Assessment of risks for the gas industry in Russia in the context of the formation of a common gas market of the Eurasian Economic Union

The research aimed to identifies the risks for the development of the gas industry in Russia in the context of the emerging common gas market of the EAEU. The state of the gas industry in Russia and Russias cooperation with the EAEU member states in the gas sector are considered. The development of the Russian gas industry is determined both by the dominant position of the vertically integrated natural monopoly PJSC Gazprom, and by the characteristics of the global hydrocarbon energy market. Based on empirical data, it is concluded that the creation of a common gas market in the EAEU is not only a challenge to the development of the Russian gas industry, but also a measure to strengthen and expand its positions in the global energy market, increase the efficiency of participation in the global energy agenda, as well as an incentive for improving the domestic gas market in Russia.

The Effect of Technological Change and Regulation on the Evolution of the New Zealand Telecommunications Market

<p><b>The absence of industry specific regulation of access to the incumbent'stelecommunications network in New Zealand for an extended period, between1989 and 2001, is unique compared with other countries with developedtelecommunications markets that were opened to competitive entry. This featureof the New Zealand market provides an opportunity to compare the conduct andperformance of antitrust regulation with industry specific regulation introducedin 2001.</b></p> <p>Of particular interest is the place of the concepts of natural monopoly andperfect competition in the regulation of a dynamic market. This thesisestablishes the characteristics that contribute to dynamic supply and demandconditions in the telecommunications market including network effects,discontinuity in demand due to participation, ongoing technological progress ofhardware, sunk costs of software development, and the irreversible investmentof augmenting capacity to meet expected growth in demand. The economicliterature on conjectural variations indicates that under such conditions theconcepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition do not explaincompetitive conduct due to an unstable market equilibrium. The implication isthat forming a reasonable view of competitive conduct is limited to the presentperiod of time.</p> <p>It is shown that decisions made under antitrust regulation are limited to theparticular context of disputed competitive conduct, and these decisions do notspeculate on future competitive conduct. In contrast, industry specific regulationhas formed a sequence of views of competitive conduct, looking forward, that isbased on concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition. It is observedthat with time, these views of competitive conduct have evolved with thechanging market conditions. If regulatory actions evolve with a changing view ofcompetitive conduct they risk reducing dynamic efficiency.</p>

The Effect of Technological Change and Regulation on the Evolution of the New Zealand Telecommunications Market

<p><b>The absence of industry specific regulation of access to the incumbent'stelecommunications network in New Zealand for an extended period, between1989 and 2001, is unique compared with other countries with developedtelecommunications markets that were opened to competitive entry. This featureof the New Zealand market provides an opportunity to compare the conduct andperformance of antitrust regulation with industry specific regulation introducedin 2001.</b></p> <p>Of particular interest is the place of the concepts of natural monopoly andperfect competition in the regulation of a dynamic market. This thesisestablishes the characteristics that contribute to dynamic supply and demandconditions in the telecommunications market including network effects,discontinuity in demand due to participation, ongoing technological progress ofhardware, sunk costs of software development, and the irreversible investmentof augmenting capacity to meet expected growth in demand. The economicliterature on conjectural variations indicates that under such conditions theconcepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition do not explaincompetitive conduct due to an unstable market equilibrium. The implication isthat forming a reasonable view of competitive conduct is limited to the presentperiod of time.</p> <p>It is shown that decisions made under antitrust regulation are limited to theparticular context of disputed competitive conduct, and these decisions do notspeculate on future competitive conduct. In contrast, industry specific regulationhas formed a sequence of views of competitive conduct, looking forward, that isbased on concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition. It is observedthat with time, these views of competitive conduct have evolved with thechanging market conditions. If regulatory actions evolve with a changing view ofcompetitive conduct they risk reducing dynamic efficiency.</p>

Procedural Issues of State Regulation of Prices (Tariffs) at the Level of the Subjects of the Russian Federation

The topic of modernization of the system of state regulation of prices (tariffs) for services of natural monopoly entities in the Russian Federation has been at the peak of relevance in recent years. Effective tariff regulation is largely hindered by the imperfect procedure for setting regulated prices (tariffs), and the lack of requirements for proper motivation of decisions in this area. This article attempts to highlight these problems and suggest ways to solve them.

Consumer Satisfaction Monitoring of Natural Monopoly Services in the Leningrad Region

The paper is demonstrates the results of consumer satisfaction monitoring with the services of natural monopolies in the Leningrad Region. The article reveals some reasons for the dissatisfaction of respondents. The authors identify the problems in natural monopolies and partners relations and propose ways to solve them.

Dealing with natural monopolies

This chapter looks at the nature of utility regulation as it has been conducted in Australia since the 1990s and the manner of the issues that have arisen in its conduct. It looks at the nature of the natural monopoly elements that exist in the utilities sector and the changing perceptions on where these elements lie. Over time the perception has arisen that only parts of the utilities have natural monopoly characteristics, and it is only these that need to be the subject of economic regulation. The role of the regulators and the various approaches to regulation are also examined (including the light-handed approach, rate of return, CPI-X, and efficient cost of service).