The Syntactic Truth Structure on the Language L of Predicate Logic

2022 ◽  
pp. 233-257
Author(s):  
Mircea Reghiş ◽  
Eugene Roventa
Keyword(s):  
2022 ◽  
pp. 205-231
Author(s):  
Mircea Reghiş ◽  
Eugene Roventa
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-20
Author(s):  
Pieter Seuren

Semantic Syntax (SeSyn), originally called Generative Semantics, is an offshoot of Chomskyan generative grammar (ChoGG), rejected by Chomsky and his school in the late 1960s. SeSyn is the theory of algorithmical grammars producing the well-formed sentences of a language L from the corresponding semantic input, the Semantic Analysis (SA), represented as a traditional tree structure diagram in a specific formal language of incremental predicate logic with quantifying and qualifying operators (including the truth functions), and with all lexical items filled in. A SeSyn-type grammar is thus by definition transformational, but not generative. The SA originates in cognition in a manner that is still largely mysterious, but its actual form can be distilled from the Surface Structure (SS) of the sentences of L following the principles set out in SeSyn. In this presentation we provide a more or less technical résumé of the SeSyn theory. A comparison is made with ChoGG-type grammars, which are rejected on account of their intrinsic unsuitability as a cognitive-realist grammar model. The ChoGG model follows the pattern of a 1930s neopositivist Carnap-type grammar for formal logical languages. Such grammars are random sentence generators, whereas, obviously, (nonpathological) humans are not. A ChoGG-type grammar is fundamentally irreconcilable with a mentalist-realist theory of grammar. The body of the paper consists in  a demonstration of the production of an English and a French sentence, the latter containing a classic instance of the cyclic rule of Predicate Raising (PR), essential in the general theory of clausal complementation yet steadfastly repudiated  in ChoGG for reasons that have never been clarified. The processes and categories defined in SeSyn are effortlessly recognised in languages all over the world, whether indigenous or languages of a dominant culture—taking into account language-specific values for the general theoretical parameters involved. This property makes SeSyn particularly relevant for linguistic typology, which now ranks as the most promising branch of linguistics but has so far conspicuously lacked an adequate theoretical basis.


1964 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-191
Author(s):  
Virgil Hinshaw,
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.


1962 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

Anyone who reads Aristotle, knowing something about modern logic and nothing about its history, must ask himself why the syllogistic cannot be translated as it stands into the logic of quantification. It is now more than twenty years since the invention of the requisite framework, the logic of many-sorted quantification.In the familiar first-order predicate logic generality is expressed by means of variables and quantifiers, and each interpretation of the system is based upon the choice of some class over which the variables may range, the only restriction placed on this ‘domain of individuals’ being that it should not be empty.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
HERMAN GEUVERS ◽  
ERIK BARENDSEN

We look at two different ways of interpreting logic in the dependent type system λP. The first is by a direct formulas-as-types interpretation à la Howard where the logical derivation rules are mapped to derivation rules in the type system. The second is by viewing λP as a Logical Framework, following Harper et al. (1987) and Harper et al. (1993). The type system is then used as the meta-language in which various logics can be coded.We give a (brief) overview of known (syntactical) results about λP. Then we discuss two issues in some more detail. The first is the completeness of the formulas-as-types embedding of minimal first-order predicate logic into λP. This is a remarkably complicated issue, a first proof of which appeared in Geuvers (1993), following ideas in Barendsen and Geuvers (1989) and Swaen (1989). The second issue is the minimality of λP as a logical framework. We will show that some of the rules are actually superfluous (even though they contribute nicely to the generality of the presentation of λP).At the same time we will attempt to provide a gentle introduction to λP and its various aspects and we will try to use little inside knowledge.


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