The Cases of Edam Holland and Gouda Holland

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-450
Author(s):  
Vadim Mantrov

Cases C-517/14 P and C-519/P, Schutzgemeinschaft Milch und Milcherzeugnisse e.V. v European Commission, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nederlandse Zuivelorganisatie, unreported 24 October 2014 (Seventh Chamber).In the two related cases commented on, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dealt with assessment of locus standi in the case of an applicant who disputed the validity of registration of two indications of geographical origin (IGOs), namely Edam Holland and Gouda Holland, being compound designations and containing a famous generic word designation (name), i.e. Edam and Gouda respectively. The importance of both cases relates, on the one hand, to the fact that registration of these IGOs was challenged on the basis of the generic names Edam and Gouda which are extensively used in practice, occupying a considerable market share. On the other, both cases could be a signal whether the CJEU re–affirms its restrictive approach to assessment of locus standi under Article 263 (4) TFEU. Although the CJEU re–affirmed its longstanding case law on restrictive assessment of locus standi also concerning registration of a compound geographical designation on the basis of a generic name, yet, as is argued in this case note, this approach did not take into account the specifics of registering IGOs (author's summary).

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.


Author(s):  
Béligh Elbalti

This chapter examines the question whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has exercised an influence on Tunisian judges and the extent of that influence. After explaining the general legal background of Tunisia as a legal system and the attitude of Tunisian judges towards foreign legal sources in general, the chapter explores the available case law of Tunisian courts in order to identify the areas of law where such an influence manifests itself. It shows that, generally speaking, Tunisian judges are quite open to foreign legal sources and frequently cite those sources in their judgments. However, when it comes to the case law of the CJEU, two opposite trends could be identified. On the one hand, the case law of Tunisian ordinary courts shows that the CJEU exercises little influence on Tunisian judges, despite extensive and diversified cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. On the other hand, the case law of the Competition Council shows that the Council is more willing to refer to CJEU decisions in deciding the cases pending before them. The chapter considers several reasons that are likely to explain this double aspect of the influence of the CJEU on Tunisian judges. It argues that the weakness of comparative research, legal education in general, as well as the role played by legal actors in Tunisia are among the main reasons behind the current situation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1187-1220
Author(s):  
Francisco de Abreu Duarte

Abstract This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU’s external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 360-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus KLAMERT

AbstractWhen we talk about harmonisation, we may mean quite different things. There is a close, yet often unclear, relationship between minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition on the one hand, and between full harmonisation and the country of origin principle on the other hand. This paper will discuss harmonisation in relation to these other regulatory models with, among others, the Tobacco Products and Services Directives as illustrations. Moreover, many years after Tobbaco Advertising I and II it remains entirely unclear how minimum harmonisation instruments must be designed in order to be lawful. This paper proposes a consistent reading of the case law on what is called legislative minimum harmonisation based on Article 114 TFEU. It is also shown that the Court of Justice of the European Union applies a lenient standard to more stringent national measures under what is called constitutional minimum harmonisation based on competences for social policy and the environment.


Author(s):  
Allan Rosas

Whilst the other contributions to this book focus on the extent to which the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is taken into account in EU neighbouring countries, notably by the national courts of these countries, this chapter deals with the reverse situation; that is, the extent to which the CJEU pays attention to the case law of both international courts and national courts of third countries. This is done mainly by looking at explicit references to such extraneous sources to be found in CJEU judgments and orders. The main focus is on the case law of the Court of Justice, but some information is also provided concerning the case law of the General Court. In the context of references to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law contained in Court of Justice judgments, some examples are also given of references to CJEU judgments which can be found in the case law of the Human Rights Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 689-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Caeiro ◽  
Sónia Fidalgo ◽  
João Prata Rodrigues

This article analyses the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on detention and the possible evolution of the understanding of mutual recognition stemming therefrom. In the Lanigan, JZ, and Ognyanov decisions, the CJEU assimilated mutual recognition with the effectiveness of cooperation, which should be understood as maximum compliance with the issuing state’s interests. Arguably, this approach is detrimental to other important values, such as, for example, the rights arising from excessively long detention and a rational and meaningful approach to the enforcement of imprisonment. On the other hand, the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment has detached mutual recognition from the exclusive protection of the issuing state and has turned it into a neutral governance principle. If mutual trust is not a given and can be assessed on a case-by-case basis through common objective parameters, the decisions deserving recognition may be uttered either by the issuing or the executing authority.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203195252094533
Author(s):  
Vincent Février

The Concept of worker is the gateway to the access to the protection of labour and social security law. The Court of Justice of the European Union first defined this concept in the field of the Free Movement of Workers in the Lawrie-Blum case. The scope of this article is to compare the definitions used by the Court in the fields of the free movement of workers and in the Social Policy Directives, in order to ascertain to which extent they can differ. Our in-depth analysis of the case law offers a nuanced picture. On one hand, it highlights that the Court tries to extend the application of the Lawrie-Blum formula to Directives which do not refer back to the national definitions of a worker, but that specificities remain in this area, like the emphasis on the link of subordination. On the other hand, for Directives referring to a national concept of workers, the Court began recently to state that, even if the competence of the Member States on this question must be acknowledged, it is not limitless.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85
Author(s):  
Dragoş Călin

Abstract The Constitutional Court of Romania has subjected the introduction of a norm of European Union law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm. On the one hand, the norm should be sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution - the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control - by national law. However, the experience of the Constitutional Court of Romania over the eight years (2007-2014) since the EU accession, does not seem to be very convincing, irrespective of the way in which European Union law, including the case law of the CJUE has been used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. 1661-1686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Vogiatzis

The purpose of this article is to explore the avenues for legal accountability vis-à-vis the European Council after the Treaty of Lisbon. This will be achieved through an assessment of the jurisdictional realms of, on the one hand, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and on the other hand, the European Ombudsman, always in relation to the European Council. Legal accountability may be understood in this respect as the supervision of the observance of the European Union (EU) rule of law. The European Ombudsman is an EU body established by the Treaty of Maastricht; by virtue of Art. 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), he or she has the power to investigate complaints of maladministration “in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role.”


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