The Weiss judgment: The Court’s further clarification of the ECB’s legal framework: Case C-493/17 Weiss and others, EU:C:2018:1000

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-465
Author(s):  
Annelieke AM Mooij
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Short Summary ◽  
European Court ◽  
Grand Chamber

In December 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Weiss case. This case is the most recent development in the Euro crisis case law. The financial crisis has shown the difficulty in determining the precise limits to the mandate of the European Central Bank. The Gauweiler case provided a legal framework but also left unanswered questions. This contribution will first provide the background to the Euro crisis and the context of the case then continue by giving a short summary and analyses of the Opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court. Finally, a reflection will be given on what lessons can be taken from the Weiss case. As the Weiss case appears to be last in Euro crisis case law, this reflection will include an overall analysis of the current interpretation of the mandate of the European Central Bank post-Euro crisis.

Karlsruhe Makes a Referral

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Di Fabio
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
First Time

On 7 February 2014 in the OMT Case, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe referred a question about the interpretation of Treaty law to the European Court of Justice for the first time. The question was whether the European Central Bank exceeded its mandate when it declared, in September 2012, that it was prepared to make emergency, unlimited purchases of specific states' bonds. Some view the referral as a genuflection acknowledging the judicial superiority of European Union jurisprudence. Has the Karlsruhe Court relinquished its role as “the final arbiter” and thereby surreptitiously bid farewell to the German sovereignty that the same Senate of the Constitutional Court so vigorously endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009?

scholarly journals Economic Constitutionalism in the EU and Germany – The German Constitutional Court, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank between Law and Politics

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 761-795
Author(s):  
Jürgen Bröhmer
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The relationship between the European Union (EU) and its member states has recently been the subject of several legal proceedings in the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) and the European Court of Justice. The backdrop to the underlying controversies were policies instituted by the European Central Bank (ECB) dealing with the economic and monetary situation in various member states in the context of the sovereign debt crises to influence interest rates, combat deflationary tendencies and keep inflation under but close to the ECB’s 2% inflation target. Especially so-called outright monetary transactions (OMTs) and the corresponding OMT-program and a particular high volume public sector asset purchasing program (PSPP) announced by the ECB have been controversially discussed. Legally, the controversies are about the prohibition for the ECB to finance debt held by the EU or member states (Article 123 TFEU) and about the delineation of economic policy (Article 119 et seq. TFEU), which lies in the hands of the members states, and monetary policy (Article 127 et seq. TFEU), which is exclusively in the hands of the ECB. The GFCC in its decisions propagated a restrictive approach emphasizing the role of the member states and pointing to the doctrines developed by it around ultra vires acts and so-called identity review. This paper attempts to shed some light on this controversy and argues that beyond the legal controversy lies a deeper problem of the relationship between judicial and political decision-making that the GFCC should exercise restraint in exercising its functions and remember its own doctrine of “open constitutional norms” developed in a different context but applicable here as well.

2. The Union institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Committee Of The Regions

This chapter focuses on the institutions responsible for executing the different tasks of the European Union (EU). The main seven institutions are complemented by two advisory bodies, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which are responsible for gathering inputs for use in decision-making. The initial institutions of the Commission, Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice were expanded to five to include the European Council, Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank in 2009 with the entry into force of the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties. This chapter also describes the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, including the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice (CoJ).

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