scholarly journals Goal-Based Collective Decisions: Axiomatics and Computational Complexity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arianna Novaro ◽  
Umberto Grandi ◽  
Dominique Longin ◽  
Emiliano Lorini
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Probabilistic Polynomial Time

We study agents expressing propositional goals over a set of binary issues to reach a collective decision. We adapt properties and rules from the literature on Social Choice Theory to our setting, providing an axiomatic characterisation of a majority rule for goal-based voting. We study the computational complexity of finding the outcome of our rules (i.e., winner determination), showing that it ranges from Nondeterministic Polynomial Time (NP) to Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PP).

Aggregation of Consumer Ratings of Online Products: Applying Social Choice Theory to Investigate the Cordorcet Efficiency of Mean Rule

2007 ◽  
Vol 51 (13) ◽  
pp. 837-840
Author(s):  
Xianjun Sam Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Sample Size ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Sample Mean ◽  
Condorcet Efficiency ◽  
Size Number ◽  
Consumer Ratings ◽  
The Mean

Mean rule has been popularly used to aggregate consumer ratings of online products. This study applied social choice theory to evaluate the Condorcet efficiency of the mean rule, and to investigate the effect of sample size (number of voters) on the agreement or disagreement between the mean and majority rules. The American National Election Survey data (1968) were used, where three candidates competed for the presidency, and the numerical thermometer scores were provided for each candidate. Random sampling data with varied sample sizes were drew from the survey, and then were aggregated according to the majority rule, the mean rule, and other social choice rules. The results show that the sample winner of the mean rule agrees with the sample majority winner very well; as sample size increases, the sample mean rule even converges faster to the correct population majority winner and ordering than does the sample majority rule. The implications for using aggregation rules for online product rating were also discussed.

scholarly journals Combining Social Choice Theory and Argumentation: Enabling Collective Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-173
Author(s):  
Jordi Ganzer-Ripoll ◽  
Natalia Criado ◽  
Maite Lopez-Sanchez ◽  
Simon Parsons ◽  
Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making

Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice

2018 ◽  
pp. 462-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Escape Route ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Opinion Change ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Shed Light

In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue between the two literatures. This paper discusses the connections between them. Important insights are that (i) deliberation can complement aggregation and open up an escape route from some of its negative results; and (ii) the formal models of social choice theory can shed light on some aspects of deliberation, such as the nature of deliberation-induced opinion change.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

scholarly journals Prosociality in Majority Decisions: A Laboratory Experiment on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jan Sauermann
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Uncovered Set ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Empirical Perspective ◽  
Committee Decision Making ◽  
Policy Shifts

Abstract Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an empirical perspective, large and arbitrary policy shifts are rare events in politics. The uncovered set (UCS) is the dominant preference-based explanation for the apparent empirical predictability of majority rule in multiple dimensions. Its underlying logic assumes that voters act strategically, considering the ultimate consequences of their actions. I argue that all empirical applications of the UCS rest on an incomplete behavioral model assuming purely egoistically motivated individuals. Beyond material self-interest, prosocial motivations offer an additional factor to explain the outcomes of majority rule. I test my claim in a series of committee decision-making experiments in which I systematically vary the fairness properties of the policy space while keeping the location of the UCS constant. The experimental results overwhelmingly support the prosociality explanation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document