scholarly journals Subsidiarity in the EU: Reflections on a centre–right agenda

European View ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-15
Author(s):  
Federico Ottavio Reho
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
White Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Federal Policies ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Eu

This article re-examines the problem of EU subsidiarity in the light of the political economy of federalism and centre–right thinking. It argues that if Christian Democratic, conservative and liberal parties are serious about strengthening subsidiarity, they should urge the EU to take steps in the direction of scenario four of the European Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe. Misleadingly titled ‘Doing less more efficiently’, this scenario is in fact about ‘delivering more and faster in selected policy areas, while doing less elsewhere’, as the subtitle correctly states. A new compact combining the targeted strengthening of key federal policies at the EU level with the EU’s gradual disengagement from other policy areas seems the most promising way to take the Union out of the doldrums and strike a compromise between Eurosceptics and Europhiles.

Crisis? What Crisis? EU Enlargement and the Political Economy of European Union Social Policy

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Sykes
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
Eu Enlargement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Strategies ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Eu

This article considers the character of EU social policy and in particular the linkages between the EU's economic and social strategies. Arguably, the most recent enlargement of the EU represents a turning point for the future of EU social policy, though there is disagreement about its future if not so much about the causes of this crisis. The article concludes that the future political economy of EU social policy and indeed of the EU itself may be subject to fundamental changes.

ESMA as a Residual Lawmaker: The Political Economy and Constitutionality of ESMA’s Product Intervention Measures on Complex Financial Products

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regulatory Arbitrage ◽  
Financial Products ◽  
Intervention Measures ◽  
Binary Options ◽  
The One ◽  
National Competent Authorities ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis article proposes that product intervention constitutes a form of residual lawmaking by ESMA that allows it to tackle aspects of investor protection not addressed by EU incomplete financial laws. Whilst product intervention may bring about certain advantages and may contribute to mitigating regulatory arbitrage problems, it constitutes a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism that raises important questions concerning: (a) ESMA’s rationale and motivations for its use; (b) its compliance with the EU constitutional framework; and (c) its adequacy for the regulation of complex financial products. This article addresses these questions through an analysis of the rationale and consequences of ESMA’s product intervention measures on binary options and contracts for differences of May 2018–July 2019, and of recent reforms of ESMA’s powers. It offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes to the literature on administrative discretion and agencies’ rulemaking through an analysis of the political economy of ESMA’s deployment of product intervention powers and, also, of what this reveals about the relationships between ESMA and the EU Institutions, on the one side, and ESMA and National Competent Authorities, on the other. Second, it contributes to the literature on the constitutionality of EU agencies through an examination of the compliance of ESMA’s product intervention measures with EU constitutional law and requirements. Third, it examines whether product intervention constitutes an adequate mechanism to address problems pertaining to investor protection in complex financial products markets and, in doing so, it contributes to the scholarly discussion on complex financial products’ regulation.

scholarly journals The political economy of agri-environmental measures: An empirical assessment at the eu regional level

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 71-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danilo Bertoni ◽  
Alessandro Olper
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Environmental Measures ◽  
The Eu

The paper deals with the political and economic determinants of EU agri-environmental measures (AEMs) applied by 59 regional/country units, during the 2001-2004 period. Five different groups of determinants, spanning from positive and negative externalities, to political institutions, are highlighted and tested using an econometric model. Main results show that AEMs implementation is mostly affected by the strength of the farm lobby, and the demand for positive externalities. At the same time it emerges a prominent role played by political institutions. On the contrary, AEMs do not seem implemented by the willingness to address negative externalities.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Brexit: Why Making It Easier to Leave the Club Could Improve the EU

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 214-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Bongardt ◽  
Francisco Torres
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

2017 ◽  
Vol 239 ◽  
pp. R3-R13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

Many Happy Returns? Investment Governance and the Political Economy of Time in UK Pensions Provision

2021 ◽  
pp. 209-246
Author(s):  
Craig Berry
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
The Political ◽  
Private Pensions ◽  
Pension Schemes ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Uk

We are increasingly conscious that private pension schemes in the UK are primarily financial institutions. UK private pensions provision has always been highly financialized, but the individualization of provision means this dynamic matters more than ever to retirement incomes. Furthermore, individualization has occurred at a time when the UK economy’s capacity to support a long-term approach to capital investment, upon which pensions depend, has declined. The chapter argues that pensions provision essentially involves managing the failure of the future to resemble the present, or more specifically present forecasts of the future. As our ability to manipulate the value of the future has increased, our ability to tolerate forecast failure has declined. The chapter details how pension funds invest, and how this has changed, and provides an original understanding of several recent attempts to shape pensions investment, ultimately demonstrating the limitations of pensions policy in shaping how provision functions in practice.

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