Aggregation of Consumer Ratings of Online Products: Applying Social Choice Theory to Investigate the Cordorcet Efficiency of Mean Rule

Author(s):  
Xianjun Sam Zheng

Mean rule has been popularly used to aggregate consumer ratings of online products. This study applied social choice theory to evaluate the Condorcet efficiency of the mean rule, and to investigate the effect of sample size (number of voters) on the agreement or disagreement between the mean and majority rules. The American National Election Survey data (1968) were used, where three candidates competed for the presidency, and the numerical thermometer scores were provided for each candidate. Random sampling data with varied sample sizes were drew from the survey, and then were aggregated according to the majority rule, the mean rule, and other social choice rules. The results show that the sample winner of the mean rule agrees with the sample majority winner very well; as sample size increases, the sample mean rule even converges faster to the correct population majority winner and ordering than does the sample majority rule. The implications for using aggregation rules for online product rating were also discussed.

Author(s):  
Arianna Novaro ◽  
Umberto Grandi ◽  
Dominique Longin ◽  
Emiliano Lorini

We study agents expressing propositional goals over a set of binary issues to reach a collective decision. We adapt properties and rules from the literature on Social Choice Theory to our setting, providing an axiomatic characterisation of a majority rule for goal-based voting. We study the computational complexity of finding the outcome of our rules (i.e., winner determination), showing that it ranges from Nondeterministic Polynomial Time (NP) to Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PP).


Author(s):  
Iain McLean

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.


Author(s):  
Jan Sauermann

Abstract Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an empirical perspective, large and arbitrary policy shifts are rare events in politics. The uncovered set (UCS) is the dominant preference-based explanation for the apparent empirical predictability of majority rule in multiple dimensions. Its underlying logic assumes that voters act strategically, considering the ultimate consequences of their actions. I argue that all empirical applications of the UCS rest on an incomplete behavioral model assuming purely egoistically motivated individuals. Beyond material self-interest, prosocial motivations offer an additional factor to explain the outcomes of majority rule. I test my claim in a series of committee decision-making experiments in which I systematically vary the fairness properties of the policy space while keeping the location of the UCS constant. The experimental results overwhelmingly support the prosociality explanation.


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