior are likely to arise when their relative performance evaluations differ.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard F. S. Wang

This article, considering relative performance vs. market share delegation in a vertically related market, shows how the order of firms’ move and the type of delegation contract would affect the input-pricing decision of the upstream monopolist and examines which delegation contract is a dominant strategy for downstream firms. The major finding is that having considered input-price commitment and delegation decision together, input price–delegation–quantity competition order coupled with relative performance delegation is the dominant strategy for downstream rivals in a vertically related market. JEL: D21, D43, L13, L21


1997 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 900-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilyn E. Demorest ◽  
Lynne E. Bernstein

Ninety-six participants with normal hearing and 63 with severe-to-profound hearing impairment viewed 100 CID Sentences (Davis & Silverman, 1970) and 100 B-E Sentences (Bernstein & Eberhardt, 1986b). Objective measures included words correct, phonemes correct, and visual-phonetic distance between the stimulus and response. Subjective ratings were made on a 7-point confidence scale. Magnitude of validity coefficients ranged from .34 to .76 across materials, measures, and groups. Participants with hearing impairment had higher levels of objective performance, higher subjective ratings, and higher validity coefficients, although there were large individual differences. Regression analyses revealed that subjective ratings are predictable from stimulus length, response length, and objective performance. The ability of speechreaders to make valid performance evaluations was interpreted in terms of contemporary word recognition models.


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