European arrest warrants and the independence of the issuing judicial authority – How much independence is required? (Case note on joined cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU OG and PI)

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-398
Author(s):  
Chad Heimrich

This case note examines the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s decision in OG (C-508/18) and PI (C-82/19 PPU) concerning the interpretation of the notion of ‘issuing judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. It assesses whether the German Public Prosecutor’s Office can be considered to be sufficiently independent to issue European Arrest Warrants. In this context, the CJEU’s previous case law on Article 6(1) will be taken into consideration and briefly outlined. The case note, then, summarises the Opinion of the Advocate General and the Court’s line of reasoning and closes with a commentary on the decision.

2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Tanja Niedernhuber

The competence for issuing a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is a hot topic at the moment. It has been the subject of four rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) alone in 2019. These are preceded by three more rulings on the same subject from 2016. All of these judgments addressed the same core question: was the issuing authority a “judicial authority” and independent enough to issue an EAW pursuant to Art. 6 (1) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (FD-EAW)? If the answer to that question is “no”, the EAW issued by the incompetent authority is not valid. This article analyses the concept of “judicial authority” in the context of the FD-EAW and the legislative change currently discussed in Germany in the light of the requirements established by the CJEU.


2014 ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Helena Patricio

A key factor in the creation of a European area of freedom, security and justice is the principle of mutual recognition, which the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, for the first time, comprehensively implemented in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Court of Justice of the European Union has greatly contributed to the understanding of the Framework Decision, accentuating its goals and enhancing its guiding principles, which are the mutual recognition of judgments in the different Member States of the European Union and mutual trust that should settle among them, for the creation of the said area. The West judgment of 28 June 2012, C-192/12 PPU, on urgent preliminary ruling procedure, aptly illustrates the impact of this case law, highlighting the role of this procedure, implemented on 1 March 2008.


Teisė ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 8-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virgilijus Valančius

The article briefly overviews some features of Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Union as well as the influence of their opinions on the case law of the Court. The research is based on the doctrine as well as on the case law. The latter spotlights inter alia the links between the opinions of Advocates General and the judgments of the Court both when propositions of Advocates General are followed and when they are not.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-450
Author(s):  
Vadim Mantrov

Cases C-517/14 P and C-519/P, Schutzgemeinschaft Milch und Milcherzeugnisse e.V. v European Commission, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nederlandse Zuivelorganisatie, unreported 24 October 2014 (Seventh Chamber).In the two related cases commented on, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dealt with assessment of locus standi in the case of an applicant who disputed the validity of registration of two indications of geographical origin (IGOs), namely Edam Holland and Gouda Holland, being compound designations and containing a famous generic word designation (name), i.e. Edam and Gouda respectively. The importance of both cases relates, on the one hand, to the fact that registration of these IGOs was challenged on the basis of the generic names Edam and Gouda which are extensively used in practice, occupying a considerable market share. On the other, both cases could be a signal whether the CJEU re–affirms its restrictive approach to assessment of locus standi under Article 263 (4) TFEU. Although the CJEU re–affirmed its longstanding case law on restrictive assessment of locus standi also concerning registration of a compound geographical designation on the basis of a generic name, yet, as is argued in this case note, this approach did not take into account the specifics of registering IGOs (author's summary).


Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

The EU’s accession to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) implies an important role for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Given that the Court has the task of interpreting the CRPD as an instrument of EU law and, in particular, ensuring that EU secondary legislation is interpreted in a manner which is compatible with the Convention wherever possible, it is not surprising to find references to the CRPD in a number of judgments and Opinions of its Advocate General rendered both before, and primarily after, the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU. This chapter explores those judgments and Opinions in some depth, looking at the status of international agreements concluded by the EU; how the CRPD has been incorporated into EU law; and discussing case law that has referred to the CRPD, and analysing the extent to and way in which the CJEU has interpreted the CRPD.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 509-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens

AbstractThis chapter examines the influence of the Advocates General in promoting trust in the work of the Court of Justice of the European Union. While it accepts that it may be difficult to quantify this influence—given the non-binding nature of the Opinions—it argues that the work of the Advocates General has an impact in securing confidence in the Court. This conclusion is supported by an examination of three possible levels of the influence exerted by the Advocates General, which are considered in the chapter in descending order of abstraction. The first and most abstract dimension of this influence is that provided by the institutional characteristics of the office of Advocate General and the role associated to it. The second dimension is the general contribution of the Opinions to the development of the case law. Finally, the chapter looks at the contribution of the Advocates General in the specific context of cases involving conflicting rights and interests and particularly in cases where fundamental human rights collide with essential Treaty objectives and freedoms—like the free movement of goods or persons—an area where trust in the work of the Court is crucial to ensure the legitimacy of the Union.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


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