Common cause failure model updating for risk monitoring in nuclear power plants based on alpha factor model

Author(s):  
Min Zhang ◽  
Zhijian Zhang ◽  
Ali Mosleh ◽  
Sijuan Chen

Common cause failure model updating (both qualitatively and quantitatively) is a key factor in risk monitoring for nuclear power plants when configuration changes (e.g. components become unavailable) occur among a redundant configuration. This research focuses on the common cause failure updating based on the alpha factor model method, which is commonly used in the living probabilistic safety assessment models for nuclear power plant risk monitoring. This article first discusses the common cause failure model updating in an ideal condition, which evaluates the common cause failure model parameters for the configurationally changed system in different ways, based on the causes of the detected failures. Then, two alternative updating processes are proposed considering the difficulty to identify failure causes immediately during plant operation: one is to update the common cause failure models with the assumption that the failures detected are independent failures and the other is to update the common cause failure models with the parameters as expectations of the values for all possible failure causes. Finally, a case study is given to illustrate the common cause failure updating process and to compare these two alternative processes. The results show that (1) common cause failures can be reevaluated automatically by the methods proposed in this article and (2) the second process is more conservative and reasonable but with more data requirements compared with the first approach. Considering limitations in accessibility of the data, the first strategy is suggested currently. More future work on data acquisition is demanded for better assessment of common cause failures during nuclear power plant risk monitoring.

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-129
Author(s):  
Hassina Metatla ◽  
Mounira Rouainia

The reliability of the safety-instrumented system (SIS) has received a lot of attention during the past decade, with the emergence of the new standards such as International Electrotechnical Commission IEC61508, and IEC61511, that provides a general framework for the design and implementation of these safety barriers. Among the problems influencing on the global SIS reliability: Common Cause Failure (CCF), which contributes too many accidents, that has a negative impacts, so it must be considered in the risk and reliability assessment for these systems. The aim of this work is to focus on the effects of common cause failures (CCFs) on the reliability of a SIS, by implementing a comparative SIS dependability study with and without consideration the CCFs, using the beta factor model, and the fault tree analysis (FTA) method.


Author(s):  
Bruce Geddes ◽  
Ray Torok

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is conducting research in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) regarding Operating Experience of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in US nuclear power plants. The primary objective of this work is to extract insights from US nuclear power plant Operating Experience (OE) reports that can be applied to improve Diversity and Defense in Depth (D3) evaluations and methods for protecting nuclear plants against I&C related Common Cause Failures (CCF) that could disable safety functions and thereby degrade plant safety. Between 1987 and 2007, over 500 OE events involving digital equipment in US nuclear power plants were reported through various channels. OE reports for 324 of these events were found in databases maintained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). A database was prepared for capturing the characteristics of each of the 324 events in terms of when, where, how, and why the event occurred, what steps were taken to correct the deficiency that caused the event, and what defensive measures could have been employed to prevent recurrence of these events. The database also captures the plant system type, its safety classification, and whether or not the event involved a common cause failure. This work has revealed the following results and insights: - 82 of the 324 “digital” events did not actually involve a digital failure. Of these 82 non-digital events, 34 might have been prevented by making full use of digital system fault tolerance features. - 242 of the 324 events did involve failures in digital systems. The leading contributors to the 242 digital failures were hardware failure modes. Software change appears as a corrective action twice as often as it appears as an event root cause. This suggests that software features are being added to avoid recurrence of hardware failures, and that adequately designed software is a strong defensive measure against hardware failure modes, preventing them from propagating into system failures and ultimately plant events. 54 of the 242 digital failures involved a Common Cause Failure (CCF). - 13 of the 54 CCF events affected safety (1E) systems, and only 2 of those were due to Inadequate Software Design. This finding suggests that software related CCFs on 1E systems are no more prevalent than other CCF mechanisms for which adherence to various regulations and standards is considered to provide adequate protection against CCF. This research provides an extensive data set that is being used to investigate many different questions related to failure modes, causes, corrective actions, and other event attributes that can be compared and contrasted to reveal useful insights. Specific considerations in this study included comparison of 1E vs. non-1E systems, active vs. potential CCFs, and possible defensive measures to prevent these events. This paper documents the dominant attributes of the evaluated events and the associated insights that can be used to improve methods for protecting against digital I&C related CCFs, applying a test of reasonable assurance.


Author(s):  
Chen Shijun ◽  
Zhang Sifan ◽  
Chen Peifeng ◽  
Zhang Kuan

The method of the event trend analysis is a so-called analyzed process that will begin with a statistics on a certain characteristic for a set of events over a period of time, and then identify and analyze its variation trend and the reason for its existence so as to develop the corresponding corrective actions. this paper combined with both the traditional event trend analysis and probabilistic safety analysis methods, develops a set of risk-informed trend analysis techniques applicable to the domestic NPPs. This method aims to highlight the significance of the events by placing larger weight on the abnormal incidents of high risk significance, and use the strategy of level management to control the common cause events so that the plant will keep a watchful eye on and give priority to eliminate these events. In addition, this paper also provides an application case to illustrate the practical use of this method. It is shown that some plants have already obtained several benefits through adopting this method into their event analysis programs. In reality, it will benefit the application of this method into subsequent NPPs event trend analysis process and provide reference and assistance for the safety operation of the nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Eishiro Higo ◽  
Shota Soga ◽  
Hiromichi Miura

Abstract This study provides an inter-unit common cause failure (CCF) analysis method utilizing the international CCF database. The inter-unit CCF is one of the possible major risks at a site with multiple units. The conventional CCF analysis is based on the CCF database, in which inter-unit CCF events rarely occur in real nuclear power plants. The conventional approach cannot be directly applied to inter-unit CCF cases because of the lack of data. The method ignores the asymmetricity among units, so it may lead to overly conservative outcomes if it is applied to inter-unit CCF. We have proposed a new concept, “commonality factor,” which represents the degree of similarity among components in different units and showed a concept that the inter-unit CCF probability can be expressed in terms of the intra-unit CCF probability with the commonality factor. The commonality factor is approximated based on CCF coupling factors, which tie two or more failures together as a CCF. This study explains how to estimate the commonality factor by analyzing the conventional CCF database and judging commonality among components from different units. The proposed method is demonstrated through two preliminary examples.


Author(s):  
Geng Feng

The importance of reliability to complex systems cannot be disputed as they are the backbones of our society. In practice, the common cause failures may have severe reverse function on complex systems’ overall stability. Survival Signature opens a new way to perform reliability analysis on systems with multiple component types. This paper under takes a research on survival signature-based reliability analysis on complex systems susceptible to Common Cause Failures. To be specific, it proposes the standard [Formula: see text]-factor model and general [Formula: see text]-factor model to combine with the survival signature. In practical applications, the [Formula: see text]-factor estimator of the system might not be defined completely due to limited data, or knowledge which requires to take imprecision into account. Some numerical cases are presented to show the applicability of the methods for complex systems. In addition, this paper may attract people’s attention on the conception of Design for Reliability.


Author(s):  
ZHIJIE PAN ◽  
YASUO NONAKA

This paper presents a new concept, complex common cause failure, for common cause failure analysis. A common stress model is developed, in which the common cause events are described as common stresses that will affect directly and simultaneously on the internal aging process of each system component and further change their failure probabilities, while the internal aging processes of components are still considered mutually independent. The common stress model can be used to estimate the reliability of systems with complex common cause failures.


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