Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household

1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Johnston
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Economics ◽  
The Public ◽  
Utility Interdependence

Collective Bargaining and the Public Interest: A Welfare Economics Assessment.

ILR Review ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 762
Author(s):  
Morris M. Kleiner ◽  
David M. Winch
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Retrospectives: James Buchanan: Clubs and Alternative Welfare Economics

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-256
Author(s):  
Alain Marciano
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Economics ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Individual Utility ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
The Public ◽  
Goods And Services

James Buchanan wrote “An Economic Theory of Clubs” and invented clubs to support a form of welfare economics in which there is no social welfare function (SWF) and individual utility functions cannot be “read” by external observers. Clubs were a means to allow the implementation of individualized prices for public goods and services and to allow each individual to pay exactly the amount he wants to pay. He developed this project to answer and counter Paul Samuelson's analysis of public goods, in which social welfare functions play a crucial role. Buchanan and Samuelson disagreed over the allocation of the costs of the public good to each individual. To Buchanan, it was by relying on individual's preferences. To Samuelson, by using a SWF. Buchanan's clubs are thus foreign and incompatible with the traditional Samuelson-style public economics in which they are used.

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